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Abstract 
Muhammad Ibn-Umar Adeka 
CRYPTOGRAPHY AND COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY 
Extending the Human Security Perimeter through a Web of Trust 
Keywords 
Human Factor; Cryptology; Cybersecurity; Communication; Risk; Authentication; 
Security Perimeter; Web of Trust; Secret Sharing; Cloud Data Repository 
This work modifies Shamir’s algorithm by sharing a random key that is used to lock 
up the secret data; as against sharing the data itself. This is significant in cloud 
computing, especially with homomorphic encryption.  Using web design, the resultant 
scheme practically globalises secret sharing with authentications and inherent 
secondary applications. The work aims at improving cybersecurity via a joint 
exploitation of human factors and technology; a human-centred cybersecurity design 
as opposed to technology-centred. The completed functional scheme is tagged 
CDRSAS.  
The literature on secret sharing schemes is reviewed together with the concepts of 
human factors, trust, cyberspace/cryptology and an analysis on a 3-factor security 
assessment process. This is followed by the relevance of passwords within the 
context of human factors. The main research design/implementation and system 
performance are analysed, together with a proposal for a new antidote against 419 
fraudsters. Two twin equations were invented in the investigation process; a pair 
each for secret sharing and a risk-centred security assessment technique. 
The building blocks/software used for the CDRSAS include Shamir’s algorithm, MD5, 
HTML5, PHP, Java, Servlets, JSP, Javascript, MySQL, JQuery, CSS, MATLAB, MS 
Excel, MS Visio, and Photoshop. The codes are developed in Eclipse IDE, and the 
Java-based system runs on Tomcat and Apache, using XAMPP Server. Its code 
units have passed JUnit tests. The system compares favourably with SSSS. 
Defeating socio-cryptanalysis in cyberspace requires strategies that are centred on 
human trust, trust-related human attributes, and technology. The PhD research is 
completed but there is scope for future work.  
  
ii 
 
Acknowledgements 
In the words of Isaac Newton (5 February 1657), if one does not stand on the 
shoulders of giants, one would not achieve greater heights. Since I could not have 
been exempted from this golden rule, let me expend some lines to recognise a few of 
those who made it possible for me to be talking of a PhD Thesis at this stage of my 
earthly struggle.  
From the home base, Nigeria, I am greatly indebted to the former Chief of Army Staff 
(COAS), Nigerian Army (NA), Lieutenant General AB Dambazau (PhD, retired), as 
well as his Director of Military Intelligence (DMI), Major General AT Umaru (retired) 
for their moral, psychological and other supports till date. I would also like to 
acknowledge the roles of the Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF), 
Abuja, Nigeria, for its scholarship, and the NA for releasing me. Specifically, mention 
must be made of the Executive Secretaries, PTDF, Dr Muttaqha Rabe Darma, Dr 
Oluwole Oluleye, Mr Femi Ajayi, Mr Aminu Ahmed Galadima and their staffs at all 
levels from the various departments; especially training, finance, protocol and 
security departments. I must also mention the former Chief of Defence Staff, Air Chief 
Marshal O Petinrin, former COAS, Lieutenant General OA Ihejirika and his Principal 
Staff Officers; especially Major General LP Ngubane (Training and Operations) and 
Major General SY Audu ( former DMI). I am also greatly indebted to the current 
COAS, Lieutenant General TY Buratai, for his interventions at critical moments. 
Here in the UK, I am greatly indebted to Dr M.J. Ngala of Heaton Education, 
Bradford, for his various facilitating efforts at linking me up with the University of 
Bradford, and his continuous effort to make me feel at home in Bradford; ditto to our 
friend, Engr. Bako Wakili, of NCC, Abuja, Nigeria.  
Rightly or wrongly, the success or failure of a research effort could be a reflection of 
the quality of supervision and other facilities; in addition to the personal disposition of 
the research student. It is in this context that I would like to express my profound 
gratitude to my supervisors, Prof. Simon J. Shepherd and Prof. Raed A. Abd-
Alhameed, both of the School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science 
(SoEECS), University of Bradford; for their diligence and understanding. Similarly, I 
am greatly indebted to the Library, ICT, Hub Research and other services of the 
University of Bradford, just as I am to various colleagues and staff of the SoEECS. To 
Dr Kelvin O. Anoh and other fellow research students, especially those in B3.26 
Labs, Chesham Building, I say thank you for your positive colleagueship. 
Finally, my wife, Saudat, and all the children/wards – Ayatullah, Saadiq, Mawaddah, 
Mardiyyah, Raheemah, Muhammad, Ishaq and ‘Uncle’ Dogo; may Allah reward you 
all for your various supports. 
Ultimate gratitude is due to Allah, the Creator of His Creation; the only One that 
makes whatever happens to happen – out of His Wisdom. 
  
iii 
 
 
Dedication 
 
 
 
 
My wife, children, parents, brothers/sisters, teachers, friends and those who perceive 
themselves as enemies; those who made positive contributions to the making of 
Nigeria and the Nigeria Project; those who stand for humanity against the workers of 
iniquity from the Big Bang till Eternity; and ultimately, the Heir of all inheritors. 
  
iv 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract …………………………………………………………………………………..i 
Acknowledgements ……. ………………………………………………………………….ii 
Dedication ………………………………………………………………………………....iii 
List of Figures …………………………………………………………………………..ix 
List of Tables …………………………………………………………………………..xii 
List of Acronyms  ………………………………………………………… ……………..xiii 
 
Chapter 1 ………………………………………………………………………………….1 
Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………….1 
1.1 Study Background ............................................................................................ 2 
1.2 Motivation and Statement of the Research Problem ........................................ 4 
1.3 Aim and Objectives .......................................................................................... 6 
1.4 Scope of the Research ..................................................................................... 6 
1.5 Research Philosophy ....................................................................................... 7 
1.5.1 Pragmatism and Mixed Methods Research Approaches ..................... 10 
1.5.2 Research Methodology ........................................................................ 10 
1.6 Importance and Contributions of the Research .............................................. 12 
1.6.1 Key Contributions ................................................................................. 12 
1.6.2 Contributions Relative to the General Research Work ......................... 14 
1.7 Layout of the Thesis ....................................................................................... 15 
 
Chapter 2 ………………………………………………………………………………..17 
Trusted Secret Sharing within the Framework of Cybersecurity and 
Cryptology……………………………………………………………………………  …...17 
2.1 Requisite Theoretical Background on Secret Sharing Schemes .................... 17 
2.1.1  The Theoretical Basis for the (k, n)-Threshold Schemes .................... 17 
2.1.2 An Overview of Secret Sharing Schemes ............................................ 26 
2.1.3 Cryptographic Key Management .......................................................... 42 
2.1.4 Key Recovery in Cryptography ............................................................. 42 
2.2 A Comparative Analysis of the Various Secret Sharing Methods ................... 48 
2.2.1 Classification of Secret Sharing Schemes ........................................... 49 
2.2.2 The Issues Arising from Active Adversarial Models ............................. 50 
2.2.3 Schemes Designed to Counter the Effects of Active Adversaries ........ 51 
v 
 
2.2.4 Comparative Performance Analyses of Secret Sharing Schemes ....... 53 
2.3 Extending the Human Security Perimeter through a Web of Trust ................. 55 
2.3.1  Zimmermann’s Web of Trust ............................................................... 56 
2.3.2 Human Factors and Human Infrastructure in the Context of Trust ....... 58 
2.3.3  Adeka’s Web of Trust .......................................................................... 62 
2.3.4 Other Models for Measuring the Human Trust ..................................... 66 
2.4 Security Concepts and the Military Security Assessment Process ................. 82 
2.4.1 Security Concepts ................................................................................ 82 
2.5 Analysis, Synthesis and the Three-Factor Security Assessment ................... 83 
2.5.1 Definitions ............................................................................................ 85 
2.5.2 Security Assessment Procedure in the Nigerian Defence and National 
Security Agencies ................................................................................................. 88 
2.5.3 Security Assessment Practice in the Private Security Industry ............ 94 
2.5.4 The Risk Assessment Matrix ................................................................ 96 
2.5.5  Findings and Innovative Propositions .................................................. 98 
2.5.6 Neologies ........................................................................................... 101 
2.6 The Concepts of Cyber and Cyberspace ..................................................... 103 
2.6.1 Network Security ................................................................................ 104 
2.6.2 Constituents of Cyber Warfare ........................................................... 104 
2.6.3 The Threat Landscape in Cyber Warfare ........................................... 105 
2.6.4 National Cyber Threats ...................................................................... 106 
2.7 Cryptographic Solutions for the Technical Threats to Cybersecurity ............ 115 
2.7.1 Confidentiality ..................................................................................... 116 
2.7.2 Integrity .............................................................................................. 116 
2.7.3 Availability .......................................................................................... 117 
2.7.4 Authentication .................................................................................... 117 
2.8 Security Engineering in Context ................................................................... 119 
2.9 Context of Cryptography .............................................................................. 120 
2.9.1  General Model of Cryptosystems ...................................................... 122 
2.9.2  Cryptographic Key Management ....................................................... 124 
2.9.3  Cryptanalysis ..................................................................................... 125 
2.10 Social Engineering: the Art of Human Hacking ............................................ 126 
2.10.1  Conceptual Clarifications .................................................................. 126 
2.11 Deductions ................................................................................................... 129 
vi 
 
2.11.1  Secret Sharing Schemes .................................................................. 129 
2.11.2   Trust, Human Factors Human infrastructure .................................... 130 
2.11.3  The Three-Factor Security Assessment Process .............................. 131 
2.11.4   Cyber Threats Landscape ...................................................................... 134 
2.11.5. Advance Fee Fraud (419) .................................................................. 135 
 
Chapter 3 ………………………………………………………………………………137 
PINs, Passwords and Password Security Purgatory ………………………137 
3.1 Definition and Significance ........................................................................... 137 
3.2 History .......................................................................................................... 137 
3.3 Categories of Access Control Tools ............................................................. 138 
3.4 Factors in the Security of a Password System ............................................. 139 
3.5 Multiplicity of Passwords and Associated Problems ..................................... 140 
3.6 Password Repositories ................................................................................. 140 
3.7 Security Guidelines on Password Usage ..................................................... 141 
3.7.1 Guidelines for Strong Passwords ....................................................... 142 
3.7.2 Guidelines on Password Management ............................................... 144 
3.7.3 Logic Challenge and Response Procedure ........................................ 145 
3.7.4 Password Security versus Human Factors ........................................ 146 
3.7.5 Training and Security Awareness Education ...................................... 147 
3.7.6 Password Security Architecture ......................................................... 147 
3.8 A Survey on Password Security Awareness in Developing Countries ......... 148 
3.8.1 The Password Security Problem ........................................................ 152 
3.8.2 Proposal for a Suggested Solution ..................................................... 153 
3.9 Deductions ................................................................................................... 153 
 
Chapter 4 ………………………………………………………………………………156 
Cloud Data Repository Secure Access Prototype Design, Implementation, 
Practical Results and Discussions ………………………………………………156 
4.1 Web Design and Implementation ................................................................. 157 
4.2 Connectivity .................................................................................................. 161 
4.3 Database ...................................................................................................... 161 
4.4 Summary of Design Steps ............................................................................ 162 
4.5 Admin Web Page ......................................................................................... 166 
 
vii 
 
4.6 Login Web Page ........................................................................................... 169 
4.7 Secure Share and other Web Pages ............................................................ 170 
4.8 Secret Data Web Page ................................................................................. 172 
4.9 Areas of New Knowledge (Novelties) ........................................................... 173 
4.10 Quantitative Assessment Relative to the SSSS Algorithm ........................... 175 
4.10.1  Real-Time Performance and Server Bandwidth Cost ........................ 175 
4.10.2   Channel Capacity Performance ............................................................. 179 
4.10.3  A Unique Advantage in the CDRSAS-PT .......................................... 181 
4.11 Technical Challenge ..................................................................................... 181 
4.12 Limitation ...................................................................................................... 184 
4.13 The Way Forward ......................................................................................... 185 
4.14 Deductions ................................................................................................... 185 
 
Chapter 5 ………………………………………………………………………………188 
Location-Based Authentication as an Antidote against GSM-Dependent 
Advance Fee Fraud in the Cyberspace ………………………………………188 
5.1. Location-Based Authentication Techniques ................................................. 189 
5.1.1  N-Kerberos Protocol ........................................................................... 190 
5.1.2  STAT I and STAT II Schemes .............................................................. 191 
5.1.3 Main Location Technique Principles ................................................... 191 
5.2 The Basics of GPS Techniques ................................................................... 194 
5.2.1 Basic GPS Positioning Calculations ................................................... 197 
5.3 GPS Capability and Location-based Authentication ..................................... 197 
5.4. The State of Cyber Insecurity in Africa, Using Nigeria as a Case Study ...... 198 
5.5 Countering Feigned-location Based Fraud Related Crimes Using the 
Digitised (Split) Cells of Origins ................................................................................. 200 
5.5.1 Background to the Deterrence Approach ........................................... 201 
5.5.2 Benefits to the Nations ....................................................................... 202 
5.5.3  The Proposed Technology ................................................................ 203 
5.6 Anticipated Challenges ................................................................................. 206 
5.6.1   Roaming ........................................................................................... 206 
5.6.2 Survey: Effect of Roaming on Location-Based Authentication ........... 207 
5.6.3   Awareness Education ...................................................................... 211 
5.6.4 Cloning Fraud ..................................................................................... 212 
viii 
 
5.6.5 Immunity/Security of Special Security Agencies and Authorised 
Government Functionaries .................................................................................. 212 
5.6.6 Man-in-the-middle and Rogue Base-station Attacks .......................... 212 
5.6.7 Compatibility with future evolutions .................................................... 213 
5.6.8 Replacement for other positioning algorithms .................................... 213 
5.7 The Way Forward ......................................................................................... 213 
5.8 Deductions ................................................................................................... 214 
 
Chapter 6 ………………………………………………………………………………216 
Conclusions and Recommendations ………………………………………………216 
6.1 Summary of Conclusions ..................................................................................... 216 
6.2  Challenges ................................................................................................... 218 
6.3  Recommendations for Future Work.............................................................. 218 
 
Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………   220 
 
Appendix 1 ………………………………………………………………………………237 
Glossary of Cyber-Network and Internet-Related Terms ………………………237 
Appendix 2 ………………………………………………………………………………249 
Online Password Security Survey Questionnaire ………………………………249 
Appendix 3 ………………………………………………………………………………252 
Structured Interviews: Sample Questions for GSM Mobile Services Survey 252 
Appendix 4 ………………………………………………………………………………255 
CDRSAS-PT:  Organisational Network Security Policy ………………………255 
Appendix 5 ………………………………………………………………………………260 
Assess Yourself 7: Interpersonal Trust Scale ………………………………260 
Appendix 6 ………………………………………………………………………………263 
Summary of the Detailed Functions of the CDRSAS Prototype ………………263 
Appendix 7 ………………………………………………………………………………268 
Cloud Data Repository Secure Access Service Prototype: Results for the JUnit 
Tests ……………………………………………………………………………………….268 
Appendix 8 ………………………………………………………………………………271 
CDRSAS-DT: Projected Characteristics, Functions and Capabilities ………271 
List of Author’s Contributions ………………………………………………………277 
 
ix 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 2.1.  Binary entropy function Hb (p) ……………………………………......    19 
Figure 2.2.  Determining the secret data for a straight line graph ………………   23 
Figure 2.3.  Determining the secret data for a quadratic function using  
threshold shares ………………………………………………………………………   26 
Figure 2.4.  Illustration of Blakley’s secret sharing scheme in three dimensions ..33 
Figure 2.5.  Linear and quadratic functions showing shares …………………….   47 
Figure 2.6. Security measures: physical, procedural and logic ………………….   56 
Figure 2.7.  Exponential decay in the probability that a shared secret item would 
get lost/damaged as the number of trustees increases …………………………..  65 
Figure 2.8. Mayer’s Proposed Model of Trust ……………………………………… 70 
Figure 2.9.  Analysis and synthesis  ………………………………………………… 85 
Figure 2.10. Risk exists iff corresponding threat and vulnerability co-exist. ……. 88 
Figure 2.11.  Nigerian Armed Forces and national security agencies: operational 
and administrative/supervisory chains of command……………………………….  89 
Figure 2.12: (a) Risk management overview (b) A flow chart for risk mitigation 
action points ……………………………………………………………………………  95 
Figure 2.13.  Open card sort arrayed on a wall; showing some Theses ……….  101 
Figure 2.14. Adversaries and exploitation points in national infrastructure ….   108 
Figure 2.15. A sample DDoS attack from a botnet ………………………………  114 
Figure2.16. Mechanism of IP traceback technology …………………………….   115 
Figure 2.17. The need for time authentication ……………………………………. 118 
Figure 2.18. Security engineering analysis framework …………………………   119 
Figure 2.19. Cryptographic settings for secret key, public key, and hash function  
(a, b and c respectively)…………………………………………………………….   121 
Figure 2.20. Characterisation of a General Cryptosystem ………………………  123 
Figure 2.21. A 419 mobile phone conversation: giving a fake caller’s location ...128 
Figure 3.1.  Challenge/response method of access control …………………….. 146 
Figure 3.2. Level of password awareness (2a = Yes; 2b = No) ………………… 149 
Figure 3.3. Significance of password length awareness ………………………… 150 
Figure 3.4. Significance of password length awareness ………………………….150 
Figure 3.5. Significance of password complexity awareness …………………….151 
 
x 
 
Figure 4.1. Pictorial impression of the layout for the CDRSAS-PT; when in 
operation ……………………………………………………………………………… 159 
Figure 4.2. CDRSAS-PT employing a secure server at Bradford University …   160 
Figure 4.3. Equipment components and requisite input data necessary  
to enable a user to gain access to the CDRSAS-PT……………………………..  160 
Figure 4.4. Java class structured database ………………………………………  162 
Figure 4.5. Web design steps: the waterfall model ………………………………..163 
Figure 4.6. Use case diagram……………………………………………………….  164 
Figure 4.7. Sequence diagram ……. ………………………………………………. 165 
Figure 4.8. State diagram …………………………………………………………….166 
Figure 4.9: (a) Part of page 1 of Admin page; (b) Part of page 2 of Admin page.167 
Figure 4.10: (a) Page 2 of Login page (Registration Form); (b) Part of page 1 of 
Login page (Login Form) ……………………………………………………………. 169 
Figure 4.11: (a) Secure share page; (b) Secret data viewing page………………171 
Figure 4.12. Secret data page displaying success ………………………………  173 
Figure 4.13. Impact of system scale on delay and server bandwidth ………  ….177 
Figure 4.14. Impact of service capacity ratio on delay and server bandwidth…. 178 
Figure 4.15. Capacity performance at different bandwidth allocations ………… 179 
Figure 4.16. Variation of spectral efficiency with bits-(signal)-to-noise power  
Ratio …………………………………………………………………………………    180 
Figure 4.17. Measuring a distance between two GPS coordinates…………….  182 
Figure 5.1. A General AAA system ………………………………………………… 189 
Figure 5.2. (a) Triangulation; (b) Trilateration; and (c) Traversing……………...  193 
Figure 5.3: (a) The 24 satellites in orbit; (b) GPS triangulation process ……….. 195 
Figure 5.4.  Hierarchical structure of cellular network: (a) Base Station (BS) for a 
cell; (b) A 7-cell cluster; (c) Cell splitting; and (d) Cellular network structure …. 204 
Figure 5.5. Total and average annual roaming statistics in a decade …………..209 
Figure 5.6. Annual roaming frequency……………………………………………    210 
Figure 1-1. Overlay Network Broken-up into Logic Layers ……………………… 243 
Figure 1-2.  The Seven Transport Layers: Graphical Representation of the 7-Layer 
OSI Model …………………………………………………………………………….  248 
Figure 7-1. Result: JUnit.Test_GPSTests.java_PT ……………………………     268 
Figure 7-2. Result: JUnit.Test_ShamirTestUtils.java_PT ……………………….. 268 
 
xi 
 
Figure 7-3. Result: JUnit.Test_ShamirPHPTest.java_PT ……………………….  269 
Figure 7-4. Result: JUnit.Test_ShamirTestFile.java_PT ………………………… 269 
Figure 7-5. Result: JUnit.Test_ShamirTestFile.java_PT ………………………… 270 
Figure 7-6. Result: JUnit.Test_TestSMS.java_PT ……………………………….. 270 
Figure 7-7. Result: JUnit.Test_test.docx_PT ……………………………………… 270 
Figure 8-1. A Projected Organogram for the Cloud Data Repository Secure 
Access Scheme – Deployment Type (CDRSAS-DT) ……………………………..276 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xii 
 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1.1.  ITU framework for a global culture of cybersecurity ………..……….…      4 
Table 1.2.  The four schools of ontology and their conclusions ……….……………… 8 
Table 2.1.  Attributes of schemes for Tompa and Woll undesirable consequences.. 49 
Table 2.2. Types of secret sharing schemes with their respective hurdles ……..      53 
Table 2.3.  A matching of application type onto the required features of secret  
Sharing schemes……………………………………………………………… ………      53 
Table 2.4.  Comparison of secret sharing schemes on extended capabilities.….      54 
Table 2.5.  Risk assessment matrix……..………………………  …………………..     97 
Table 2.6.  Estimates of time required to break keys by brute force ………….     .  125 
Table 5.1. Top ten countries by count (cybercrime perpetrators)……………… …   199 
Table 5.2. Statistics of fraudulent cybercrimes in Nigeria ……………………….…   200 
Table 5.3. Grand total of the number of subscribers who roam their GSM  
calls in Nigeria with associated statistics …………………………………………….   208 
Table 2-1. Questionnaire on Password Security Survey …………………………..   250 
Table 3-1. Questionnaire for GSM Call Roaming in Nigeria …………………………253 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
xiii 
 
List of Acronyms 
 
(NB: For glossary of terms, Appendix 1 might be of help) 
 
AAA  Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting  
AES  Advanced Encryption Standard 
AFN  Armed Forces of Nigeria  
A-GPS Assisted-GPS 
API   Application Programming Interface  
APT  Advanced Persistent Threat 
ARPANET Advanced Research Projects Agency net  
AS  Autonomous System 
ATM  Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
ATPESS Adeka’s Twin Probability Equations on Secret Sharing 
ATREs Adeka’s Twin Risk Equations 
BAF  British Armed Forces  
BCE  Before the Common Era (Equivalent to BC) 
BDC   Bureau de Change 
BDS   BeiDou Satellite Navigation System (the COMPASS) … China 
BS   Base station  
CA  Certification Authority 
CBR  Constant Bit Rate 
CDRSA Cloud Data Repository Secure Access 
CDRSAS Cloud Data Repository Secure Access Scheme  
CDRSAS-DT Cloud Data Repository Secure Access Scheme – Deployment Type 
CDRSAS-PT Cloud Data Repository Secure Access Scheme – Prototype 
CDS  Chief of Defence Staff (Nigeria) 
COAS  Chief of Army Staff’s (Nigeria) 
COO  Cell of Origin 
CRM   Composite Risk Management  
CRU  Climate Research Unit  
CSEPS  Certified Social Engineering Prevention Specialist 
CSS  Cascading Style Sheets 
CYBERCOM Cyber Command  
xiv 
 
DDoS  Distributed Denial-of-Service 
DES  Data Encryption Standard 
DH  Named after Diffie-Hellman (Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman) 
DIA   Defence Intelligence Agency (Nigeria)  
DLL   Down Line Loading 
DAI  Director (-ate) of Air Intelligence (Nigeria) 
DMI  Director (-rate) of Military Intelligence (Nigeria) 
DNI   Director (-ate) of Naval Intelligence (Nigeria) 
DoS  Denial-of-Service 
DSA  Digital Signatures Algorithm  
DSS  Department of State Security (Nigeria; same as SSS) 
E-CID  Enhanced-Cell ID 
EFCC  Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
E-OTD Enhanced Observed Time Difference  
eNB   evolved-Node B 
ESN  Electronic Serial Number 
EW  Electronic Warfare 
FIPS  Federal Information Processing Standard (US) 
FM   Field Manual 
FMECA  Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis  
FMEA  Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
GCA  Global Cybersecurity Agenda 
GCC  Global Culture of Cybersecurity 
GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters (UK)  
GET An HTTP request method between a Client and Server; ‘GET’ Requests 
data from a specified resource 
GLONASS  Globalnaya Navigationnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema …Russia 
GNSS  Global National Satellite System (Galileo) …EU 
GPS  Global Positioning System …USA 
GSon  Google GSon (a Java Library) 
HASH  a Hash Algorithm 
HeNB  Home e-Node B 
HF&E  Human Factors and Ergonomics  
xv 
 
HFES  Human Factors and Ergonomics Society  
 
HTML  HyperText Markup Language 
HTTP   HyperText Transfer Protocol  
ICC  International Criminal Court 
ICT  Information and Communication Technology  
IDE  Integrated Development Environment (Eclipse) 
IDEA  International Data Encryption Standard  
ICT   Information and Communication Technology  
IEEE  Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers  
I/O  Input/Output  
IP  Internet Protocol 
IPng  next generation IP 
IPS  Internet Protocol Suite 
IQRF  Information Query Radio Frequency 
ISO  International Organisation for Standardisation (based in Europe) 
ISP  Internet Service Provide 
IPSec  IP Security  
IPTv  IP Television 
IPv4  IP Version 4 
IPv6  IP Version 6 
IT  Information Technology 
ITU  International Telecommunication Union 
ISP  Internet Services Provider  
JANET Joint Academic NETwork 
JDK  Java Development Kit  
JQuery Java Query (Library) 
JRE  Java Runtime Environment 
JSON  JavaScript Object Notation 
JSP Java Server Pages  
JSTL  JSP Standard Tag Library 
KEK   Key Encryption Key  
KTK   Key Transfer Key 
LAN  Local Area Network 
xvi 
 
LBA Location-Based Authentication 
LBS Location Based Service 
LSSS  Linear Secret Sharing Scheme 
LTE   Long Term Evolution 
LTE-A  LTE-Advanced 
MAC  Message Authentication Code  
MATLAB MATrix LABoratory 
MDC  Manipulation Detection Code 
MDMP  Military Decision-Making Process 
MD5  Message Digest 5 (An algorithm for  a one-way hash function) 
MIC   Message Integrity Check  
MIL-STD-1629 Military Standard 
MIN   Mobile Identification Number 
MitM  Man-in-the-Middle 
MSC   Mobile Switching Centres 
MSP   Mobile Service Provider 
MU  Mobile User 
MySQL My Structured Query Language  
NA  Nigerian Army 
NAF  Nigerian Air Force 
NAIC   Nigerian Army Intelligence Corps  
NAWANI Nigerian Army Wide Area Network Infrastructure  
NCC  Nigerian Communications Commission 
NCP  Network Control Protocol 
NCSP  National Cybersecurity Programme (UK)  
NFIU   Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit 
NIA   National Intelligence Agency (Nigeria)  
NIST  National Institute of Standards and Technology (US) 
NN  Nigerian Navy 
NNPC  Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
NP  Nigeria Police 
NSA  National Security Agency (US) 
NTC  National Training Centre  
OCSIA Office for Cybersecurity and Information Assurance (UK)  
xvii 
 
OCSP  Online Certificate Status Protocol 
OSI  Open Systems Interconnection 
OTAR  Over The Air Re-keying 
OTP  One-Time Pad 
PAN  Personal Area Network  
PBE  Password-Based Encryption 
PC  Personal Computer 
PGP  Pretty Good Privacy  
PHP  Hypertext Pre-processor (Originally: Personal Home Page) 
PIN  Personal Identification Number 
PKI  Public Key Infrastructure  
POST An HTTP request method between a Client and Server; ‘POST’ 
Submits the data to be processed to a specified resource 
PRNG  Pseudo-Random Number Generator 
PSTN   Public Switched Telephone Network  
QoS   Quality of Service 
RA  Registration Authority 
RDBMS  Relational Database Management System 
RFID  Radio Frequency Identification Device 
Rijndael Named after Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen 
ROT-13 Rotate by 13 places 
RPN   Risk Priority Number 
RSA  Named after Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman 
SCR   Service Capacity Ratio 
SDH  Synchronous Digital Hierarchy  
SE  Social Engineering  
SFU   Special Fraud Unit 
SHA  Secure Hash Algorithm 
SHA – (0-3) Secure Hash Algorithm; Versions 0 - 3. 
SONET Synchronous Optical NETworking 
SPKI   Simple Public-Key Infrastructure 
SSS  Secret Sharing Scheme 
SSS  State Security Service (Nigeria) 
SSSS  Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme 
xviii 
 
STAT  Space-Time Authentication Technique 
TCP  Transmission Control Protocol  
TDOA  Time Difference of Arrival  
TOA  Time of Arrival  
TTP  Trusted Third Party 
URL  Universal Resource Locator 
US-CERT United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team 
UUID  Universally Unique Identifier  
VA  Validation Authority 
VoIP  Voice over Internet Protocol 
VPN  Virtual Private Network 
VSS  Verifiable Secret Sharing  
WAN  Wide Area Network  
WCS  Worldwide Cybersecurity Summit 
WHO  World Health Organisation 
WISD  World Information Society Day 
WSIS  World Summit on Information Society 
WWW  World Wide Web  
WW1  First World War (Ditto for WW2, WW3)  
XAMPP An open-source cross-platform web server solution stack [5]. 
XOR  Exclusive OR (a logic operation) 
3GPP  3rd Generation Partnership Project 
419 Advance Fee Fraud (The term ‘419’ was coined from Section 419 of the 
Nigerian Criminal Code (part of Chapter 38: Obtaining Property by 
False Pretences; Cheating) 
419-ners Advance-fee fraud stars   
1 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Computer communication or computer-mediated communication is defined as 
“any communicative transaction that occurs through the use of two or more 
networked computers” [6]. The latest global estimate of Internet users as at 30th 
June 2016 is 3,631,124,813 users [7]. Given the estimated human population of 
7,340,094,096, Internet users account for 49.47% of the total population; 
approximately half of the global population. The number of computers 
connected to the Internet at any given time varies; a rough estimate shows an 
average of 605.6 million computers on the Internet worldwide [8].  
 
While IPv4 (Internet Protocol Version 4) uses 32 bits for an IP address on the 
net, and can therefore support 232 (4,294,967,296) addresses, IPv6 uses 128-
bit addresses, so the new address space would have a capacity for 2128 
(approximately 340 undecillion [9] or 3.4×1038) addresses. Both versions of IP 
addresses are currently in use; with IPv4 transiting to IPv6. Based on these 
statistics, it is clear that the Internet is virtually everywhere, and has proved 
indispensable in virtually all fields of human activities; including 
research/academic activities, military, medical, finance, economy and 
administration. This yields the practical definition of Computer Communications.  
 
With the above realities in mind within the context of a glaring possibility that, for 
a foreseeable future, human technological advancement will be computer-
based, cybersecurity in forms of its computers, the network as well as its stored 
and transmitted data is already a matter of great concern to every human. 
 
Using a technology-centred cybersecurity mechanism, it has been discovered 
that the state of insecurity in a cyber network is directly proportional to its 
complexity; i.e., the more complex a cyber network is, the more insecure it 
becomes [10]. This 6-chapter Thesis explores the possibility of a people-centred 
cybersecurity design, focusing on trust-centred human attributes that could be 
used to gauge trustworthiness in trustees. The exploration was conducted 
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within the framework of trusted secret sharing, cryptography and a secure cyber 
network.  
 
This chapter will briefly cover the study background, motivation and statement 
of the research problem, the research aims and objectives, the scope of the 
research, research philosophy, importance and contributions of the research, 
and closes with the layout of the entire Thesis. 
 
1.1 Study Background 
 
Ross [11] noted that “Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing 
was ever made.” Thus, in a situation that is akin to the disruptions/destructions 
by highway robbers and sea pirates, both the wired and wireless information 
super-highways are also permeated by sundry criminals. These exploit both 
human factors and technological tools to perpetrate various forms of crimes. A 
computer crime, or cybercrime, refers to any crime that involves a computer and 
a network [12]. The computer may have been used in the commission of a 
crime, or it may be the target [13]. Net crime, on the other hand, refers to a 
criminal exploitation of the Internet [14]. Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) 
attacks are considered as the most potent/disruptive of cyberattacks [15]. 
Further details on the state of cyber threat landscape are in Section 2.6 [16].  
 
In an attempt to draw requisite attention to the growing threats to global 
cybersecurity, the ITU’s Global Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA) noted that 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have become an integral 
part of the information society since ICT networks are regarded as part of basic 
national infrastructure [17]. As global reliance on ICTs grows, so does 
vulnerability to attacks on critical infrastructure through cyberspace. Kevin 
Mitnick [18] believes that hacking is best accomplished by using a combination 
of technical and nontechnical means (social engineering; exploitation of human 
factors) [19-21]. Since the analysis of the threats reveals a combination of 
technical and nontechnical means of cyberattacks, defensive strategies ought to 
reflect this mixture as well. While procedural measures and social engineering 
will counter nontechnical attack approaches, cryptography becomes handy as a 
tool for technical cyber defence. 
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Evidence abound to show that the global community is reasonably aware of the 
threats posed by cyberattacks. This is demonstrated by the various cyber 
defence measures in the offing at local, regional and global levels. In January 
2002, the UN General Assembly endorsed a proposal for a global summit on 
ICT related issues, with the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) as 
the lead agency. Consequently, the ITU organised the event, which included the 
participation of more than 50 heads of states and many international, regional 
and national organisations. This resulted in the World Summit on Information 
Society (WSIS) [22], which was held in 2 phases; in Geneva (December 2003) 
and Tunis (November 2005). One of the chief aims of the WSIS was to bridge 
the global digital divide separating rich countries from poor countries, by 
spreading access to the Internet in the developing world. The conferences 
established 17th May as World Information Society Day (WISD). 
 
As a follow up to the Tunis phase of the World Summit on Information Society 
(WSIS) (2005)  [22], the ITU launched the Global Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA) 
in 2007, as a framework for international cooperation aimed at enhancing 
confidence and security in the information society [17]. Its main objective is to 
promote a Global Culture of Cybersecurity (GCC), taking into account all the 
different actors from divergent sectors in the information society, as illustrated in 
Table 1.1. This leads to the motivation for this research and the statement of the 
research problem; the research question. 
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Table 1.1.  ITU framework for a global culture of cybersecurity [22]  
 Area of Cybersecurity 
Requirement 
Professional Responsibility 
 
1. 
 
Political Culture of 
Cybersecurity 
 
Legislatures, Executives, Stakeholders, … 
 
2. 
 
Legal Culture of Cybersecurity 
The court, Judge, Prosecutor, Attorney, 
Regulator, Law Enforcement, … 
 
3. 
Economic & Managerial 
Culture of Cybersecurity 
Auditors, Executive Manager, Production 
Manager,  Human Resources Manager, CIO, 
CISO, ... 
 
4. 
Technical Culture of 
Cybersecurity 
System, Network Engineer, System 
Administrator, Software Developer, … 
5. Social Culture of Cybersecurity Not assigned to any professional group due to 
lack of requisite appreciation of its significance 
by the ITU 
 
 
1.2 Motivation and Statement of the Research Problem 
While highlighting the trend in the incidence of network insecurity within a spate 
of about three years, Schneier  concluded that computer security is not a 
problem that technology can solve [10]. Security solutions have a technological 
component, but security is fundamentally a people problem. On the other hand, 
Ferguson [23] agrees that a security system cannot be stronger than its 
weakest link, while Hadnagy [24] is of the view that the biggest security 
weakness is the human infrastructure. Similarly, Mitnick [18] concludes that “the 
human factor is truly security’s weakest link.” Thus, in line with Kessler’s 
position that, “if you know the enemy and know yourself your victory will not 
stand in doubt;…” [25]  and, “if you know the enemy and know yourself you 
need not fear the results of a hundred battles,” as expounded by Sun Tzu [26], it 
implies that an effective security arrangement, of any kind, is infeasible without 
the security engineer taking into cognisance relevant human factors, which are 
the main vulnerabilities usually exploited by the attackers. 
 
Most existing security arrangements seem to underplay the significance of 
human factors (social engineering) in cyber defence. Examples include the 
ITU’s GCC design in Table 1.1 which fails to assign the responsibility for the 
social culture of cyber-security to any group of professionals. This 
underestimation of the significance of social engineering input in cyber defence 
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is also indicative of the current UK NCSP which allocated only one percent of 
the £650 million earmarked for cybersecurity, from 2011-2015 to education [27].  
 
The apparent lack of requisite attention on the social/nontechnical aspect of 
cyber defence, in both past and present efforts, inspired the conduct of this 
research in the chosen topic of ‘Cryptography and Computer Communications 
Security: Extending the Human Security Perimeter through a Web of Trust.’ 
This research was carried out within the framework of trusted secret sharing, 
cryptography and a secure cyber network; it adapted a technological scheme 
combined with the human factor of trust, using a secure web environment, in an 
effort to enhance cybersecurity. This aimed at increasing or expanding the 
security perimeter relative to human trust in an effort to answer the main 
research question: ‘Solving for insecurity in computer networks; is it a 
technology-centred or human-centred problem?’ Consequently, the research 
addressed the above question as broken down into the following components: 
  
 What is security engineering? 
 What are the nature and scope of contemporary cyber threats? 
 What are the security challenges in countering the prevalent and 
foreseeable cyber threats? 
 What is the context of cryptography in cybersecurity? 
 Technology versus social engineering; what are their relative weights in 
cybersecurity? 
 In a human-centred cybersecurity design, what are the most critical human 
factors that could be used to gauge trustworthiness in an interpersonal 
human relationship? 
 How can technology be combined with trust-centred human factors in an 
effort to improve cybersecurity? 
 Aside from theoretical analysis, would it be feasible to pragmatically 
demonstrate the synergy of technology and human trust factor in aid of 
cybersecurity?  
 
Next are the aim and objectives of the research effort in order to answer the 
above research questions. 
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1.3 Aim and Objectives 
The primary aim of this study was to find a way of devising a new or adapted 
technological scheme that would combine the capabilities of technology with the 
human factor of trustworthiness in an effort to enhance cybersecurity. This was 
designed to increase or expand the human trust security perimeter. In order to 
achieve this aim, it was broken down into the following specific objectives:  
 
 Situate a pragmatic context of security engineering. 
 Clearly, determine the nature and scope of the threats to cyber-security in 
the contemporary world. 
 Highlight the major challenges in cyber-security and identify the weakest 
link of the cybersecurity system. 
 Bring out the relative contributions of technological and human factor 
considerations, in relation to the effectiveness of cybersecurity.  
 Design or adapt a technological scheme that could combine the 
capabilities of technology with trust-centred human attributes to enhance 
cybersecurity. 
 Using the research findings, demonstrate, pragmatically, a new scheme 
that combines a scientific technology with the human factor of trust and 
show how the synergy enhances cybersecurity. 
 Suggest or work out ways and means through which the Third World 
environment, especially Nigeria, could benefit optimally from the research 
work. 
 
In order to fulfil the above aim and its resultant objectives, the scope of this 
research is defined as presented in the next section. 
 
1.4 Scope of the Research 
 
The research proposes a globalisation of a web-based practical implementation 
of secret sharing, with a focus on modifying the algorithm for Shamir’s Secret 
Sharing Scheme (SSSS), in forms of addition, subtraction and/or replacement 
of some elements. The research proposes to modify the SSSS algorithm by 
sharing a much shorter (than most secret data) randomly generated key that is 
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used to lock up the secret data; as opposed to encrypting/sharing the secret 
data itself. This would be extremely significant in cloud computing. The 
performances of the SSSS would also be compared with those of the resultant 
scheme to identify their relative strong and weak points, using appropriate 
metric parameters. This is done in an effort to resolve some of the identified 
weaknesses and unresolved questions in the (k, n) - threshold schemes. As a 
by-product, the resultant system implementation should also serve as a secure 
cloud data repository.  
 
The overall system implementation is geared towards conceptualising, planning, 
designing, developing and launching a computer-based web server that 
practically implements the combination of interaction between the human factor 
of trust and technology in an effort to improve security within the cyberspace. 
This is achieved via a form of secret sharing scheme; the (k, n)-Threshold 
algorithm, using the modified SSSS as one of the cryptographic primitives. The 
system is built up using HTML5, PHP, Java, Servlets, JSP, Javascript, MySQL, 
JQuery, and CSS. The codes are written in Eclipse IDE. These are running on 
Tomcat and Apache databases using XAMPP Server. The functioning prototype 
passes JUnit tests and has also been tested for performances and compared 
with the SSSS. There are other libraries used, which include the Database 
Connector, Joda Time, Google’s JSON parser and Shamir’s Algorithm. The 
source code is object oriented and adheres to software engineering tools and 
principles. The success of this research effort, epitomised by a functional web-
based prototype, should pave way for further work aimed at upgrading the 
system into a multi-functional mass operating system for public or 
organisational deployment.  
 
With the research topic in mind, shaped by the research question, motivation, 
aim/objectives and the resultant scope of the research, the appropriate research 
philosophy, methods and methodology will now be decided upon and outlined 
next. 
 1.5 Research Philosophy  
In the context of the philosophy of research, there are four main features of 
research design, which are distinct, but closely related [28]. These include: 
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 Ontology -  the researcher’s view about the real world and his/her 
assumptions about its nature; 
 
  Epistemology – the assumptions that the researcher makes about the 
best way to investigate the world and about reality; 
 
 Methodology – the way the researcher puts together his/her research 
techniques in order to arrive at a coherent picture; and  
 
  Methods and Techniques – these relate to what the researcher 
actually does in order to collect his data and carry out his investigations. 
 
It is required that all of the above four research principles must be coherent and 
consistent in order to be able to create a viable research design. These 
principles remain the same, regardless of whether one engages in a scientific 
research in a laboratory or one sends out a customer questionnaire [28]. 
According to Easterby-Smith et al. [28], there are four main schools of ontology 
(how reality is constructed), as summarised in Table 1.3. 
 
Table 1.3. The four schools of ontology and the summaries of their conclusions 
[28] 
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In addition to the guidance from the research philosophy, there are also 
different epistemological approaches within the social sciences; i.e., the way in 
which the researcher chooses to investigate the world. The two main 
approaches are Positivism and Social Constructionism [28]: 
 A Positivist posits that the best way to investigate the world is via 
objective methods, such as observations in a laboratory. Thus, positivism is in 
tune with realist ontology. 
 
 A Social Constructionist believes that reality does not exist by itself. 
Rather, it is constructed and given meaning by people. Thus, the focus is on 
feelings, beliefs and thoughts, as well as how people communicate these 
attributes. Hence, Social Constructionism fits better with relativist ontology. 
 
These philosophical approaches, both ontological and epistemological, are 
valid. There are many renowned researchers working in all of these traditions 
and schools. There are others who draw on multiple approaches depending on 
what they are investigating [29, 30]. The important thing is that the research 
should be internally systematic and consistent. If a researcher adopts the Social 
Constructionist approach within relativist ontology, the research would need to 
involve conversations; since mere observation of people ‘doing what they do’ 
would not produce the results that would be required to answer the research 
questions. 
 
From the conclusion in the previous paragraph, it would necessitate that the 
chosen ontology and epistemology have implications on methodology. Thus, 
Realists tend to use a positivist epistemology. They start with hypotheses, and 
then gather facts through experiments, with a view to proving or disproving their 
hypotheses, and thereby confirming, or otherwise, their theory. Clinical trials for 
new drugs or treatments are good examples of Realist/Positivist research. On 
the other hand, Relativists tend to take a Social Constructionist view. They start 
with questions, and then use case studies and surveys to gather both words 
(views) and numbers, which they compare in order to generate theories. Thus, 
Social Constructionist approaches tend to draw on qualitative sources of data, 
while Positivist approaches are inclined to quantitative data.  
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A researcher may choose to use primary or secondary data for studies, and 
also combine both quantitative (quantities and numbers) and qualitative (nature, 
using descriptive words) techniques. Both have their advantages and 
disadvantages, hence, the wisdom of most researchers in combining the two 
approaches, leading to what is called Mixed Methods Research [29, 30]. 
 
1.5.1 Pragmatism and Mixed Methods Research Approaches 
 
Mixed Methods Research is a methodology for conducting research which 
involves the integration of quantitative and qualitative research methods, 
techniques, approaches, concepts or language in a single study [29, 30].  From 
the philosophical point of view, mixed research uses the pragmatic method and 
system of philosophy. The logic of inquiry for mixed methods includes the use of 
induction (discovery of patterns), deduction (testing of theories and hypotheses) 
and abduction (uncovering and relying on the best of a set of explanations for 
understanding the results). Mixed Methods Research permits the use of multiple 
approaches to answer the research questions, as opposed to restricting or 
constraining researchers' choices; i.e., it rejects dogmatism [29, 30].  This 
naturally leads to the perception that Pragmatic Research is the philosophical 
partner for Mixed Methods Research [31, 32]. The term pragmatic, as the 
opposite of idealistic, describes a philosophy of "doing what works best" [33]. 
From its etymology in Greek (pragma; deed), the word has historically 
described philosophers and politicians who were more interested in the real-
world application of ideas as opposed to abstract notions. Pragmatism takes an 
explicitly value-oriented approach to research. 
 
1.5.2 Research Methodology 
 
From the primary research question or statement of the research problem 
(Solving for insecurity in computer networks: is it a technology-centred or 
human-centred problem?) and the aim of this research effort, it is obvious that 
the concepts of human factors and trust among humans must interplay within a 
technological setting in order to arrive at a value-oriented research outcome. 
This is essentially a social science oriented investigation in a technological 
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science environment; i.e., using technological tools. Thus, it seems that a 
Relativist/Social Constructionist approach would be at home with this research; 
without being able to do away with the Realist/Positivist research completely. 
Hence, the study adopted the Pragmatic Research approach; using Mixed 
Methods research with the integration of both Qualitative and Quantitative 
research techniques. 
 
In most cases, secondary data were sourced from published and unpublished 
materials such as books, journals, newspapers, seminars, Internet, live 
telecasts, conference papers and other earlier research works. A technological 
system that could combine the capabilities of technology with human trust to 
enhance cybersecurity was adapted from the SSSS {the (k, n)-Threshold secret 
sharing algorithm} and applied using other cryptographic 
primitives/mathematical concepts via a web design implementation. The 
landmark results are as recorded by the web-based system tagged Cloud Data 
Repository Secure Access Scheme (CDRSAS) in Chapter 4. Further details on 
the web design and implementation concepts are in Section 4.1, while the 
comparative performances of the CDRSAS and the Shamir’s algorithm are 
presented in Section 4.10.  
 
Two surveys were conducted; both employed questionnaires and structured 
interviews, with an examination of official documents from government 
agencies. The first survey was designed to assess the level of awareness on 
password security by Internet users in Africa, using Nigeria as a case study; the 
questionnaire for this is attached as Appendix 2. The results showed that 
employees among the junior staff were generally more security-conscious than 
their senior counterparts. Since the senior staff is administratively in charge of 
organisations, this finding would significantly affect the measure of assurance in 
computer networks negatively; i.e., the degree of trust to be placed on the 
network system is reduced. The second survey aimed at appreciating the state 
of cyber insecurity and establishing some statistics on the use of GSM mobile 
phones in Nigeria, as it concerns roaming of services. This survey established 
that the overall effect of GSM roaming on location-based authentication is 
negligible. This would engender greater trust and confidence in cyber networks; 
i.e., by improving cybersecurity as a result of minimising the negative impacts of 
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419-ners (advance-fee fraud stars).  It was part of the data obtained from this 
survey that facilitated the proposal in Chapter 5; the questionnaire for this is 
attached as Appendix 3. 
 
Having decided on the research setting as outlined above, there are needs to 
both preview and review the significance and possible contributions of this 
research outcomes to human civilisation. This is presented in the next section.  
   
1.6 Importance and Contributions of the Research 
 
In general terms, it is optimistic that the outcome of this study would be of great 
benefit to governments, corporate organisations and individuals who have one 
thing or the other to do with the ICT industry. The work is also aimed at 
stimulating interest in this subject area among the upcoming generation of 
engineers in the developing countries, especially Nigeria. In specific terms, the 
results attained in this work have uncovered many areas of new knowledge. As 
projected in the research outline plan, the main novelties that have been 
accomplished relate to modifications, in form of additions and replacement of 
some elements, in the SSSS algorithm, in an effort to resolve some of the 
identified weaknesses in the (k, n)- threshold schemes. The contributions are in 
two categories: namely, key contributions and contributions relating to the 
general research work.  All these are highlighted hereunder. 
1.6.1 Key Contributions 
 
 The CDRSAS-PT has modified the SSSS algorithm by sharing a much 
shorter (than most secret data) randomly generated key that is used to lock up 
the secret data; as opposed to encrypting/sharing the secret data itself. This 
would be extremely significant in cloud computing, especially if homomorphic 
encryption becomes a reality. In a nutshell, it costs more in terms of bandwidth 
and delay in a typical communication link to encrypt the data and share the 
resulting information among servers (as done in SSSS) compared to sharing 
the keys only (as proposed in the CDRSAS). Theoretically, the strong points of 
this modification are demonstrated in Section 4.10, using four QoS metric 
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parameters; namely, server bandwidth, system scale, service capacity ratio and 
real-time performance (time delay).  
 
 Other novelties associated with the CDRSAS-PT include the following: 
 
 The geographical spread of participants (trustees) which is now global in 
nature as against a one-location based recombination process envisaged 
in previous secret sharing schemes. This revolution in the science of secret 
sharing is illustrated in Figure 6.2. 
 As a consequence of globalisation, location-based user authentication 
techniques are introduced. These are the employment of the GPS 
coordinates and SMS text mobile authentication codes; thus greatly 
enhancing the security of the system. 
 Inherent capability for location-based automatic mutual authentication; a 
novelty in the public civil domain. 
 In an effort to minimise the chances of hacking, a dynamic time window is 
introduced within which secret sharing and recombination processes must 
be accomplished. Consequently, a digital clock and timer (down counter) 
are incorporated into the system, since time restriction is among the logic 
tests in the greatly enhanced Shamir’s secret sharing algorithm. 
 Other long-standing unresolved issues in relation to secret sharing, which 
have now been resolved in the Cloud Data Repository Secure Access 
Scheme (CDRSAS), include the following: 
 
o Who is the Combiner;  
o Where should the recombination take place; and  
o Who is entitled to have access to the reconstructed secret? 
 
These questions have now been resolved with the designation of an 
Authorised User (non-permanent) in the scheme, to be programmed by 
the Admin for every secret sharing session, as would be dictated by 
particular circumstances. 
 It is also instructive to note that the practical implementation of a web-
based authentication secret sharing scheme, with all the complements of 
the CDRSAS, has no precedence. 
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 The risk assessment discoveries are: 
 
 
 Of particular significance is the ability of this study in discovering the need for 
a 3-factor (Risk, Threat and Vulnerability) based security assessments, 
contrary to the haphazard and non-systematic practice in most armed forces 
throughout the world. This discovery made it possible for the author to be the 
only person with military background whose paper made a chapter in a 
recent defence publication in Nigeria [34]. 
 Adeka’s Twin Risk Equations (ATREs), a by-product of the above discovery, 
facilitate an easy and pragmatic understanding of the systematic quantitative 
risk-based security assessment process (Section 2.5.1; Equations (2.28) and 
(2.29); Figure 2.9). 
 Adeka’s Twin Probability Equations on Secret Sharing (ATPESS) serve as 
mathematical instruments to prove that secret sharing (using a network of 
human trustees) enhances the security of the secret data under protection 
(Section 2.3.3; Equations (2.25) and (2.27); Figure 2.7). 
 
1.6.2 Contributions Relative to the General Research Work  
 
 Information warfare is a potent weapon for industrial espionage, thus 
constituting a great threat to all corporate organisations. Hence, any 
organisation that has competitors and whose operations are computerised, 
such as the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), will benefit 
from the knowledge and experience acquired via this study. 
 This study has contributed to the existing body of knowledge, hence, it would 
serve as a useful reference material for future researchers; by filling literature 
gaps on the subject matter.  
 The research is of great significance because its informed proposal to use a 
combination of location-based authentication and further digitisation of GSM 
country code into smaller area codes would be an antidote to the fraudulent 
419 (advance fee fraud) crimes in Nigeria and many countries in the world.  
 The outcome of this study will be of great benefit to the Nigerian Armed 
Forces, in particular, and the nation at large. Specifically, the experience from 
15 
 
this study could be handy in streamlining the security arrangements for 
projects like the Nigerian Army Wide Area Network Infrastructure (NAWANI) 
at minimal costs. 
 The subject of Cryptography and Computer Communications Security will 
always remain indispensable, as long as technological developments remain 
computer-driven.  
  Finally, it is hoped that this work will stimulate further research on the need 
to fully exploit the various techniques associated with the Art of Human 
Hacking in countering cyber threats/attacks. 
 
Now that it has been decided that this research effort is both viable and 
feasible, the readers of its Thesis are now provided with a preview of its 
contents as laid out in the next section. 
 
1.7 Layout of the Thesis 
The Thesis contains 6 chapters, beginning with the introduction in Chapter 1 
and ending with Conclusion in Chapter 6. Apart from Chapters 1 and 6, every 
chapter ends with a deductive section which records important deductions in the 
chapter. Similarly, apart from Chapter 6, every chapter begins with an 
unlabelled/unnumbered section which serves as an introduction to the chapter. 
Chapters 2 – 5 are now briefly introduced in this segment, with each of the 
chapters organised as follows:  
  
 Chapter 2 deals with literature review. It covers secret sharing schemes, the 
concepts of trust and the extension of human security perimeter through a 
web of trust (an exposition on the subtitle of this Thesis). It also discusses the 
concept of security and the military security assessment process, a 3-factor 
security assessment process (risk-centred security assessment technique) 
and analysis/synthesis. This is followed by the concepts of cyber/cyberspace 
with its threat landscape and national cyber threats/vulnerabilities. The 
chapter ends with highlights on cryptography/cryptanalysis and social 
engineering before deductions. 
 Chapter 3 focuses on passwords and password security purgatory, with an 
analytical presentation on a password survey, designed to estimate the level 
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of awareness on passwords by Internet users in Africa, using Nigeria as a 
case study.  
 
 Chapter 4 discusses the Cloud Data Repository Secure Access Scheme 
(CDRSAS), which is a web-based authentication scheme. It is primarily 
designed to implement the sharing, distribution and reconstruction of a 
sensitive secret data. This is carried out in a secure web environment, 
globally. Though primarily designed as a secret-sharing system, it could be 
adapted to serve as a cloud data repository and secure data communication 
system. This chapter highlights the web design concept, the 
design/development and presents its performance characteristics with 
practical results; with identified areas of novelties. The performances are 
compared with the Shamir’s algorithm to identify possible areas of 
improvements and deficiencies, with a projection for future work. 
 Encouraged by the results in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 exploits the inherent 
security enhancement characteristics of various location-based 
authentication techniques, with a focus on the role that Global Positioning 
System (GPS) could play in optimising this authentication approach. This 
would go a long way in facilitating successful socio-technological 
countermeasures against feigned-location based fraud related crimes; such 
as the 419 advance fee fraud practised in Nigeria and many countries in the 
world. This also contains a survey analysis, designed to appreciate the state 
of cyber insecurity and estimate the possible negative impact of GSM 
roaming on LBA, with encouraging results. 
 Conclusions and recommendations are covered in Chapter 6. These 
comprise of the summary of conclusions, challenges and recommendations 
for future work. This is followed by appendices. The Thesis terminates with 
the author’s contributions.  
 
The Thesis proceeding now continues with the literature review in the next 
chapter – Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Trusted Secret Sharing within the Framework of Cybersecurity 
and Cryptology 
 
This literature review begins with discussions on the theories of secret sharing 
algorithms. This covers the theoretical basis for (k, n)-Threshold schemes, a 
historical overview of Secret Sharing Schemes (SSS) globally and their 
comparative analysis. These are followed by highlights on cryptographic key 
management, focusing on key recovery schemes. The concepts of trust and the 
extension of human security perimeter through a web of trust (an exposition on 
the subtitle of this Thesis) is then treated. It also discusses the concept of 
security and the military security assessment process, an examination of a 3-
factor security assessment process (risk-centred security assessment 
technique) and analysis/synthesis. These are followed by the concepts of cyber 
and cyberspace with its threat landscape, as well as national cyber threats and 
vulnerabilities. The chapter ends with highlights on cryptography/cryptanalysis 
and social engineering before deductions. 
 
2.1 Requisite Theoretical Background on Secret Sharing Schemes 
 
This section deals with the theoretical basis for SSSS, an overview of Secret 
Sharing Schemes (SSS) globally and cryptographic key management with 
highlights on key recovery schemes. 
 
2.1.1  The Theoretical Basis for the (k, n)-Threshold Schemes 
 
In cryptography, secret sharing is a method by which a given secret is 
distributed among a set of participants (trustees), each of whom is given only a 
share of the secret. Reconstruction of the secret would only be possible when 
all the participants or a stringently defined minimum subset of participants 
(access structure or authorised set) pool their shares together. In other words, 
both individual shares and any number of shares less than the authorised set 
are of no use on their own. Thus, generally, the access structure of a (k, n)-
18 
 
threshold scheme normally partitions the set of all subsets of participants into 
authorised sets who can recover the secret and unauthorised sets who cannot; 
some schemes feature an intermediate third class of subsets, who are neither 
authorised nor unauthorised [35-37]. The aim of the scheme is to provide tight 
control over the sensitive data and remove the single-point vulnerability.    
 
The objective of a secret sharing scheme is to make a given secret D (say 
some data, e.g., key combination) inaccessible to unauthorised persons while 
making it accessible to authorised persons when the need arises. It is assumed 
that non-mechanical solutions which could manipulate this data in the process 
are allowed [38]. The goal is to divide D into n pieces Di,…,Dn such that: 
 
 Knowledge of any k or more Di pieces makes D easily reconstructable. 
 Knowledge of any k-1 or fewer Di pieces leaves D completely 
indeterminable  (in the sense that all its possible values are equally 
likely; assumed absolute randomness). 
 
This assumption is supported by the concept of entropy in information theory. 
The entropy H, of a discrete random variable X, measures the level of 
uncertainty associated with the value of X [39, 40].  It is a key property of 
entropy that it is at a maximum when all the messages in the given message 
space have the same probability of occurrence  or most unpredictable. That is, 
p(x) = 1/n, for p(x1),...,p(xn). Thus yielding H(X) = log n. This attribute is 
illustrated by the entropy of a Bernoulli trial (Equation 2.1), a function of success 
probability, usually termed the Binary Entropy Function: 
 
     pppppHb  1log1log 22      (2.1) 
  
 
The entropy is maximised at 1 bit per trial when the two possible outcomes are 
equiprobable; similar to the case of an unbiased tossing of a coin. This is 
illustrated in Figure 2.1 [38]. 
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Figure 2.1. Binary entropy function Hb (p) [39] 
 
  
Threshold schemes are suitable for an environment where a group of mutually 
suspicious individuals, with conflicting interests, must work together. Since this 
cooperation might be against the individual consent of some participants, the 
veto power inherent in the system could paralyse the activities of the group. 
Hence, there is a need to be circumspect in defining the boundary of the access 
structure (selection of k) relative to the entire set of participants (n) [38, 41]; 
hence, the nomenclature (k, n)-threshold scheme. This is necessary so that a 
reasonable majority of the participants should be able to function effectively, 
and a reasonable minority should be able to block possible undesirable actions. 
This versatile cryptographic primitive has been employed in various 
applications. These include access control, electronic voting, key recovery 
mechanisms, online auctions, distributed certificate authorities, secure 
multiparty computation and protection of cryptographic keys [35, 42]. 
 
Usually, secret sharing schemes have two fundamental attributes [35, 43]; 
privacy and recoverability. That is, respectively, the unauthorised sets should 
not be allowed to know the secret and the authorised sets should be able to 
recover the secret by pooling requisite shares together. Similarly, secret sharing 
schemes have two functionalities which are usually carried out by an entity, who 
could be a neutral third party or one of the participants. The Dealer is usually 
responsible for organising the system parameters, generating the secret, 
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0 
creating the initial shares and distributing them among the participants. Next is 
the Combiner who pools requisite shares together to recombine the secret. In 
most cases, the Dealer is also the Combiner; however, one of the unanswered 
questions is the entity that should have access to the recombined secret - 
whether this should be the Dealer, a participant or an entirely different entity. 
 
Mathematical Definition 
 
The main idea behind the SSSS is based on polynomial interpolation [38]. The 
polynomials could be replaced by any other functions which are easy to 
evaluate and to interpolate. This idea is rooted in the notion that two points are 
enough to define a line, three points are required to define a quadratic 
expression, four points are required to define a cubic function and so on. In 
other words, it requires ‘k’ points to define a polynomial of order ‘k-1’ [44]. 
 
Given k points in the Cartesian plane (x1, y1),...,(xk, yk) with distinct xi's, there 
is one and only one polynomial g(x) of order k-1such that g(xi) = yi for all i. 
Without losing generality, it can be assumed that the data D is a number or it 
could be made a number. In order to divide it into pieces Di, pick a 
random k - 1 degree polynomial 
 
 
1
110 ...)(


k
k xaxaaxg      (2.2) 
 
where  Da 0 . Then evaluate: 
 
).(...,),(,...),1(1 ngDigDgD ni   
 
 
Using any subset of k of the Di values, the coefficients of g(x) can be found 
by interpolation, and then evaluate D = g(0). Knowledge of just k-1 of 
these values, on the other hand, is not enough to calculate D. In order to 
make this claim more precise, Shamir uses modular arithmetic; i.e., 
finite field arithmetic or arithmetic in the Galois Field [GF(p)] instead of 
real arithmetic; the set of integers modulo a prime number p forms a field 
within which interpolation can be carried out.  
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Example 1 
 
As an illustration for the (k, n)-threshold scheme [38, 44], using integer 
arithmetic rather than the GF, for simplicity, it is required to share a secret D 
where   k < n. Then randomly, choose the coefficients a1, a2, a3, …, ak-1, and let 
0aD   and g(x) is as defined in Equation (2.2) above. Construct n points {i, f(i)}, 
for i = 1, 2, 3,…,n. Given any subset of k of these pairs, the coefficients of the 
polynomial g(x) can be determined through Lagrange interpolation, and then 
the value a0 = D, which is the secret, can be evaluated.  
 
Distribution of Shares 
 
 
Let: 
 
 
;3
;6
;1234



k
n
D
 
 
and the random integers are: 
 
       
.94
;166
2
1


a
a
   
 
From Equation (2.2), it follows that: 
 
 
         2941661234 xxxg        (2.3) 
 
Now, construct 6 points from the polynomial g(x), resulting in the following 6 
pairs of secret share points: 
 
                 5614,6,4414,5,3402,4,2578,3,1942,2,1494,1  
 
Give each participant a different single share point {x and g(x)}.  
 
 
Recombination of Shares 
 
 
In order to reconstruct the secret, any 3 points are sufficient. Consider the 
following 3 points:  
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                4414,5,;3402,4,;1942,2, 221100  yxyxyx   
 
Applying Lagrange polynomial interpolation: 
 
 
       2021010 xxxxxxxxl              525424  xx
   
 
            33121161 2  xx  
 
 
       2120101 xxxxxxxxl            545242  xx   
 
            523121 2  xx  
 
 
       1210202 xxxxxxxxl            454252  xx   
 
           32231 22  xx  
 
 
 
Recalling that: 
 
       
           (2.4) 
 
 
 
Therefore: 
 
 
    
 
 
     3/2223/1441452/312/134023/312/116/11942 222  xxxxxx    
 
 
  2941661234 xxxg   
 
 
 Recall that the secret D is the constant coefficient, thus: 
 
1234D . 
 
 
2 
j = 0 
Ʃ yj lj (x) g (x) = 
2 
j = 0 
Ʃ yj lj (x) g (x) = 
23 
 
 
 
 
Example 2  
 
In a threshold scheme, a secret data (a prime number) is shared among 5 
trustees.  The key can be recovered by using any 2 shares.  Show that the 
secret can be recovered from any 2 of the following shares and hence 
determine the secret data. (Consider the use of graphical 
observation/interpolation; hence, start by plotting the points to solve the 
problem). 
 
         .5,6;1,4;3,2;9,1;13,3 54321  SSSSS  
 
Plotting the points (Si ) as given will produce the graph in Figure 2.2. It is clear 
that any two points are sufficient to reproduce the line since all of the points 
above lie on it.  Thus, the secret data, represented by the point at which the 
graph intersects the y-axis, is clearly 7. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Determining the secret data for a straight line graph 
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Mathematically, the above result can be verified as follows. Using the general 
formula for a line: 
 
 
y = mx + c, where m is the gradient = (change in y)/(change in x) 
between two points 
 
Take two points on the line e.g. (4, -1) and (6, -5) 
 
The gradient m is: 
 
     22/446/15   
  
Using the point (4, -1) and substituting m = -2 into the above equation gives: 
 
 
7
421


c
c
 
 
Similarly, checking with point (6, -5) gives: 
 
 
 
Again, 
7c  
 
The equation of the line is y = -2x + 7 and holds true for all the points above and 
can be recovered from any two of the above points, using the technique 
demonstrated for (4, -1) and (6, -5). 
 
Hence, the secret data is 7. 
 
c
c


12
625
25 
 
 
 
Example 3 
 
Given that the equation of a straight line is y = mx + c, where m represents the 
slope of the line and c represents the secret data (a prime number).  Generate 
six shares that can be used by six trustees for a threshold scheme requiring a 
minimum of two shares for key recovery. 
 
For this problem, a value should be chosen for the secret data.  Let the secret 
data = 9. Then, the equation of the line can be determined as y = -8x + 9; 
assuming the line passes through the point (1, 1).  In this case, ‘9’ is fixed and ‘-
8’ is chosen randomly.  Using the straight line obtained, any six share points 
can be worked out, e.g.: 
 
Share points =             15,3,25,2,17,1,23,4,33,3,1,1   
 
 
Example 4 
 
show that the following shares can recover the secret prime number when any 
three shares are used and hence determine the secret value and the degree of 
the generating polynomial. 
 
       
   .48,5,33,4
,22,3,12,1,18,1,40,3
65
4321


SS
SSSS
 
 
From the question, it is obvious that the threshold k = 3. Therefore, the 
generating polynomial is of degree 2; a quadratic function. Hence, to solve this 
problem, it is required to plot the points and show that the resulting curve is 
quadratic.  All quadratics require 3 points to be reconstructed uniquely.  All of 
the points above lie on this curve. Thus, any three of them can be used to 
determine the secret value; i.e., the point at which the curve intersects the y-
axis.  The corresponding plot is shown in Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3. Determining the secret data for a quadratic function using 
threshold shares 
 
From Figure 2.3, the Secret number ( the point at which the graph crosses the 
y-axis) is 13. 
 
 
2.1.2 An Overview of Secret Sharing Schemes 
 
Imagine a situation where the president and his Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) 
have a different key, each, for unlocking the trigger for the nuclear missile 
launch; both of whom must be present simultaneously to launch a nuclear 
missile. The digital equivalent of this would be that both of them have a secret 
piece of information or data, and only the combination of both items of 
information would be acceptable as a working key by the launch computer. This 
scenario is referred to as secret sharing in cryptography. In addition to its use in 
warfare management as illustrated above, this cryptographic primitive has 
several other applications in real life situations. Modern cryptographic secret 
sharing, as originally attributed to Shamir [38] and Blakley [45], was initially 
designed for safeguarding keys. However, it has been applied in other areas far 
beyond this original intent. Nowadays, secret sharing is a valuable instrument in 
electronic voting [46], metering schemes [47], distributed key distribution [48] 
and secure multi-party computation [49, 50].  
 
The simplest form of secret sharing is the scheme whereby all n participants are 
required to be present before the secret could be unlocked; while the secret  
0
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remains hidden for any smaller group less than n. More complex secret sharing 
involves designs where a threshold number of participants must cooperate in 
order to reconstruct the secret. There are also more flexible schemes in which 
pre-defined groups of people are allowed to unlock the secret using what is 
called an access structure. Basically, secret sharing may fall into one of three 
categories [51]. These are simple secret sharing, threshold secret sharing 
schemes and linear secret sharing. 
 
 Simple Secret Sharing 
Additive Secret Sharing is an example of secret sharing schemes where all 
participants must come together or cooperate before a secret can be 
reconstructed, as illustrated in this segment. 
 
Given a secret s  F, the dealer D selects n – 1 random integers   = },,{ 121 nrrr  
uniformly from F. D then calculates  
 




1n
ii
in rss mod F         (2.5) 
 
D then sends each player ,ip  11  ni : the share ii rs   and the share ns  is 
sent to np .  
 
The reconstruction of the secret s  F is a trivial solution; a mere addition of all 
the shares: 
  


n
i
iss
1
mod F 
 
From the above, it is clear that in the additive secret sharing scheme, the secret 
can only be reconstructed, if and only if, all participants pool all their shares 
together. If one or more participants refuse to cooperate, no information about 
the original secret can be recovered. Such a scheme is referred to as a perfect 
secret sharing scheme. 
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Theorem: Perfect Secret Sharing 
A perfect secret sharing scheme is perfect in an information theoretic sense 
when the required P participants can reconstruct the secret s  F, but any 
smaller set cannot discover anything about the secret [51, 52]. 
 
Proof 
 
Given a secret s  F and a random uniform distribution of the shares of the 
secret among P participants, all participants are needed to reconstruct the 
secret. Imagine a situation where 1P  participants try to reconstruct the secret 
s: 
 
 s′= 


1
1
p
i
is          (2.6) 
 
If they add their respective values of shares together, they can calculate the 
value for s = s + s P . However, since the random value s P  is unknown, they 
have no information with which to determine the true value of the secret s [53]. 
 
Definition 1: Ideal Secret Sharing  
 
 Secret sharing schemes with information rate 1 are called idea [52, 54]. A 
scheme is said to be ideal if its share has the same length as the secret. The 
ideal property could be perceived as the efficiency of the scheme. 
 
Definition 2: Information Rate   
 
 In secret sharing, information rate as studied by Stinson [55] is a measure of 
the amount of information that participants need to keep secret. The information 
rate for a particular shareholder is the bit-size ratio {i.e., (size of the shared 
secret)/(size of that user’s share)}. As for a secret sharing scheme itself, the 
information rate is the minimum such rate for all participants [52, 56]. The 
efficiency of a secret sharing scheme is measured by its information rate.                                                                                   
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Threshold Secret Sharing Schemes 
 
Both Shamir and Blakley presented simple, but powerful, secret sharing 
schemes that allowed a k-threshold of n participants, where k   n, to 
reconstruct the secret. Both solved an impractical real world problem often 
found in combinatorics texts [44]: 
 
“Eleven scientists are working on a secret project. They wish to lock 
up the documents in a cabinet so that the cabinet can be opened if 
and only if six or more of the scientists are present. What is the 
smallest number of keys to the locks each scientist must carry?” 
 
In the real world, the number of locks on the cabinet would be   462115  , while 
the number of keys to be carried by each scientist would be   252105  .  Luckily, 
mathematics offers a much cleaner and more practical solution. In geometry, for 
instance, it is known that given two arbitrary distinct points on the circumference 
of a circle, there is no enough information to reconstruct the entire circle. 
However, given three distinct points, the entire circle can be reconstructed. 
Considering this circle as the secret, it could be seen that a simple 3-threshold 
secret sharing scheme has just been constructed. While this circle obviously 
has severe limitations, there exist other structures which can have an arbitrary 
number of points and hence an arbitrarily sized threshold. One such scheme 
was constructed by Shamir in [38, 57]. His solution used curves and 
reconstructed the secret by interpolation when a threshold of k people supplied 
their parts, as illustrated in Section 2.1.2, under Shamir’s Secret Sharing 
Scheme. Blakley [45], also invented a similar scheme which used the 
intersection of hyperplanes, as opposed to polynomial interpolation, to 
reconstruct the secret. Another secret sharing scheme, by Asmuth and Bloom 
[58], uses congruence classes to solve the secret sharing problem. The Shamir 
Secret Sharing Scheme (SSSS) is analysed in further details below.  
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Definition  
A (k,n)-threshold secret sharing scheme is a scheme which can divide a secret 
s  F into shares Fssss n },...,,,{ 321  such that k n, and: 
 
 Given any set of k or more shares ,is  s can be reconstructed. 
 Any set of fewer than k shares gives no information about s at all. 
 
Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme 
Given n participants P = },,...,,,{ 321 npppp  polynomial interpolation could be 
used to construct a (k, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme that will require a 
subset  AP, kA   in order to successfully reconstruct the secret.  
 
 Creating the Shares 
 
The dealer D first selects a secret s  F in order to create the shares. He then 
constructs a random polynomial f(x) with a degree of k-1. 
 
1
1
2
21 ...)(


k
k xrxrxrsxf  mod F      (2.7) 
 
subject to the following conditions: 
 
 The field F >n, where F is a GF(q) for some prime power q. 
 The secret s  F. 
 The threshold k n . 
 The coefficients }...,{ 11 krr  are chosen independently and randomly from 
the interval [0, F). 
 
Each share is  of the secret can then be created by an evaluation of the function 
f(x). That is: 
 
 ).(...,),2(),1( 21 nfsfsfs n       (2.8) 
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 Example (Polynomial construction) 
 
Let F = 17, s = 4, k = 3, and r{1… k−1} ={3, 6}. The polynomial is then, as stated 
in Equation (2.7), 
 
2634)( xxxf  mod 17       (2.9) 
 
and some of the secret shares are: 
 
2
1 )1(6)1(34)1(  fs  mod 17 = 13 
2
2 )2(6)2(34)2(  fs  mod 17 = 0 
2
3 )3(6)3(34)3(  fs   mod 17 = 16    s3 = f(3) = 16      (2.10) 
2
7 )7(6)7(34)7(  fs  mod 17 = 13 
 
 Reconstructing the Secret 
The secret can be reconstructed using polynomial interpolation. A minimum of k 
participants, one more than the degree of the polynomial, must contribute their 
shares to the reconstruction of the polynomial. The information needed from 
each participant is a tuple consisting of his value for x and the output of the 
polynomial function on x. In other words, each participant has a tuple (x, q(x) = 
xs ). Since no two participants share the same value for x, the tuples are in 
Lagrange form, and the interpolation polynomial in the Lagrange form is defined 
as [51]: 
 
 

 


ijk
j ji
j
k
i
i
xx
xz
xqzL
,
11
.)()(  mod F          (2.11) 
 
Since own interested is only in the first value, s, Equation (2.11) can be 
simplified by setting z = 0 


 


ijk
j ji
j
k
i
i
xx
x
xqL
,
11
0
.)()0(  mod F 
32 
 
 


 

ijk
j ji
j
k
i
i
xx
x
xq
,
11
.)(  mod F 
 
 





ijk
j
ijj
k
i
i xxxxq
,
1
1
1
..)(  mod F        (2.12) 
 
Equation (2.12) can be generalised a bit more by writing it in the form 
 
 


k
i
iixqL
1
).()0(   mod F 
 
  




ijk
j
ijji xxx
,
1
1
.       (2.13) 
 
From Equation (2.13), it is seen that i  is independent of the shares and only 
depends on the number of shares used in the reconstruction of the polynomial. 
Thus, the values of i could be pre-computed and then used later when 
recombining the secret.  
 
 Definition 1 
 
The vector },...,{ 1 n   such that   
k
i ii
ss
1
  is called the recombination 
vector. 
 
 Example (Reconstruction of the secret using polynomial interpolation) 
 
 Consider the previous example where a polynomial mod 17 was constructed 
and the shares 1s  13, 2s   0, 3s   16,  7s  13 were generated. To 
reconstruct the secret using Equation (2.12) and three of the shares created 
(e.g., ), 721 sandss , the secret is: 
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L(0)  





ijk
j
ijj
k
i
i xxxxq
,
1
1
1
..)( mod 17 
      




ijk
j
ijj xxx
,
1
1
..13 +  




ijk
j
ijj xxx
,
1
1
..0  +  




ijk
j
ijj xxx
,
1
1
..13  mod 17 
      11 17.7.12.2.13     + 0 + 13.     11 72.2.71.1    mod 17 
  
      =  13.    10.2.14.1.133.7.1.2   mod 17    =  4. 
 
Blakley’s Scheme 
The idea behind Blakley’s threshold secret sharing scheme [45], is that, given n-
dimensional non-parallel hyperplanes, they will intersect at a given point. Some 
coordinate of this point of intersection gives the secret. This is illustrated in 
three dimensions as in Figure 2.4. The secret corresponds to the position where 
all the three planes intersect; Point A. 
 
 
 
. 
Figure 2.4. Illustration of Blakley’s secret sharing scheme in three 
dimensions [45]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
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Asmuth and Bloom Secret Sharing Scheme 
 
This scheme was first proposed by Asmuth and Bloom [58], and the idea behind 
it is that the keys or shares, usually referred to as shadows, are congruence 
classes of a number associated with the original key or secret. 
 
 Creating the Shares 
 
In order to share the secret ,0, ss  among n people with a k-threshold, choose 
a number sp  and a set of numbers nmmmm  321  such that the 
 ji mm ,gcd  = 1 for ,ji    .,1,gcd 1111   inkiikii mpmandipm  Then, 
calculate the value i
k
i mM 1 and select an arbitrary integer A such that 
,0 My  where  pAxy . . The shares would then be .mod ii myS   
 
 Example: Key Construction 
 
Let the secret be ,2s  then, select a set of numbers that meet the constraints 
mentioned above. For instance, let p = 3, k = 3, n = 4, and 
11,9,7,5, 4,321 mmmm respectively. Hence, the number .3159.7.5 M  Let the 
random integer ‘A’ be 50. Therefore, ,1523502.  pAxy  which clearly 
satisfies the condition .0 My   
 
Thus, the keys (shares) created to be given to the n participants would be   
 
.911mod152
;89mod152
;57mod152
;25mod152
4
3
2
1




s
s
s
s
            (2.14) 
 
 Reconstructing the Secret  
In this scheme, the reconstruction of the shared and distributed secret is fairly 
simple. First, find the original y-value by applying the Chinese remainder 
theorem on the set of congruences. That is, solve the congruence system: 
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.mod
;mod
;mod
;mod
33
22
11
kk msy
msy
msy
msy





       (2.15) 
. 
After reconstructing the values of y, the original secret is then obtained from  
 
pys mod         (2.16) 
 
where p is a public variable that was chosen during the construction of the keys 
(shares). 
For example, given k keys or shadows from the shadows nss ,1 that were 
created during key construction above, the secret s could be rediscovered by 
first finding the y-values using the Chinese remainder theorem on k = 3 of the 
congruences used earlier: 
 
.11mod9
;9mod8
;7mod5



y
y
y
              (2.17) 
 
Since y = 152, by Equation (2.16) the secret is found to be s = 152 mod 3, i.e., s 
= 152 mod 3 = 2. 
 
Mignotte’s Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme  
 
Mignotte’s threshold secret sharing scheme [59] is another scheme that uses 
the Chinese remainder theorem to solve the problem of secret sharing. It is 
similar to the Asmuth and Bloom Secret Sharing Scheme but differs in the 
requirements and restrictions on the input data and choice of coprime moduli.  
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 Creating Shares 
In order to share a secret among 2n   people with a threshold ,nk   create n 
coprime integers such that 
knknknnn mmmmmmmmmm  ....., 2132121   and choose a secret s 
which lies within the interval    ...,.. 2132 knknkn mmmmmm   Each share is 
then ii mss mod . 
 
 Reconstructing the Secret 
Given a set of k shares, the secret can be reconstructed by using the Chinese 
remainder theorem on the given set of congruence classes: 
 
 
.mod
;mod
11
kk ii
ii
mss
mss


  
 
Linear Secret Sharing 
 
An interesting aspect of all the above secret sharing schemes is that they use 
ideas from linear algebra to solve the problem of secret sharing. Actually, if the 
Asmuth & Bloom scheme were to be used on polynomials instead of integers, it 
would have generalised the Asmuth & Bloom scheme to Shamir’s scheme. In 
fact, with small modifications, all the above schemes can be generalised as was 
shown in [60]. As they are nearly equivalent, many features, such as key 
updating algorithms, are easily applied across the different schemes. Other 
traits, such as information security, are equally as good from one scheme to the 
next. From here on, this work will focus on different traits and security aspects 
of linear secret sharing schemes (LSSSs), primarily using Shamir’s scheme, but 
the methods used apply equally as well to the LSSSs. 
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 Updating the Keys 
In some cases, such as a company where employees may come and go and 
where board members are exchanged annually, it may be necessary to secretly 
update the keys held by the remaining active participants. This can be easily 
accomplished. First, generate k − 1 random α-values. Thereafter, create a new 
polynomial, with zero as the first coefficient: 
 
 



1
1
mod.0)(
k
i
i
i FxxP               (2.18) 
 
and calculate the shares ''1 nss   with this polynomial. Once this is done, 
distribute each share 'is  to the participant with the corresponding is  share and 
have him calculate his new share ii
new
i sss  ' . As soon as the new share is 
created, both is  and 'is  should be destroyed. In this way, anybody with the old 
share is  can no longer participate in the secret sharing scheme, and hence, all 
former employees that have left an organisation would not pose any security 
threat to the scheme. 
 
 Example 
Supposing that the secret s = 5 and the Shamir secret sharing polynomial 
.7mod235)( 2xxxf   For the four participants, },,,{ 4321 ppppP  , the 
dealer would create the following shares: 
 
.0)4(
;4)3(
;5)2(
;3)1(
4
3
2
1




fs
fs
fs
fs
             (2.19) 
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Now suppose that the dealer does not want the participant 3p  to hold a valid 
share any longer. In order to exclude 3p , he creates a new polynomial  
7mod.1.60)( 21 xxxp   and generates the shares: 
 
5)4('
;2)2('
0)1('
4
2
1



ps
ps
ps
       (2.20) 
                                                                                                                               
and distributes them to their corresponding participants. Each player that 
receives 'is  then computes his new share (
new
is ) in the scheme as shown 
earlier: 
 
 
.550'
4);s(butexistnotdoess
;025'
;303'
444
3
new
3
222
111




sss
sss
sss
new
new
new
           (2.21) 
 
Using the new shares the participants can reconstruct the secret correctly. On 
the other hand, any combination of two new shares and the share 3s  cannot 
reconstruct the secret. 
 
 Definition: Homomorphic Encryption 
Homomorphic encryption is an encryption scheme that allows operations, such 
as multiplication and addition, to be performed on ciphertext values, resulting in 
a ciphertext that is equal to performing identical operations on the plaintext prior 
to encryption [58, 61]. 
 
 Verifying the Shares 
In [62], Feldman introduced a verifiable secret sharing (VSS) scheme based on 
the Shamir’s scheme. Using homomorphic encryption (as defined above) the 
Feldman scheme allows the participants to verify whether or not the shares they 
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have received are consistent. It should be noted, however, that while the 
Feldman scheme binds a player to a given share, the secret is now only 
computationally secure, i.e., retrieving the secret without the correct number of 
shares is computationally impossible. The use of discrete logarithms is an 
example of a homomorphic encryption method that facilitates the use of this 
scheme. 
 
Another method of VSS is a method by Pedersen [63]. In this method, like the 
Feldman’s, the secret remains secure in the information theoretic sense, but the 
consistency of the shares is only computationally secure, The Pedersen VSS 
scheme allows a player to non-interactively check whether the share he has 
received is consistent. 
 
Security 
 
As seen in the simple secret sharing schemes, the linear threshold secret 
sharing schemes are also perfectly secure. It was shown that any subset of 
participants consisting of at least k members can reconstruct the secret. 
Assuming that an adversary has obtained 1k  shares, then, for each possible 
value in the (half-open) interval ),,0[ F  he can construct one unique 
polynomial 'f  with degree k−1 such that '.)0(' sf   Even though one of these 
values will contain the correct secret, each of the values are equally likely, 
hence by knowing k − 1 of the shares the adversary still has learned nothing 
about the secret. 
 
Limitations 
 
As powerful as they are, threshold schemes have some impractical limitations 
[64]. For instance, in a threshold scheme, it is presumed that all participants are 
equal. However, to borrow from George Orwell [65], some participants “are 
more equal than others”. In other words, in most circumstances, some 
participants are trusted more than others. For instance, in a network of 
computers, where each computer represents a participant, a higher threshold 
for computers that are more likely to be corrupted, like those connected to the 
Internet, and a lower threshold for the more trusted computers would be 
required. That is, it might be necessary or better to define differently sized 
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subsets of the participants needed to reconstruct the secret. The structure 
consisting of all these sets is called an access structure, as briefly discussed in 
the next segment. 
 
The Concepts of Access Structures and Monotone Span Programmes 
The threshold secret sharing schemes presented in the previous sections only 
allow any subset of a size k or greater to reconstruct the secret. This approach 
has obvious disadvantages where it is required that a more fine-grained 
configurable scheme be emplaced. Ideally, it would be preferred to have a 
method where a set of potentially differently sized authorised subsets could be 
defined; this flexibility is the main purpose and/or advantage of an access 
structure. As introduced in [66], an access structure, denoted by  , consists of 
a set of authorised subsets where each authorised subset has the ability to 
reconstruct the secret [67].  
 
Definition  
 
A perfect secret sharing scheme realising the access structure   is a method of 
sharing a secret S among a set of n participants (denoted by P), in such a way 
that the following two properties are satisfied [55]: 
 
o If an authorised subset of participants PB  pool their shares, then they 
can determine the value of S. 
o If an unauthorised subset of participants PB  pool their shares, then 
they can determine nothing about the value of S. 
 
Definition 1  
The unauthorised or adversary structure, denoted by  , consists of all the sets 
that are not in  . The tuple ( , ) is an access structure if .  An 
access structure is said to be complete if .P  
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Definition 2 
An access structure   is said to be monotone increasing if it satisfies the 
following property: 
 
o If PB  is an authorised subset of   and CB  then C is also an 
authorised subset of  . 
 
Similarly, the unauthorised set   is monotone decreasing, in other words, if 
a set A is in   then any set AB    is also in . 
 
 Definition 3 
All subsets of   that cannot be split into smaller authorised subsets are known 
as minimal sets. The collection of these sets forms the access structure. This 
set of minimal subsets is denoted by 0 .   
 
 Example 
  
Supposing there are five participants  521 ,,, ppp  and an access structure   
with the authorised sets },,,{},,,{},,,{},,{ 32143253121 ppppppppppp then, 
 
0 },,{},,,{},,{ 43253121 pppppppp     (2.22) 
 
and hence, 
 
  0  321 ,, ppp .  
 
Since the set  321 ,, ppp  21, pp , it is not part of the basis access structure 0 . 
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2.1.3 Cryptographic Key Management 
 
In cryptography, key management is concerned with the secure generation, 
distribution, and restoration of keys [68]. It is extremely important to ensure that 
secure methods of key management are emplaced; such that once a key is 
randomly generated, it should remain secret to avoid its compromise[69]. This is 
significant because, in most cases, attacks on public-key are directed at the key 
management level, rather than the cryptographic algorithm itself. Thus, such 
secure arrangement must be maintained while users are able to obtain a 
suitable key pair requisite for both their efficiency and security needs; users are 
able to legitimately access other people’s public keys, and also publicise their 
own public keys. If security is not ensured, unauthorised persons could either 
change public keys listed in a directory or impersonate other users. In order to 
ensure that certificates used for these transactions cannot be forged, the 
issuing of certificates must be conducted in a way that is impervious to attacks.  
This is ensured through positive authentication of both the identity and public 
key of an individual prior to issuance of certificates. 
 
In the event that someone’s private key is lost or compromised, others must be 
promptly informed so as to desist from either encrypting messages using the 
invalid corresponding public key or accepting messages signed using the invalid 
private key. Users should also be able to store their private keys securely to 
avert unauthorised access, without hindering legitimate access. It is a significant 
managerial security requirement, that a key should have a life span during 
which it is valid; its expiration date must be chosen carefully and publicised in 
an authenticated channel [68]. 
 
2.1.4 Key Recovery in Cryptography 
 
Definitions 
It is generally understood that one of the hindrances to the widespread use of 
encryption, in some instances, is the fact that when a key is lost, any data 
encrypted with that key becomes inaccessible, and could be rendered useless. 
Key recovery is a general term encompassing the various ways through which 
43 
 
emergency access to encrypted data could be guaranteed [68]. Key recovery 
first became popular as a result of US Government's policies on exporting 
strong cryptography. In a nutshell, the Government agreed to permit the export 
of systems employing strong cryptography as long as a key recovery method 
that allows the Government to read encrypted communications was 
incorporated; this was to be facilitated through the use of escrow agencies. 
 
In the use of secret-key cryptosystems, users must, first of all, agree on a 
session key; i.e., a secret key to be used for the duration of one message or 
communication session. In accomplishing this requirement, a risk exists that the 
key will be intercepted during transmission. This is an important key 
management problem, for which Public-key cryptography offers an attractive 
solution within a framework termed digital envelope or key encapsulation. The 
digital envelope consists of a message that is encrypted using secret-key 
cryptography and an encrypted secret key [70]. While digital envelopes usually 
use public-key cryptography to encrypt the secret key, this is not mandatory; 
Alice and Bob could use an already established secret key to encrypt the secret 
key in the digital envelope. In a nutshell, the digital envelope is accomplished as 
follows: Alice chooses a secret key and encrypts the message with it, then 
encrypts the secret key using Bob's public key. She sends both the encrypted 
secret key and the encrypted message to Bob. When Bob wants to read the 
message, he first decrypts the secret key, using his private key, and then 
decrypts the message, using the secret key. In a multi-addressed 
communications environment such as e-mail, this can be extended directly and 
usefully [51]. 
 
The Need for Key Recovery 
 
If one loses one’s car or house keys, one can call a locksmith or car dealer who 
can procure a new one. However, if one loses one’s cryptographic key, there is 
nobody to call; it’s gone.  Many companies protect themselves against this 
problem by implementing a key recovery strategy. When Alice generates a 
symmetric key to encrypt her files or a private/public key pair to be used for key 
distribution, she stores the keys in such a way that only she can recover them. If 
Alice has a key recovery plan, she also creates copies of the keys and stores 
them in such a way that someone else can recover them. Similarly, it is possible 
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for Alice to store them so that it takes more than one person to recover the 
keys.  This way, no one single individual can surreptitiously recover the keys 
and examine Alice’s secret information.  
 
Using the Digital Envelope for Key Recovery 
 
The most common form of key recovery is the RSA digital envelope [58]. Alice 
has a software program that encrypts her files.  It generates a symmetric 
session key and uses that key to encrypt each file.  Alice stores the session key 
securely, possibly using Password-Based Encryption (PBE). When the session 
key is generated, Alice can also encrypt it using a key recovery RSA public key. 
This arrangement is essentially a digital envelope. If Alice loses her key, the 
owner of the key recovery RSA private key, a recovery agent, can open the 
digital envelope and retrieve Alice’s encrypting session key. 
 
Key Recovery via a Trusted Third party 
There are three basic entities that can act as a key recovery agent: 
 
 A Trusted Third Party (TTP). 
 A group of trustees, each holding a portion of the key.  
 A group of trustees using a threshold scheme. 
 
A TTP is more of a company than a person (e.g., Verisign, Thawte).  One of its 
jobs is to distribute session keys (and KEKs) to parties wishing to communicate 
securely. Consider a case where Alice decides to use the TTP as her key 
recovery agent; this requires a certain amount of trust. To act as the key 
recovery agent, the TTP generates an RSA key pair and distributes the public 
key to Alice. When Alice generates her keys (the session key or private/public 
key pair), she encrypts them using the public key that was generated by the 
TTP (the digital envelope). Alice doesn’t send the digital envelope to the TTP 
because trust should have some limits.  She stores the envelope somewhere 
safe like on a USB stick or smart card; probably, more than one copy. If Alice 
forgets her password, has a hard drive failure, etcetera, she can take the digital 
envelope to the TTP.  The TTP can open it using the RSA private key and give 
the contents to Alice. When Alice uses the recovered key (or keys) she once 
again protects them using PBE. 
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Advantages/Disadvantages of Using TTPs 
 
The advantage of this system is that key recovery is simple and straight 
forward. One disadvantage of this scheme is that the TTP has a potential 
access to all the keys. The main disadvantage (from her employer’s point of 
view) is that the TTP may go out of business. In this case, the company will 
have to get a new TTP, generate a new key recovery key pair, distribute the 
new public key and have everyone create new digital envelopes of their keys. 
 
Key Recovery via a Group of Trustees 
 
Many companies and individuals do not like the idea of one company (or 
person) having access to all of the keys. In such situations, it seems better to 
break the key into parts and distribute them to several individuals or companies 
(called trustees). Suppose Alice has a 128-bit symmetric key that she uses to 
encrypt the files on her hard drive. Alice can split this key into three parts 
containing 5 bytes, 5 bytes, and 6 bytes.  She can now create three digital 
envelopes using the public keys of three trustees.  The advantage here is that 
no one person can reconstruct the key.  All three of the trustees must gather to 
reconstruct the data. However, the problem here is that one of the trustees 
could recover part of the key (the one entrusted to him) and try to brute-force 
the remaining portion that he does not have. If a trustee has 6 bytes (48 bits) he 
would only need to brute force the unknown 80 bits. This attack may be unlikely, 
but cryptography is an art that does not allow unnecessary uncertainty. One 
way to overcome this problem is to use a 384-bit value as a seed in a Pseudo-
Random Number Generator (PRNG). The PRNG uses the 384-bit value to 
generate a 128-bit session key. The 384-bit seed can be split into three parts, 
each 128 bits long.  Each trustee receives a digital envelope containing 128 bits 
of the total value. More importantly, each trustee is missing 256 bits of the 
required seed.  It is computationally infeasible to attempt to brute-force a 256-bit 
key within a reasonable timeframe; given the amount of resources and 
timeframe it requires to brute-force a 128 bit key, as illustrated in Table 2.6 
(Section 2.92). 
 
Advantages/Disadvantages of Using a Group of Trustees 
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The splitting of the secret into multiple digital envelopes has the advantage of 
preventing one individual from yielding too much power. However, this 
approach is more difficult to implement and suffers from the same type of 
problems encountered with the TTP. If one of the trustees goes on holiday, the 
key is lost.  If one of the trustees leaves the company, the key recovery process 
must start all over again from scratch. In large companies, requiring all users to 
create totally new digital envelopes can be time-consuming and costly. 
 
Key Recovery via Threshold Schemes 
 
Threshold schemes are often referred to as secret sharing or secret splitting. A 
secret (such as a session key or private/public key pair) is split into several 
shares, a subset of which must be combined to recover the secret. For 
instance, a secret might be split into 6 shares and any 3 might be needed to 
recover it.  The value 3 in the above scheme is called the threshold number. 
Any reasonable share size and recovery threshold are possible (provided the 
threshold number is less than or equal to the share count). In order that the 
secret data or key be recoverable, it must be an RSA private key [39]. The RSA 
cryptographic algorithm consists of three main steps; namely, key generation, 
encryption, and decryption. RSA algorithm involves a public key and a private 
key. While the public key can be known to everyone and is used for encrypting 
messages, all messages encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted 
with the use of the private key, which  is kept secret and known only to its 
owner, the originator.   
 
If Alice’s company were to implement a threshold scheme, it might work like 
this: The Company decides how many shares there will be, how many are 
needed for the key recovery and who the trustees will be. To start the process, 
all trustees gather to generate and collect shares. First, a key recovery RSA key 
pair is generated.  Then the threshold program splits the private key into the 
required number of shares. Each trustee gets one share.  The program 
generates the shares by taking as input the private key, the number of shares 
required and the threshold value. Each trustee is responsible for protecting their 
share (PBE). Once the shares have been generated the key recovery public key 
is distributed and the private key is destroyed. The key recovery public key can 
be used by any employee to encrypt their keys into a digital envelope. If an 
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employee loses their key they take their digital envelope to an available trustee. 
That trustee finds any two of the other trustees (assuming three are needed). 
The three trustees give their shares to the program running the threshold 
algorithm. The program combines the shares to reconstruct the previously 
destroyed private key. The private key is used to open the digital envelope and 
is then destroyed again.  
 
Creating Private Key Shares 
Consider a situation where one is required to split up a secret data into a given 
number of shares; ensuring that any fixed subset of those shares can recover 
the secret. In order to do this successfully, one would need to create shares that 
are points on a polynomial (of appropriate degree) which intersects the y-axis at 
the secret value. This is because a polynomial of degree n needs exactly n+1 
points to define it uniquely.  
 
 Examples 
 
As an example, take the simplest kind of polynomial – a straight line. The line y 
= 6x+11 is a straight line that intersects the y-axis at the value 11. Any number 
of points that lie on this line can be generated. More importantly, given any two 
points on the line, the above equation could be uniquely reconstructed, and so 
the secret value could be determined. This is illustrated in Figure 2.5. 
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Figure 2.5. Linear and quadratic functions showing shares 
 
 The quadratic polynomial y = 3x2 – x + 9 intersects the y-axis at the value 
9. Since it has degree 2 (the value of the highest power) it requires 3 
points in order to reconstruct the equation and determine the secret. The 
constant value at the end of the equation is always the secret value.  The 
other values can be chosen randomly. See Figure 2.5. 
 
 The threshold scheme sequence is as follows: 
 
o Decide on a threshold value (say k); Choose a polynomial that has degree 
(k-1); Set the constant in the polynomial to the secret value and choose 
random numbers for the remaining terms; Decide how many trustees are 
required (say n, where n > k) and generate these n points (shares) from 
the polynomial; and Give one share to each trustee. 
 
After the overview of the theoretical background for the secret sharing schemes 
as discussed above, a comparative analysis of the various secret sharing 
methods will now be undertaken in the next segment of this chapter.  
 
2.2 A Comparative Analysis of the Various Secret Sharing Methods 
 
Traditionally, secret sharing models make the following important assumptions 
concerning the potentially malicious disposition of entities involved in the 
sharing and reconstruction mechanisms. This potentially malicious behaviour is 
usually modelled as an adversary with the following presumptions [35, 38, 71]: 
Trusted Dealer - An adversary cannot corrupt the dealer; he is fully trusted. 
Passive - An adversary can capture shares, but otherwise the protocol is 
executed correctly; shares are never corrupted. 
Polarised Participants - Participants are either completely honest or completely 
malicious (there are no intermediate positions). 
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While these assumptions could be reasonable in some situations, they would 
not necessarily be applicable in many environments. Obviously, they fall below 
the requirement of the high-security demands placed on computationally secure 
cryptographic primitives that are modelled using provable security [35, 72, 73]. 
Quite a few recent works on secret sharing schemes have focused on the 
problems of secret sharing in situations where some of these assumptions are 
challenged; i.e., most of the recent works involve active adversaries, as 
opposed to the passive ones in the traditional presumptions. In the new re-
orientation, schemes are designed with the assumption that adversaries are 
able to take full control of participants and corrupt their shares. 
  
Tompa and Woll [74] were the first to challenge the traditional secret sharing 
adversary model.  Their paper demonstrated how an active adversary could 
exploit the Shamir threshold scheme; their attack model can be applied to any 
linear secret sharing system. The paper assessed the impact of an active 
adversary that takes the form of a participant who maliciously submits a fake 
share during the reconstruction of a secret. This led to various secret sharing 
models to cater for the undesirable consequences that would emerge as a 
result of the active adversary notion in secret sharing. Table 2.1 illustrates the 
characteristics of some secret sharing schemes with expected possible attacks 
based on the notion of active adversaries.  
 
Table 2.1. Attributes of schemes for Tompa and Woll undesirable 
consequences [35] 
 Possible Attacks 
 
Scheme Type 
 Honest Users 
Learn Secret? 
Honest Users 
Alerted to 
Cheating? 
Adversary 
Learns Secret? 
Robust Schemes  Yes Sometimes Yes 
Cheater Detection  No Yes Yes 
Cheater Identification  No Yes Yes 
Almost Robust (Fairness)  Sometimes Yes Sometimes 
Cheating Immune  No No No 
 
2.2.1 Classification of Secret Sharing Schemes  
 
Secret Sharing Schemes could be classified into various categories using 
different criteria [75-77]. This could be in terms of the number of secrets to be 
shared; yielding two classes - identified as ‘single secrets’ and ‘multiple secrets’ 
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[78, 79]. They may also be classified in terms of the share’s capabilities; 
resulting in another two classes – tagged ‘same weighted shares’ and ‘multi-
weighted shares’ [80, 81]. In this way, the secret share of a higher level user 
contains more information about the original secret than the share for a lower 
level user. Other criteria used for categorisation include the abilities of the 
scheme, the computational power of the participants, its robustness [74, 82, 83], 
and the techniques used in designing the schemes. 
Generally, secret sharing schemes are classified into one of three categories 
[75]; namely, ‘perfect’, imperfect’ and ‘ramp’ [5]  schemes. Of these, the SSSS 
which belongs to the class of perfect secret sharing schemes is the most 
original, simplest, flexible and most popular [5, 75]. These categories and their 
authors are as illustrated below: 
Perfect secret sharing schemes – Benaloh (1989), Feldman (2008), Herzberg 
(1995), (Pedersen (1992) and Shamir (1979). 
Non-perfect secret sharing schemes - Asmuth-Bloom (1983), Brickell (1995), 
Ghodosi (1998), Iftene (2007) and Mignotte (1983). 
Ramp secret sharing schemes – Blakley (1979), Bai (2006), Franklin (1992) and 
Pang (2008). 
 
The need to consider the concept of active adversaries and the impact they 
may have on secret sharing schemes is highlighted in the next two sections.  
2.2.2 The Issues Arising from Active Adversarial Models 
 
A shift from the traditional passive adversarial model in favour of active 
adversaries for a secret sharing scheme raises a number of issues which were 
either not apparent previously or not important. Now that the Dealer is no longer 
fully trusted, shares can now be corrupted and the participants are neither fully 
trusted nor absolutely polarised, these issues now demand serious attention. 
They include answers to the following questions [35, 84, 85]:  
Who should reconstruct the shares – the Dealer, one of the participants or an 
external third party? 
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Should reconstructions be open or closed; should the secret be revealed during 
reconstruction or not? 
Are the adversaries static or dynamic? 
 
What are the goals of the adversaries – is it just to prevent reconstruction or 
gain information about the secret? 
 
2.2.3 Schemes Designed to Counter the Effects of Active Adversaries 
 
In an effort to answer some of the questions above and neutralise the threats 
posed by active adversaries like the three attack models illustrated in Table 2.1, 
various secret sharing schemes were devised in recent time. These include:  
Robust Secret Sharing Schemes   
The term Robust Secret Sharing usually describes schemes that are designed 
to ensure successful reconstruction of the correct secret; even if some 
participants submit incorrect shares. The schemes in this category include: 
 Bellare and Rogaway’s Classification – Bellare and Rogaway introduced 
a unifying framework for secret sharing schemes whereby the traditional 
concepts of a trusted Dealer and polarised participants are maintained, with a 
relaxation of the presumption that shares can only be captured but not 
corrupted. Excluding their fourth category of ‘no privacy’, this framework 
identifies three meaningful levels of privacy thus [84, 86, 87]:  
   
o Perfect Secret Sharing (PSS) - No information about the secret is 
revealed, independent of the computing power of the adversary; this is the 
traditional model of privacy. 
o Statistical Secret Sharing (SSS) – A small amount of information about the 
secret is potentially revealed, independent of the computing power of the 
adversary; i.e., an imperfect scheme in the traditional model. 
o Computational secret Sharing (CSS) – This protects the secret from an 
adversary with reasonable computing resources. 
This framework goes further by identifying nine levels of recoverability. 
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 Robust construction 
Detecting and Identifying Cheaters 
Schemes that detect and/or identify cheaters comprise of the following: 
 
Secret Sharing Schemes with Cheater Identification - These allow honest 
participants to detect and identify any corrupt shares submitted by an adversary 
[88]. 
Attributes of secret sharing schemes with cheater identification (detection) are 
[75, 82, 88]: 
 
o Presumption of a trusted Dealer; 
o Honest participants are willing to sacrifice recovery of the secret if an 
adversary corrupts the shares; for as long as the corrupted shares are 
identified (detection); 
o The main recoverability goal of the adversary is to prevent the correct 
secret from being reconstructed while remaining unidentified (undetected); 
o The schemes potentially allow the adversary to obtain the correct secret, 
while honest participants do not. 
Other schemes include: 
 
Almost robust secret sharing; 
 Cheating immune secret sharing; 
 Rotational secret sharing; 
 Verifiable secret sharing (VSS);  
 Information-theoretically (interactive) secure VSSs; 
 Computationally secure VSSs; and 
 Publicly-verifiable VSSs. 
 
The performance assessment of various secret sharing schemes is presented 
in the next section. 
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2.2.4 Comparative Performance Analyses of Secret Sharing Schemes 
 
The comparative performance analyses of secret sharing schemes are 
illustrated in Tables 2.2 – 2.4 below. 
 
 
 
Table 2.2. Types of secret sharing schemes with their respective hurdles  [52] 
Type of scheme Usage Hurdles 
Threshold Schemes. A group of mutually 
suspicious individuals with 
conflicting interests must 
cooperate. 
Design of access 
structures is difficult 
General Access Structure 
Schemes. 
 
Only certain specified 
subsets of the participants 
should be able to recover 
the secret. 
To add extra functionalities 
is difficult.  
 
Verifiable Secret Sharing 
(Interactive Proofs).  
 
Dealer and shareholders 
both interact with each 
other. Also, shareholders 
can interact with each 
other. 
Asserts a proof only to the 
participants of this protocol 
and only at the moment it is 
held. They cannot be legal 
proofs in court.  
Verifiable Secret Sharing 
(Non-Interactive Proofs).  
 
Only dealer is allowed to 
send messages, in 
particular, the shareholders 
cannot talk with each other 
or with the dealer when 
verifying a share.  
Many of the proposed 
schemes are providing 
cheating verification but not 
cheater identification.  
 
Publicly Verifiable Secret 
Sharing.  
 
Everybody can verify the 
correctness of his share.  
 
New members can‟t enroll 
the system according to the 
need of actual 
circumstance.  
Proactive Secret Sharing 
Schemes. 
Improve security through 
periodic executions.  
 
Need to be more secure 
and efficient of course, 
without any information-
leak or any secret change.  
 
Table 2.3. A matching of application type onto the required features of secret 
sharing schemes [52]  
Application Semantics Required feature of secret sharing 
Transfer money from a bank  Threshold schemes  
Launching of a ballistic missile  Threshold, General Access Structure  
Communications networks  Ideal, Perfect, Low complexity  
Trusted Shareholders, Untrusted Dealer  Verifiable Secret Sharing  
Trusted Dealer, Untrusted Shareholders  Verifiable Secret Sharing, Periodically 
Renew Share  
Electronic voting  Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing  
Private querying of database  Low Complexity, Threshold  
Collective Control  Periodically renew shares, Enroll/dis-
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 enroll shareholders, Recover lost share  
escrow-cryptosystems  Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing  
Secure Storage  
 
Ideal, Reliable, General Access Structure  
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4. Comparison of secret sharing schemes on extended capabilities [52] 
  
 
Tables 2.2 – 2.4 mark the end of formal reviews for the secret sharing literature. 
Bearing in mind that central to the idea of secret sharing is the notion of single-
point vulnerability and the need to eliminate this while handling a sensitive data, 
it is timely that the concepts of human security perimeter and its extension 
mechanisms are espoused next. Other related concepts like the web of trust, 
human factors, human infrastructure, human trust, and trust-related human 
characteristics that are indispensable in the process of interpersonal human 
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relations would also be discussed in the next section. It would also be 
interesting to find out if the term ‘trust’ is quantifiable and measurable using 
appropriate scales. 
 
 
2.3 Extending the Human Security Perimeter through a Web of Trust 
 
Security perimeter is the boundary within which security control measures are in 
effect to protect assets. These measures are in three categories; physical, 
procedural and logic [89]. Physical security measures employ guards, weapons, 
dogs, safes, strong rooms, fence/barbed wire and the likes, while procedural 
measures deal with security management/policy related issues like vetting and 
password policies. Logic security is concerned with the deployment of 
cryptographic assets in forms of mathematical algorithms and cryptographic 
protocols, such as digital signatures and various encryption/decryption 
techniques and keys. These are designed to ensure confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, authenticity and non-repudiation in order to preserve mutual trust 
among corresponding partners. This research effort is only concerned with logic 
security, but with due considerations for the other two components of security 
measures. This is very crucial because it has become evident that, in practice, 
there cannot be technical hacking in a vacuum (completely independent of 
human hacking) [90]. For this reason, in addition to technical solutions (e.g., 
using Cryptography) for every security problem, there are needs for the 
elements of both physical and procedural measures as well. For instance, it is 
expected that every organisation must have procedural security policy 
measures or guidelines as illustrated by the sample in Appendix 4 [91]. 
 
The illustration in Figure 2.6 does shed some light on the concept of security 
perimeter, where the individual employee in an organisation, or a person within 
a given system of human interaction, only trusts himself within his individual 
perimeter. It is a common saying that once an item of information is disclosed to 
a second party; it would cease to remain a secret. This poses a problem 
because he/she cannot operate alone and function well as a worker; he must 
interact with various other individuals and entities, both within and outside the 
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organisation. Hence, in order for him to function effectively, he would need to 
extend or expand his narrow security perimeter; to do this, he needs trust- and 
confidence-enhancing measures such as provided by one or some of the 
security measures identified above. This is where technology (e.g., 
cryptographic algorithms and protocols) comes to play. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6. Security measures: physical, procedural and logic 
 
 
At the heart of security concern is the issue of trust that is associated with the 
active variables in a system. Since the human factor is the most critical element 
in security systems [92], security perimeter could be defined in relation to the 
human trust level; via mutual positive identification of the 
correspondents/devices, using various means of authentication [93]. 
 
2.3.1  Zimmermann’s Web of Trust 
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The web of trust is a concept used in PGP and other PGP-compliant systems to 
establish the authenticity of the binding between a public key and its owner.  Its 
decentralised trust model is an alternative to the centralised trust model of a 
PKI, which relies exclusively on a CA or a hierarchy of CAs. As with computer 
networks, there are many independent webs of trust, and any user can be a 
part of, and a link between, multiple webs [94]. 
 
The web of trust protocol was first described by Zimmermann in 1992 in the 
manual for PGP version 2.0, as follows: 
“As time goes on, you will accumulate keys from other people that 
you may want to designate as trusted introducers. Everyone else 
will each choose their own trusted introducers. And everyone will 
gradually accumulate and distribute with their key a collection of 
certifying signatures from other people, with the expectation that 
anyone receiving it will trust at least one or two of the signatures. 
This will cause the emergence of a decentralised fault-tolerant 
web of confidence for all public keys” [95]. 
The scheme is flexible, unlike most public key infrastructure designs, and 
leaves trust decision(s) in the hands of individual users. It is not perfect and 
requires both caution and intelligent supervision by users. Essentially all PKI 
designs are less flexible and require users to follow the trusted endorsement of 
the PKI-generated certification authority (CA)-signed certificates. It uses self-
signed certificates and third party attestations of those certificates. The term 
"web of trust" does not imply the existence of a single web of trust, or common 
point of trust, but rather one of any number of potentially disjoint "webs of trust." 
 
Among its benefits is the fact that it can interoperate with a PKI CA fully trusted 
by all parties in a domain that is willing to guarantee certificates, as a trusted 
introducer. However, if the "web of trust" is completely trusted, its nature is such 
that trusting one certificate amounts to granting trust to all the certificates in that 
web. A PKI is only as valuable as the standards and practices that control the 
issuance of certificates. Thus, by including PGP or a personally instituted web 
of trust in a PKI scheme, it could significantly degrade the trust-ability of that 
enterprise's or domain's implementation of PKI [96].  Another of its drawbacks is 
58 
 
that, if a user loses track of a private key, he would no longer be able to decrypt 
messages sent to him; if the message was encrypted using the matching public 
key found in an Open PGP certificate. Similarly, early PGP certificates did not 
include expiry dates, and those certificates had unlimited lives. Users had to 
prepare a signed cancellation certificate against the time when the matching 
private key was lost or compromised. 
 
2.3.2 Human Factors and Human Infrastructure in the Context of Trust 
 
In this segment, effort is made to define/explain the terms trust’, ‘human factors’ 
and ‘human infrastructure’. Additionally, their pristine concepts and, where 
necessary, contexts of usage in this research work are also highlighted. This is 
a deliberate effort to properly situate the subtitle of this research Thesis in order 
to further facilitate its easy understanding by the readers. 
 
Trust  
 
Etymologically, the word ‘trust’ comes from Old Norse, a North Germanic 
language (Icelandic), which was spoken by the inhabitants of Scandinavia, as 
well as the inhabitants of their overseas settlements, from about the 9th to 13th 
centuries BCE [97, 98]. It either metamorphosed from ‘traustr’ which meant 
‘strong’ or ‘treysta’ which stood for ‘strengthen’ or ‘reinforce’. In modern English, 
the words generally taken as synonyms of ‘trust’ include faith, belief, hope, 
conviction, confidence, expectation, reliance and dependence. A cursory look at 
the dictionaries unveils the main elements of its definition as “firm belief in the 
reliability, truth, or ability of someone or something” (Oxford); “confidence in and 
reliance on good qualities, especially fairness, truth, honour, or ability” 
(Encarta); “to believe that someone is good and honest and will not harm you, 
or that something is safe and reliable” (Cambridge); “belief that someone or 
something is reliable, good, honest, effective, etc.” (Webster); and “allow 
someone to have, use, or look after (someone or something of importance or 
value) with confidence.” The value of trust in the process of all forms of human 
interaction is as significant as aptly described by Russell [99] in her book title: 
“Trust: The New Workplace Currency;” i.e., it is the medium of exchange among 
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humans, without which no trade, whether in kind or cash, can take place with 
positive results [100, 101].  
 
The need for trust arises from the fact that, working together often involves 
interdependence, and people must, therefore, depend on others in various ways 
to accomplish their personal and organisational goals. Thus, the definition of 
trust adopted in this research is “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to 
the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform 
a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or 
control that other party” [2, 102]. The term ‘vulnerability’ here implies the 
willingness to accept some measure of risk. 
 
The significance of trust is as powerful in the process of human interactions as 
punctuation is in sentence construction. Consider the following illustration using 
a sentence - with and without punctuation marks: 
 
Without Punctuation: “A woman without her man is nothing” 
 
With Punctuation: (1) “A woman, without her man, is nothing.” 
    (2) “A woman: without her, man is nothing.” 
 
As the respective punctuation marks turned the possible imports of the above 
sentence upside down, so does a message of trust – when appropriately or 
inappropriately communicated - turn the results of human interaction upside 
down. Trust is the basic infrastructure for all forms of human interactions; be it 
socio-economic, socio-political, ethnoreligious, interpersonal, electronic, and 
tele-communicative – whether locally or globally. Hence, there must be factors 
that enhance trust with corresponding benefits [103, 104] and factors that 
diminish it with corresponding detriments [99, 105]. These factors are governed 
by the key elements in the synonyms and definitions of trust as highlighted 
above. A careful examination would suggest that they include the attributes of 
faithfulness, hopefulness, confidence, reliability, truthfulness, ability, fairness, 
honour (integrity, principles, morality, honesty, probity, righteousness, rectitude, 
uprightness, goodness, decency, prestige, reputation, distinction, virtue, etc.), 
safety, effectiveness, predictability, benevolence, etc. While these factors yield 
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benefits, their exact opposites attract detriments. Indeed, the concept of all 
forms of trusteeship is a function of human trust [106]. 
 
 
 
Human Factors and Ergonomics 
 
Human factors and ergonomics (HF&E), also known as comfort design, 
functional design or systems, is the practice of designing products, systems, or 
processes to take proper account of the interaction between them and the 
people who use them [107, 108]. The term ‘human factor’ is used mainly in the 
US. Its other variants include ‘human factors engineering’ and ‘human 
engineering’. In Europe and the rest of the world, the term ergonomics’ is more 
prevalent [108, 109]. 
 
‘Human factors’ is an umbrella term for many areas of research; including 
human performance, technology, design, and human-computer interaction. It is 
a profession that focuses on how people interact with products, tools, 
procedures, and any processes likely to be encountered in the modern world 
[101, 110, 111]. Its practitioners may come from a variety of backgrounds; 
though predominantly they are psychologists (cognitive, perceptual, and 
experimental) and engineers. Other contributors are designers (industrial, 
interaction, and graphic), anthropologists, and computer scientists. While 
ergonomics tends to focus on the anthropometrics1 for optimal human-machine 
interaction, human factors is more focused on the cognitive and perceptual 
factors [107, 108, 112]. 
  
Human factors practitioners are particularly interested in the following areas: 
workload, fatigue, situational awareness, usability, user interface, learnability, 
attention, vigilance, human performance, control and display design, stress, 
visualisation of data, individual differences, aging, accessibility, shift work, 
human error, and working in extreme environments. In a nutshell, ‘human 
factors’ involves working to make the environment function in a way that looks 
                                                     
1
 Anthropometry is the study of objective measurable physical variables in humans, which 
impacts on architecture, industrial design and ergonomics. 
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natural to people by taking relevant human attributes into consideration. The 
terms ‘human factors’ and ‘ergonomics’ became popular only in recent times, 
although the origin of this field of study is traceable to the design and use of 
aircraft during WW2  in an effort to improve aviation safety [108]. 
 
Different sectors of human activities concentrate on slightly varying aspects of 
human factors and ergonomics. Although prominent among these varieties 
include those from professional societies, scientific literature, government 
agencies, industry and open sources [107], for convenience, I will take only a 
few samples for illustration; each from a  different sector.  
 
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (HFES) sees HF&E as a discipline  
concerned with the application of what we know about people, their abilities, 
characteristics, and limitations of the design of equipment they use, 
environments in which they function, and jobs they perform [107, 113]. In the 
perception of WHO, HF&E refers to environmental, organisational and job 
factors, as well as human and individual characteristics which influence 
behavior at work in a way that may affect health and safety. A simple way to 
view human factors is to think about three aspects; the job, the individual and 
the organisation and how these impact on people’s health and safety-related 
behaviour [107]. In the scientific literature, HF&E is defined as a body of 
knowledge about human abilities, human limitations, and other human 
characteristics that are relevant to design. Human factors engineering is the 
application of human factors information to the design of tools, machines, 
systems, tasks, jobs, and environments for safe, comfortable, and effective 
human use. It is essentially concerned with the understanding of interactions 
among humans and other elements of a system, and the profession that applies 
theory, principles, data and methods to design in order to optimise human well-
being and overall system performance [107, 108, 114]. ISO 6385 has also 
adopted the second scientific definition. In the industrial sector, HF&E is the 
study of human performance and its application to the design of technological 
systems. The goal of this activity is to enhance productivity, safety, convenience 
and quality of life. Example topics include models [115] and theories of human 
performance, design and analytical methodology, human-computer interface 
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issues, environmental and work design and physical/mental workload 
assessment. Human factors engineering requires input from disciplines ranging 
from psychology and environmental medicine to statistics [116-118]   . 
 
The concept of human factors, as employed in this research work, relates to all 
the trust-enhancing (beneficial) and trust-diminishing (detrimental) human 
attributes, as highlighted under trust above. It is then posited that the 
consideration of applicable elements of these attributes, both the positive and 
negative, is a ‘sine qua non’ in the design and functioning of all aspects of 
human endeavours in order to realise optimum output; with particular emphasis 
on technological systems. 
 
Human Infrastructure 
 
An infrastructure is the most basic level of physical and organisational structure 
in a complex body or system that serves as a foundation in order to enable the 
rest of its elements to function optimally [119]. Thus, it follows that the large-
scale public systems, services, and facilities of a country or region that are 
necessary for economic activity, including power and water supplies, public 
transport, telecommunications, roads, and schools constitute the national 
infrastructure. When this definition is applied to the concept/context of the term 
‘human infrastructure’ as employed in this research work, it would mean that 
any technological design/device/system that is emplaced without the necessary 
quality assurance that could only be guaranteed via requisite considerations of 
trust and human factors, as highlighted above, would not yield optimum results. 
With particular reference to any technological system, a skillful interplay 
between human trust and other human factors should constitute its 
infrastructural base. For instance, if one puts in place a gigantic state of the art 
industrial complex without trained workers who are capable of operating its 
complex systems efficiently, this would amount to a mere waste of time and 
resources. 
 
2.3.3  Adeka’s Web of Trust 
In contrast to the Zimmermann’s web of trust as a possible successor to the PKI 
system, which was highlighted earlier, the concept of web of trust as reflected in 
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the subtitle of this work has two component elements. The first element relates 
to a network (web) of trustees or participants in the business of secret sharing 
as expounded by Shamir. The second element has to do with the security which 
results from the web implementation of this research effort, which serves to 
enhance secret sharing via a secure and trusted website [120]. The same trust 
instruments (a web of trusted associates and secure website) that engender the 
emergence of such a secure and healthy business environment could also be 
responsible for the extension of the individual human security perimeter 
discussed earlier, as a consequence of increased human confidence. 
 
Statistical Proof for the Extension of Human Security Perimeter through a Web 
of Trust: Estimating the Measure of Trust from the Web 
 
In statistical contraption, the probability that a valuable item (Secret Data) that is 
kept by one trusted person would get lost or damaged is equal to the probability 
that the item would be safe or remain secure. Let the probability of loss/damage 
for the item being kept by one trustee be designated as
1TPL  and the 
corresponding probability that the item would remain safe/secure be denoted as
1TPS . Then, it can be deduced that: 
1TPL  = 21                 (2.23) 
1TPS  = 21               (2.24) 
 
Similarly, it can be shown that: 
  
2TPL = 2TPS  = 41  
3TPL = 3TPS  = 61  
. 
 . 
 . 
  
iLTP  = iSTP  = i21                         (2.25) 
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Where ‘i’ is the iterative index for trustees or trusted people sharing the Secret. 
In other words, Equation (2.25) is an expression of the individual probability that 
the fraction of the Secret that is held by each of the ‘n’ participants (the ith 
participant) or trustees will be lost/damaged or remain safe/secure. 
 
The probability that all the Shares might get lost2 is the Joint Probability ( nJLTP ) 
of loss/damage for all the individual probabilities as defined above (‘n’ being the 
total number of participating trustees). In statistical notation, this is computed by 
taking the product of all the individual probabilities: 
 
 nJLTP   = 1TPL  • 2TPL  • 3TPL  •  . . . • nLTP   
   = 

n
i
iLTP
1
             (2.26) 
But 
1TPL  = 2TPL  = 3TPL  = . . . = nLTP , for all  siT '  (Shamir’s assumed equal likelihood). 
 
From Equation (2.25): 
 
 nLTP  = n21 , thus, Equation (2.26) leads to: 
 nJLTP  = )21(
1


n
i
i             (2.27) 
From Equation (2.27), it can be demonstrated that, for all ‘i’s’ greater than ‘1’ (i = 
1,n), iJLTP  is much less than 1TPL . Equations (2.25) and (2.27) may be referred 
to as Adeka’s Twin Probability Equations on Secret Sharing (ATPESS). 
Consider the following illustration: 
 
As an example, let n = 5, then, Equation (2.27) yields: 
                                                     
2
It is noted that own worry is that the secret portions (Shares) being held by the trustees might 
get lost; not that they would be safe. Thus, henceforth, the effort to estimate the level of trust 
that could be associated with sharing a Secret among more than one trustee will be devoted to 
the probability of loss/damage only. For a (k, n)-threshold scheme, since not all the Shares are 
required in order to reconstruct the Secret, it follows that the concern should be about the joint 
probability of loss/damage. 
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 5TPJL  =   )21(
5
1

i
i  = ( 21 ) • ( 41 ) • ( 61 ) • ( 81 ) • ( 101 )  
  =   
41060.2 x (i.e., 0.000260 for 5TPJL  compared with 0.5 for 1TPL ) 
 
But  
 nJSTP  =   1 - nJLTP ; i.e., 5TPJS    =   1 - 5TPJL  
  =    1 - 0.000260 
  =     0.99974 = 9.9974 x 10-1 (i.e., nJSTP 0.1 ), for n = 5. 
Where nJSTP  is the joint probability that all the n Shares would remain secure. 
 
This illustration proves that mathematically and sensibly speaking, as n 
increases in the (k, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme, independent of ‘k’, the 
joint probability for the Secret getting lost/damaged or compromised decreases 
exponentially. By implication, since the joint probability of the Secret being safe 
is inversely proportional to that of its loss/damage, it follows that the joint 
probability for safety increases exponentially, as n increases. This is illustrated 
in Figure 2.7. 
 
Figure 2.7. Exponential decay in the probability that a shared secret item 
would get lost/damaged as the number of trustees increases 
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Effect of (k, n)-Threshold Secret Sharing on Human Trust 
Using statistical probability, as illustrated above, the lesson acquired is that 
secret sharing decreases the chances for the loss/damage of the Secret 
exponentially and, by implication, it increases the chances for the 
safety/security of the Secret exponentially. Therefore, it would be reasonable to 
posit that, secret sharing increases or extends the human confidence/trust that 
is to be associated with the safety/security of the Secret Data, when compared 
to a situation where an individual keeps the Secret all alone. The resultant 
increased confidence/trust, due to enhanced safety/security, is engendered by 
the involvement of the network (web) of ‘n’ trusted associates or 
participants/trustees in the sharing scheme; and hence, the subtitle of this 
Thesis – ‘Extending the Human Security Perimeter through a Web of Trust. 
Other models for measuring human trust are briefly highlighted in the next 
section. 
 
2.3.4 Other Models for Measuring the Human Trust 
 
The subject of trust has been generating increased interest in organisational 
studies, most probably because many of the problems associated with 
organisational/system complexity have defied solutions, despite advances in 
technology. Cybersecurity is obviously one of such problems. Scholars have 
alluded to trust as a fundamental ingredient, a lubricant or an indispensable 
dimension of social interaction [2]. The importance of trust has been highlighted 
in many areas of human endeavour. These include communication, leadership, 
management by objectives, negotiation, game theory [121], performance 
appraisal, labour-management relations and implementation of self-managed 
work teams. In spite of the great deal of interest in trust among scholars, its 
study in organisations has remained problematic for a number of reasons. 
These include problems with the definition of trust; lack of clarity in the 
relationship between risk and trust; confusion between trust and its 
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antecedents/outcomes; lack of specificity of trust referents leading to confusion 
in levels of analysis; and a failure to consider both the trusting party (trustor) 
and the party to be trusted (trustee). Mayer et al. [2, 102] considered all these 
problems in varying degrees and came up with a model of trust of one individual 
or party for another, incorporating risk taking in the relationship. A major 
difficulty in previous researches on trust was a lack of clear differentiation 
among the factors that contribute to trust, trust itself, and its outcomes. Of 
particular significance is the relationship between trust and risk.  Though many 
researchers agree that the need for trust only arises in a risky situation, there is 
no consensus on its relationship with trust; it is unclear whether risk is an 
antecedent to trust, is trust, or is an outcome of trust – and hence, the role of 
interpersonal trust in risk taking.  
 
In the following subsections, the definition of trust developed by [2] is presented, 
and it is differentiated from similar concepts. This would be followed by the 
characteristics of both the trustor and the trustee, which affect the amount of 
trust the trustor has for the trustee. Thereafter, the relationship between trust 
and risk is considered. Finally, the effects of context as well as the long-term 
development of trust will also be highlighted. A pictorial impression of an 
integrative model of organisational trust [2, 102] as deduced by Mayer et al. will 
be presented in the process of this brief coverage. 
 
Definition 
 
Mayer et al. [2]  began with the positions of several researchers on the concept 
of trust. He cited  Rotter [122] who defined trust as “an expectancy held by an 
individual or a group that the word, promise, verbal or written statement of 
another individual or group can be relied upon.” His other cited opinions include 
the “willingness to take risks may be one of the few characteristics common to 
all trust situations;" and in order “to appropriately study trust there must be 
some meaningful incentives at stake and that the trustor must be cognisant of 
the risk involved.” Mayer then defined trust as “the willingness of a party to be 
vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the 
other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the 
ability to monitor or control that other party.” He applied this definition to any 
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relationship with another identifiable party who is perceived to act and react with 
volition toward the trustor. With the introduction of vulnerability, this definition 
parallels other definitions because being vulnerable implies that there is 
something of importance that could be lost, and hence, an inherent risk is also 
germane. It should be noted that trust is not taking risk per se; it is rather a 
willingness to take risk. This distinction will be further explored in a later section.  
 
It is observed that many terms have been used synonymously with trust, thus 
muddling up the nature of trust. These include cooperation, confidence, and 
predictability. There is a need to differentiate trust from these concepts in order 
to correctly understand its nature [2, 102]. This is briefly attempted in the next 
three paragraphs. 
 
Cooperation 
 
Although trust and cooperation have at times been treated as synonymous, they 
are essentially two different concepts. One could cooperate with someone who 
one does not really trust for the following possible reasons: If it is known that 
there are control mechanisms to punish the trustee for untoward behaviour; if 
the situation does not make the trustor vulnerable; or where the trustee’s 
motives coincide with the trustor's desires. Thus, cooperation without trust is 
possible where vulnerability is absent or minimal. 
 
Confidence 
 
The relationship between ‘confidence’ and ‘trust’ is not clearly defined in the 
available literature [2]. After citing several authors to illustrate the lack of clarity 
in the distinction between the two terms, Luhmann [123] proposed a distinction 
that helps to differentiate trust from confidence. He noted that both concepts 
refer to expectations that might lead to disappointments. He argued that trust 
differs from confidence because it requires a previous engagement on a 
person's part, recognising and accepting the fact that risk does exist. Although 
Luhmann suggested that both confidence and trust may become routine, the 
distinction "de-pends on perception and attribution. If you do not consider 
alternatives (every morning you leave the house without a weapon!), you are in 
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a situation of confidence. If you choose one action in preference to others in 
spite of the possibility of being disappointed by the action of others, you define 
the situation as one of trust" [123]. In this differentiation between trust and 
confidence, it is documented that risk must be recognised in the former and 
assumed; such is not the case with confidence. The trustor's explicit recognition 
of risk in Mayer’s model [2]  eliminates the conceptual ambiguity inherent in 
other research conclusions such as the one presented by Coleman [124].  
 
Predictability 
 
As with cooperation and confidence, there is clearly a relationship between 
predictability and trust, but the association is also vague. While it is accepted 
that both prediction and trust are means of reducing uncertainty as documented 
by Lewis and Weigert [125], much of the literature tends to equate the duo as 
synonyms as highlighted by Gabarro [126]. He illustrated this point by citing 
many definitions of trust, including "the extent to which one person can expect 
predictability in the other's behaviour in terms of what is 'normally' expected of a 
person acting in good faith." In the words of Deutsch [127], in order for the term 
trust to be meaningful, it must go beyond predictability. He contended that to 
equate the two is to suggest that a party who can be expected to consistently 
ignore the needs of others and act in a self-interested fashion is therefore 
trusted because the party is predictable. A major lacuna in such an approach is 
the willingness to take a risk in the relationship and to be vulnerable. One can 
believe such a trustee to be predictable in a situation in which the trustee 
influences resource distribution between the trustee and the trustor but also be 
unwilling to be vulnerable to that trustee. It is obvious that another party's 
predictability is not sufficient to make a person willing to take a risk.  
 
Another clear illustration is that, if a person's superior always "shoots the 
messenger" when bad news is delivered, the superior is predictable. However, 
this predictability will not increase the likelihood that the individual will take a 
risk and deliver bad news to him. On the contrary, predictability can reduce the 
likelihood that the individual will trust and therefore take actions that allow 
vulnerability to the superior. Hence, predictability is insufficient to engender 
trust; and cannot be equated with trust [127]. The highlights on the factors 
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concerning the trustor and trustee, which lead to trust would further illustrate 
this point, as discussed next.  
 
 
Characteristics of the Trustor  
 
This and the next sections deal with factors concerning the trustor and then the 
trustee; which lead to trust. These components of the trust model are illustrated 
in Figure 2.8.  
 
                         
  
One major factor which will determine the trust that one party has for another 
relates to the traits of the trustor; some parties are more likely to trust than are 
others. Many authors have considered trust from the perspective of a person's 
general willingness to trust others. One of the early trust theorists was Rotter 
[122], who defined interpersonal trust "as an expectancy held by an individual or 
a group that the word, promise, verbal or written statement of another individual 
or group can be relied upon." This definition seems to suggest that the author is 
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Figure 2.8. Mayer’s Proposed Model of Trust   [2] 
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speaking of trust for a specific trustee, but his widely used trust scale focuses 
on a generalised trust of others; something like a personality trait that a person 
would presumably carry from one situation to another. For instance, typical 
items in his scale include: "In dealing with strangers one is better off to be 
cautious until they have provided evidence that they are trustworthy;" and 
"Parents usually can be relied upon to keep their promises." An aspect of this 
concept is demonstrated in the results of trust measurement using Rotter’s 
Interpersonal Trust Scale [128]; a scale of 25-Question Graded Questionnaire 
whose responses measure the examinee as a trustor and then uses one’s 
scores as a trustor to serve as a reflection of one’s disposition as a trustee. That 
is if Mr ‘A’ trusts others 75% of the time as a trustor, then, there are chances 
that he would be 75% trustworthy as a trustee. A series of practical tests led to 
the following conclusion: “People who trust more are less likely to lie and are 
possibly less likely to cheat or steal. They are more likely to give others a 
second chance and to respect the rights of others” [128]. Rotter’s Interpersonal 
Trust Scale is attached as Appendix 5 
 
Other authors who have discussed trust in similar veins include Dasgupta, who 
sees generalised expectations of others as a major element in trust. For 
instance, "Can I trust people to come to my rescue if I am about to drown?" 
[129]. In the same vein, Farris et al. [130] defined trust as "a personality trait of 
people interacting with the peripheral environment of an organisation." That is, 
trust is viewed as a trait that leads to a generalised expectation about the 
trustworthiness of others.  
 
In the trust model in Figure 2.8, this trait is referred to as the propensity to trust. 
Propensity could be thought of as the general willingness to trust others; people 
with different experiences, personality types, and cultural backgrounds vary in 
their propensity to trust [131]. Propensity will influence how much trust one has 
for a trustee prior to the availability of any data on that particular trustee – this is 
akin to what is referred to as blind trust (or bind love). Propensity is an 
associate of credulity, gullibility, naivety, unwariness or the tendency to do 
something (e.g., trust) without any cogent reason as it affects the characteristic 
of an individual or group.  
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The propensity to trust is similar to the concept of risk propensity in the model 
for the determinants of risk behaviour, as espoused by  Sitkin and Pablo [132]. 
They define risk propensity as "the tendency of a decision maker either to take 
or avoid risks" [132]. However, this differs from the propensity to trust others as 
adopted by Mayer et al. [2]  because risk propensity, as defined, is situation-
specific and it is affected by both personality characteristics and situational 
factors, whereas propensity to trust is viewed as a trait that is applicable to 
different situations. Based on the foregoing, Mayer et al. [2] posited that:  
 
“The higher the trustor's propensity to trust, the higher the trust for a trustee 
prior to the availability of information about the trustee.”  
 
It is to be noted that, though an understanding of trust requires the 
consideration of the trustor’s trust propensity, a given trustor has varied levels of 
trust for various trustees. Thus, the trustor’s propensity alone is not sufficient. 
Hence, this variance is addressed in the next section by examining the 
characteristics of the trustee.  
 
Characteristics of the Trustee and the Concept of Trustworthiness  
 
An approach to understanding why a given party will trust another party more or 
less than others is to consider the attributes of the trustee. Ring and Van de 
Ven [133] argued that due to the possibility of risk in transactions, managers 
must concern themselves with the trustworthiness of the other party. A number 
of authors have considered why a party will be judged as trustworthy. Citing 
several authors, Mayer et al. [2]  noted that credibility is affected by two factors; 
expertise and trustworthiness. Trustworthiness is a function of motivation (or 
lack of it) to lie. For example, if the trustee had something to gain by lying, he or 
she would be seen as less trustworthy. Generally, trust is based on 
expectations of how another person will behave, based on that person's current 
and previous implicit and explicit claims. In fiduciary relationships, trust is based 
on a belief in the professional's competence and integrity. A careful examination 
of the items in Johnson-George and Swap's [134] measure of trust reveals that 
they reflect inferences about the trustee. All available authors [2]  have 
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suggested that the characteristics and actions of the trustee will make him/her 
more or less trustworthy. Hence, in order for researchers to understand why 
some parties are more trusted than others, a clear assessment of these 
trustee’s characteristics are indispensable. A substantial number of the 
characteristics are highlighted in the treatment of trust under Section 2.3.2. 
Figure 2.8 summarises these factors of trustworthiness to three; namely, ability, 
benevolence, and integrity. These three characteristics of the trustee that must 
interplay with the trustor’s propensity to trust in order to determine 
trustworthiness are briefly highlighted next. These variables are not trust per se, 
but they help to build the foundation for the development of trust. 
 
The Factors of Trustworthiness 
 
Some authors identify a single trustee characteristic that is responsible for trust, 
whereas other authors demarcate as many as ten characteristics [2, 135]. In 
spite of this discrepancy among the researchers, three characteristics of a 
trustee appear to be constant in the literature; namely, ability, benevolence, and 
integrity. These three appear to account for a major portion of trustworthiness. 
Each3 of these contributes a unique perceptive perspective from which to 
assess the trustee, while the set provides a solid foundation for the empirical 
study of trust for another party [2].  
 
  Ability - Ability relates to that group of skills, competencies, and characteristics 
that enable a party to have influence within some specific domain. This area of 
the ability is specific because the trustee may be highly competent in some 
technical area, affording that person trust on tasks related to that area, having 
little or lacking aptitude, training, or experience in another area - for instance, in 
interpersonal communication. Although such an individual may be trusted to do 
analytic tasks related to his or her technical area, the individual may not be 
trusted to initiate contact with an important customer. Hence, trust is relative to 
the domain of competence [136, 137]. Other terms used in the literature which 
                                                     
3
It is interesting to note that Aristotle's Rhetoric suggests that a speaker's ethos (Greek root for 
ethics) is based on the listener's perception of three things: intelligence; character (reliability, 
honesty); and goodwill (favourable intentions toward the listener). These bases provide an 
interesting parallel with the factors of ability, integrity, and benevolence, respectively.  
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also connote ability in a similar context include competence, perceived 
expertise, expertness, functional/specific competence, interpersonal 
competence, business sense and judgment. Whereas these terms connote a 
set of skills applicable to a single, fixed domain (e.g., interpersonal 
competence), ability highlights the task- and situation-specific nature of the 
construct in the model proposed by Mayer et al. [2]. 
 
Benevolence – Apart from the self-centred profit motive, benevolence is the 
extent to which a trustee is believed to be interested in doing good to the 
trustor. Benevolence suggests that the trustee has some specific attachment to 
the trustor; e.g., the attachment in the relationship between a mentor (trustee) 
and a mentee (trustor). The mentor wants to help the mentee, even though the 
mentor is not required to be helpful, and there is no extrinsic reward for the 
mentor. Benevolence is the perception of a positive orientation of the trustee 
toward the trustor [2]. Other researchers also used expressions that connote 
benevolence as a basis for trust. These include: trustee’s motivation to lie 
(inversely proportional to high benevolence); intentions/motives; altruism; loyalty 
[135]; the extent to which the leader's behaviour is relevant to the individual's 
needs and desires of the led; and the likelihood that the trustee would give 
priority to organisational goals ahead of individual goals. 
 
Integrity – Basically, the relationship between integrity and trust involves the 
perception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that are appealing or 
acceptable to the trustor. McFall [138] and Biba [139] illustrated why not only 
the adherence to but also acceptability of the principles are important. She 
posited that mere following of a set of principles defines personal integrity. 
However, if that set of principles is not deemed acceptable by the trustor, the 
trustee’s integrity would not be considered relevant for the purpose of 
trustworthiness; she called this moral integrity. The issue of acceptability 
precludes the argument that a party who is committed solely to the principle of 
profit seeking at all costs would be judged high in integrity, except in the unlikely 
event where this principle is acceptable to the trustor. Other connotations of 
integrity include the consistency of the party's past actions; credible 
communications about the trustee from other unrelated parties; the belief that 
the trustee has a strong sense of justice; and the extent to which the trustee's 
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actions are in tune with his or her words. Even though a case could be made 
that there are differentiable reasons why the integrity of a trustee could be 
perceived as higher or lower (e.g., lack of consistency is different from 
acceptability of principles), in the evaluation of trustworthiness it is the 
perceived level of integrity that is important rather than the reasons why the 
perception is formed  [138] 
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the three factors of ability, benevolence, and 
integrity are common to most of the previous works on trust. These three factors 
appear to explain concisely the reasons for the variation in the level of trust that 
a trustor may have for trustees. Hence, Mayer et al. concluded, in line with the 
trust model in Figure 2.8, that:  
 
“Trust for a trustee will be a function of the trustee's perceived ability, 
benevolence, and integrity and of the trustor's propensity to trust” [2]. 
 
Interrelationship of the Three Factors 
 
Ability, benevolence, and integrity are important to trust, and each may vary 
independent of the others. This does not imply that the three are unrelated to 
one another; it only means that they are separable [2]. Consider the case of an 
individual and a would-be mentor. Ideally, the individual would want the mentor 
to be able to have the maximum positive impact on the mentee’s career and to 
assist/guide the mentee as much as possible. The extent to which the mentee 
would trust the mentor is a function of the mentee’s perception that the mentor 
has the ability to be helpful. This perception, alone, would not assure that the 
mentor would be helpful; it would only mean that the possibility exists. 
 
As regards the mentor’s integrity, it is a function of previous positively viewed 
actions of the mentor in his or her relationships with others, compatibility of the 
mentor's statements with actions, and credible communications from others 
about honourable actions by the mentor. However, even if the individual is 
assessed to have high integrity, he or she may or may not have the knowledge 
and capabilities to be a helpful mentor. Hence, integrity alone will not make the 
individual a trusted mentor. 
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Consider the case of the person whose integrity is well known and whose 
abilities are stellar. Only these two would not guarantee that this potential 
mentor is trustworthy. This individual may have no particular attachment to the 
projected mentee. Relative to the organisational setting, the projected mentee 
might not trust the potential mentor enough to divulge sensitive information 
about mistakes or shortcomings to him. If the manager were also benevolent 
toward the projected mentee, he or she may try to protect him/her from the 
possible consequences of mistakes. A manager who is less benevolent to the 
focal employee may be more disposed to using the information in a way that 
helps the company most, even at the possible expense of the employee. 
However, benevolence by itself is not sufficient to engender trust. Thus, a well-
intentioned person who lacks ability may not even know who in the organisation 
should be made aware of pertinent information. Rather than being helpful, such 
a person could actually do harm to the employee's career. Thus, a perceived 
lack of any of the three factors could undermine trust. 
 
Ordinarily, if ability, benevolence, and integrity were all perceived to be high, the 
trustee would be deemed quite trustworthy. However, trustworthiness should be 
thought of as a continuum, rather than the trustee being either trustworthy or not 
trustworthy. Each of the three factors can vary along a continuum [2]. Although 
the simplest case of high trust presumes a high level of all three factors, there 
may be situations in which a meaningful amount of trust can develop with lesser 
degrees of the three. While it is obvious that, when all the three factors are high, 
it signifies a high level of trustworthiness, it would also be of interest to find out 
the amount by which these factors or some of them must drop before a trustee 
could be adjudged as untrustworthy. Similarly, the knowledge of the situations 
in which each of the three factors is most sensitive or critical would be of great 
importance and worth investigating. This leads to the pertinent interactive role of 
propensity in trust assessment.  
 
Prior to the development of any relationship between two parties – when little or 
nothing is known about the three attributes of ability, benevolence, and integrity 
- the trust model in Figure 2.8 can explain trust using propensity. As a 
relationship begins to develop, the trustor may be able to obtain data on the 
trustee's integrity through third-party sources and observation, with little direct 
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interaction. At this stage, since there is little information about the trustee's 
benevolence toward the trustor, it is suggested that integrity will be important to 
the formation of trust early in the relationship. As the relationship develops  
further, interactions with the trustee allow the trustor to gain insights about the 
trustee's benevolence, and the relative impact of benevolence on trust starts to 
grow. Thus, the development of the relationship is likely to alter the relative 
importance of the factors of trustworthiness. Hence, Mayer et al. concluded 
thus:    
 
“The effect of integrity on trust will be most salient early in the relationship prior 
to the development of meaningful data on benevolence, and the effect of 
perceived benevolence on trust will increase over time as the relationship 
between the parties develops” [2]. 
 
Each of these three factors captures some unique elements of trustworthiness. 
It was earlier posited, parsimoniously, that as a set, ability, benevolence, and 
integrity appear to explain a major portion of trustworthiness. Each element 
contributes a unique perceptive perspective from which the trustor considers the 
trustee. If a trustee is perceived as high on all three factors, it is argued here 
that the trustee will be perceived as quite trustworthy. Next is a brief explanation 
of risk and its relationship with trust. 
 
Risk Taking in Relationship   
 
It was previously emphasised that risk is an essential component of a model of 
trust. It is important for its role in trust-related matters to be clearly spelt out and 
understood by all; researchers, students and both advertent and inadvertent 
practitioners. There is no risk taken, per se, in the willingness to be vulnerable 
(i.e., to trust), but risk is inherent in the behavioural manifestation of the 
willingness to be vulnerable. In other words, one does not need to risk anything 
in order to trust; however, one must take a risk in order to engage in trusting 
action. The fundamental difference between trust and trusting behaviours 
(actions) is the same as the difference between a "willingness" to assume risk 
and actually "assuming" risk [2, 102]. Trust is the willingness to assume risk; 
behavioural trust is the assuming of risk. This critical differentiation highlights 
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the importance of clearly distinguishing between trust and its outcomes. It is 
reiterated that trust will lead to risk taking in a relationship, and the form of the  
risk taking depends on the situation. Even though the form of the risk taking 
depends on the situation, the quantum of risk that a party will take is a function 
of the amount of trust for the other party; a case of direct proportionality.  
 
From the foregoing, it should be understood that the outcome of trust in the 
model proposed by Mayer et al. [2] is Risk Taking in Relationship (RTR). RTR 
as an inherent outcome of trust is different from general risk-taking actions 
because it can occur only in the context of a specific and clearly identifiable 
relationship between two parties. In addition, RTR suggests that trust will 
increase the likelihood that a trustor will not only form some affective link with a 
trustee but also that the trustor will allow personal vulnerability. The separation 
of trust from RTR is as illustrated in Figure 2.8 by the inclusion of a box 
representing each construct.  
 
It should also be noted that trust is not involved in all risk-taking actions. A good 
illustration is the case of a farmer who invests time and resources into planting 
crops; the farmer is taking a risk with the assumption that sufficient rain will fall 
during the critical times of the growing season so that there will be a profitable 
yield. Although this action involves risk, it does not involve a trust as defined in 
this theory (Mayer’s trust model), because there is no relationship with an 
identifiable "other party" to which the farmer would make himself or herself 
vulnerable. Nevertheless, proponents of a sociological approach might argue 
that this is an example of trust because there is a system that produces 
meteorological forecasts; Sitkin and Pablo are of the view that perceptions of 
meteorologists' accuracy would affect risk perception [132]. It should be 
remembered that the meteorologists do not control the weather; they merely 
provide data about the likelihood of various weather scenarios. Thus, the farmer 
does not trust the weather but takes a risk on what the weather will do [127]. 
The assessment of risk in a situation involves consideration of the context, such 
as weighing the likelihood of both positive and negative outcomes that might 
occur. If a decision involves the possibility of both negative and positive 
outcomes, the aggregate level of risk would be different, compared to a 
situation in which only the possibility of the negative outcome exists.  
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In summary, trust is a willingness to be vulnerable to another party, but there is 
no risk involved with holding such an attitude. Trust increases the likelihood of 
RTR, which is the behavioural manifestation of trust. Whether or not a specific 
risk will be taken by the trustor is determined by both the amount of trust for the 
trustee and by the perception of risk inherent in the behaviour. Mayer et al. then 
concluded that “RTR is a function of trust and the perceived risk of the trusting 
behaviour.” After illustrating the significance of risk in the trust model of Figure 
2.8, the effect of context and the evolution of trust will be briefly highlighted in 
the next paragraphs. 
 
The Role of Context  
 
From the above, discussion on risk-taking behaviour makes a clear argument 
for the significance of the context in which the risk is to be taken. Even though 
the level of trust (as determined by ability, benevolence, integrity and propensity 
to trust) may be constant, the specific consequences of trust will be determined 
by contextual factors; the stakes involved, the balance of power in the 
relationship, the perception of the level of risk, and the alternatives available to 
the trustor. In the same vein, the assessments of the antecedents of trust 
(ability, benevolence, and integrity) are affected by the context. In a nutshell, the 
trustor’s perception and interpretation of the context of the relationship will affect 
both the need for trust and the evaluation of trustworthiness. Changes in the 
political climate and the perceived volition of the trustee in the situation can 
cause a re-evaluation of trustworthiness. Where there is a strong organisational 
control system, this could impede the development of trust, because a trustee's 
actions may be interpreted as responses to that control rather than signs of 
trustworthiness. Therefore, a clear understanding of trust for a trustee 
necessitates understanding how the context affects perceptions of 
trustworthiness.  
 
Long-Term Effects 
 
So far, in the trust model proposed by Mayer et al., as illustrated in Figure 2.8, 
trust is only described at a given point in time. There is a need to consider the 
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evolution of trust within a relationship in order to understand it completely [2, 
140, 141]. This is necessary because the level of trust will gradually evolve as 
the parties interact. Available literature indicates that there are several factors 
that affect the process by which trust evolves. Most of these factors revolve 
around the fact that low trust will lead to a greater amount of surveillance or 
monitoring of work progress by the supervisor (trustor); since the employee 
(trustee) would interpret this as evidence of distrust by the supervisor, this 
would lead to a chain of actions and reactions whose outcomes influence how 
trust would evolve between the two parties. Some researchers have suggested 
that since reputation evolves from patterns of previous behaviour, the 
emergence of trust can be demonstrated in game theory [121, 142, 143].  
 
The trust model proposed by Mayer et al. [2] incorporates the dynamic nature of 
trust. This is symbolised in Figure 2.8 by the feedback loop from the 
"Outcomes" of RTR to the perceived characteristics of the trustee. This 
dynamism is demonstrated by the fact that when a trustor takes a risk in a 
trustee that leads to a positive outcome, the trustor's perceptions of the trustee 
are enhanced. Similarly, perceptions of the trustee will decline when trust leads 
to an unfavourable outcome. Boyle and Bonacich have suggested that the 
outcomes of engaging in a trusting behaviour will affect trust ‘directly’ [140]. 
Contrary to this conclusion, Mayer et al. asserted in their conclusion that, as 
illustrated in Figure 2.8, the outcomes of the trusting behaviour (RTR), whether 
favourable or not, will influence trust ‘indirectly’ [2] at the next interaction, 
depending on the situation. This influence is, principally, an update of the 
trustor’s prior perceptions of the ability, benevolence, and integrity of the 
trustee. 
 
Comparison of Trust Scales 
 
Adeka’s statistical and graphical approaches at estimating the measure of trust 
in Section 2.3.3 apply only to the case of secret sharing. This merely proves 
that the amount of trust in the secret sharing process is directly proportional to 
its number of participants (trustees). Outside this domain, it is not a trust scale 
per se, in the strict sense of the nomenclature. 
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The trust model, as proposed by Mayer et al., is the first that explicitly considers 
both characteristics of the trustee as well as the trustor. It clearly distinguishes 
trust from the factors that contribute to it, and as well differentiates trust from its 
outcome of risk taking in the relationship. The model defines trust in such a way 
that distinguishes it from other similar concepts (cooperation, confidence, 
predictability), which have often been confused with trust in the literature. 
Additionally, the critical role of risk is clearly specified in this model. The model 
presents a versatile and dynamic definition of trust with a set of its determinants 
on the part of the trustee (ability, benevolence, and integrity) and the trustor 
(propensity to trust). It is noteworthy that the model also highlights the 
significance of context and long-term effects in the evolution of trust. The 
differentiations between factors that cause trust, trust itself, and outcomes 
(RTR) of trust are critical to the validation of the model; all the three component 
elements must be measured in order to fully test the model. The most 
problematic component of the model from the standpoint of measurement is 
trust itself; because trust is a willingness to be vulnerable, a measure that 
assesses that willingness is needed. 
 
Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale was also highlighted, as reflected in Appendix 
5; it is used to measure generalised trust of others. It estimates, quantitatively, 
the trusting attributes of a trustor and uses the result as a gauge for the trustor’s 
trustworthiness. That is, using the argument that one who trusts others is likely 
to be trustworthy. The product of Rotter’s and similar scales could serve as a 
veritable aid for the proposed Mayer’s scale. This, to a large extent, defines the 
parsimony of Mayer’s scale; it would rely on other means to measure most of its 
quantities – including trust itself. 
 
After dealing with trust and its related concepts above, the concept of security 
itself will be briefly highlighted next to serve as a basis for the treatment of 
analysis/synthesis and the military/civil security assessment processes that 
follow in order to focus on the need for a risk-centred 3-factor security 
assessment technique.  
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2.4 Security Concepts and the Military Security Assessment Process 
 
2.4.1 Security Concepts 
A look up on security in dictionaries yields a general view that security is 
“freedom from danger, risk or loss” [144, 145]. In the context of this research 
work, the concern is about dangers, risks and losses associated with 
computers, its information/data and network transactions. Fundamentally, the 
need for cryptography arose in response to the requirements to secure 
information, whether in storage or transit. The most primary security needs it 
sets out to address are confidentiality, integrity, availability and authenticity [1]. 
 
While authentication is used for the symmetric (private-key) cryptography, its 
equivalent in asymmetric (public-key) cryptography is the digital signature. An 
authentication is implemented by means of a Message Authentication Code 
(MAC) generated by the sender, with an authentication key which is shared by 
the sender and the receiver. On the other hand, certification of each 
participant’s public key is effected via the digital signature of a Certification 
Authority (CA) in a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) scheme [23]. 
 
The above concepts are vital security requirements for social interaction using 
computers, just as they are in face-to-face interactions: that someone is who he 
claims to be; that someone’s credentials, whatever type, are valid; and that a 
document purporting to have come from a person actually came from that 
person. These are the functions of authentication, integrity, and non-
repudiation, respectively [146]. 
 
In assessing security problems in a system, it is important to appreciate several 
characteristics of the system’s security posture. These must include the threats, 
vulnerabilities and risks [1]. Threats are the events, issues or entities that can 
potentially do harm to the security of the system; these may be intentional or 
otherwise, including natural disasters. Vulnerabilities are the channels or means 
that make it possible for or engender a potential ability for harm to afflict the 
system; they are opportunities for harm to occur. For instance, lack of balanced 
diets makes a person vulnerable to diseases or leaving the gate unlocked 
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amounts to a vulnerability in the physical security of the house. Lastly, risks are 
said to exist where both threats and vulnerabilities co-exist. In other words, a 
threat to a system that can actually use an already existing vulnerability to 
compromise the security of the system creates a risk. For example, in an army 
that is facing a completely illiterate enemy, writing down the orders at all, in 
plain text, constitutes vulnerability, but there is no risk associated because there 
is no corresponding threat, since the enemy lacks the ability to read the 
message. Usually, in a systematic risk analysis to determine the potential 
problems in the security of a system, it is useful to create a matrix of the various 
threats and vulnerabilities associated with the system (Risk Assessment Matrix) 
[1]. 
 
2.5 Analysis, Synthesis and the Three-Factor Security Assessment 
  
The discovery of the 3-factor security assessment process, and its revolutionary 
derivatives, calls for a redefinition or new understanding of the relationship 
between the terms ‘Analysis’ and ‘Synthesis’, as well as the intricate 
relationship among the security assessment factors of risk, threat and 
vulnerability, especially in the military.  
 
This section is a direct consequence of the pragmatic conclusion in the last 
paragraph of Section 2.4.1, i.e., the object of every security assessment is the 
determination of possible Risk(s) relative to the asset to be protected, and that 
this risk could be systematically calculated quantitatively, using the Risk 
Assessment Matrix approach; with Threat(s) and Vulnerabilit(ies)y as inputs – 
hence, a 3-facor security assessment approach. Other than this approach, the 
security assessment process could be anything but systematic; haphazard, 
uncoordinated and stressful. Though this approach is not entirely new in the 
civil security sector of the security industry, it is contrary to the norm in most 
armies throughout the world. With the exception of the US military (probably, 
with some allies), which discovered the anomaly in 1998 and took steps to 
rectify it by 2006, most military establishments around the world are unaware of 
the inconsistency. Some armies also discovered the anomaly around the turn of 
the century but, rather than rectifying the situation, they adopted the 
Manoeuvrist Approach; a winding and rather complex approach to military 
appreciation, estimate process or a security assessment process which does 
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not really simplify the process – rather, it makes the assessment process more 
subjective and less quantitative.   
 
In the search for an answer, as regards the reason (s) behind the disparity in 
the practice between the civil and military elements of the security industry, the 
researcher discovered that possible misconceptions (with the exception of 
Indian Army) surrounding the terms Analysis (as employed in the treatment of 
the Intelligence Cycle; i.e., Intelligence Analysis) and Synthesis, were most 
probably responsible. Hence, as a by-product or derivative of this research 
effort, Adeka [34] gives a detailed treatment of the security 
assessment/management processes and the intricate relationship that exists 
between the two evaluation terms/techniques of analysis and synthesis, with 
some revolutionary results. This section gives a synopsis of the findings with 
pertinent and innovative propositions.  
 
The factual reality is that analysis and synthesis, as scientific methods, always 
go hand in hand; they complement each other. Every synthesis is built upon the 
results of a preceding analysis, and every analysis requires a subsequent 
synthesis in order to verify and correct its results [86].  The analysis is planned 
and structured so that the problems could be framed up, while synthesis is 
emergent and facilitates the making of connections that identify breakthrough 
ideas and opportunities. While analysis is a means to an end, synthesis is the 
actual end or resides at the end. This intricately interwoven relationship is aptly 
illustrated in Figure 2.9 [147]. Thus, it would not be correct to adopt one method 
to the exclusion of the other, even as a reductionist. Reductionism alone is not 
sufficient as an effective evaluation approach because it is learned from 
Aristotelian quotes that “the Whole is greater than the Sum of its parts” [148]]. It 
might be useful to pen down some definitions at this stage. 
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         Figure 2.9.  Analysis and synthesis [147] 
 
2.5.1 Definitions 
 
 Analysis - Resolution of anything complex into simple elements (opposite of 
synthesis); i.e., the separation of an intellectual or material whole into its 
constituent parts for individual study [149]. In other words, “the separation of 
something into its constituents in order to find out what it contains, to 
examine individual parts, or to study the structure of the whole” [150]. 
 Syn- and Thesis - The prefix ‘syn-’ is of Greek origin, meaning ‘together’, 
‘together with’ or ‘united’ [119]. Similarly, the word ‘thesis’ comes 
from tithenai, which is Greek for ‘to put or lay down’ [150]. 
 Synthesis - The combining of the constituent elements of separate material 
or abstract entities into a single or unified entity (opposite of analysis); i.e., a 
complex whole  is formed by combining individual pieces [150]. In Greek, it is 
Synthesis Analysis 
Facts Insights 
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called suntithenai, which means place together or put together [151]]. In other 
words, a new unified whole resulting from the combination of different ideas, 
influences, or objects [150], is formed to facilitate a study of the complete 
entity. Hence, the Aristotelian quotes: “The Whole is greater than the Sum of 
its parts” [148].  
 Threat - The potential for a threat-agent to exploit or accidentally trigger a 
specific vulnerability [152]; i.e., a potential that an event, process, activity, or 
substance can be perpetuated by one or more threat agents that have an 
adverse effect on an organisation, via a specific vulnerability [152]. Thus 
defined, it implies that a threat is not significant unless a specific vulnerability 
corresponding to it can be identified [1, 153]. 
 
 . The US military uses hazard, mostly, in place of threat or interchangeably, 
and danger for vulnerability [154]. The military’s Composite Risk 
Management (CRM) process “does not differentiate between the sources of 
the hazard,” [154], thus, vulnerabilities are usually treated as hazards or 
threats (leading to Equation (2.29)); vulnerability is not mentioned in its 5-
step CRM process. However, this is not without some measure of apparent 
inconsistencies; sometimes threat and hazard are used to differentiate 
between threats emanating from the enemy and natural disasters 
respectively [154]. 
 
 Intelligence Analysis - Intelligence analysis establishes the significance and 
implications of processed information, integrates it by combining disparate 
pieces of information to identify collateral information and patterns, then 
interprets the significance of any newly developed knowledge [155]. In other 
words, intelligence analysis is the interpretation of the significance and 
implications of integrated processed bits of information. 
 
  Threat Analysis - The examination of threat-agents against system 
vulnerabilities to determine the threats for a particular system in a particular 
operational environment. Threat analysis is synonymous to threat 
assessment [152]. 
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 Vulnerability -  A flaw or weakness in system security procedures, design, 
implementation, or internal controls which, if exploited or accidentally 
triggered, could result in a security breach or a violation of the system’s 
security policy [1]. 
 
 Risk - Risk refers to the likelihood that vulnerability will be exploited or 
triggered; that a threat may become harmful [1]. Inherent in this definition are 
two possible deductions. The first is that risk is not a function of the action to 
be taken as viewed by many; rather, it is strictly dependent on the degree of 
match or mismatch between threats and vulnerabilities, to the advantage of 
the adversary or threat-agent. Secondly, the two most conspicuous 
components of risk are the threat and vulnerability; both must 
correspondingly co-exist for risk to exist [1]. In other words, as far as the 
identification of risk is concerned, a threat carries no significance unless it 
has a co-existing or potential vulnerability that corresponds to it, and vice 
versa. The tripartite relationship among the trio is such as to mathematically 
satisfy Equations (2.28) and (2.29) [34]; Equation (2.29) applies to the US 
military model only. 
 
vtr               (2.28) 
  vtr   ,                       (2.29) 
  
 Where r denotes Risk, t denotes Threat, v stands for Vulnerability, τ is as 
defined and the symbols ‘∧’ and ‘∨’ represent the logic operators ‘AND’ and 
‘OR’ respectively. Equation (2.28) is the substantive formula for determining 
the existence of risk in the risk assessment process, while Equation (2.29) 
specifically applies to the US military approach as a variant of Equation 
(2.28); this is a consequence of the apparent inconsistency in its concepts of 
threat as illustrated in the above definition. These two equations were 
originally derived by the author as a consequence of his understanding of the 
tripartite relationship among the three concepts; risk, threat, and vulnerability. 
They may be referred to as Adeka’s Twin Risk Equations (ATREs); for the 3-
factor security assessment process. The curve of Equation (2.28) is as 
plotted in Figure 2.10. It depicts the existence of Risk on the graph of Threat 
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against Vulnerability; i.e., risks exist only if, and only if, corresponding threats 
and vulnerabilities co-exist.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10. Risk exists iff corresponding threat and vulnerability co-exist. 
 
2.5.2 Security Assessment Procedure in the Nigerian Defence and 
National Security Agencies 
 
The security agencies strictly covered by this section are those established by 
the National Security Agencies Act of 1986; these are the Defence Intelligence 
Agency (DIA), State Security Service (SSS or DSS) and National Intelligence 
Agency (NIA). It is noted that, currently, the DIA has operatives outside its 
headquarters, in addition to the Services intelligence establishments; the 
Nigerian Army Intelligence Corps (NAIC), Directorate of Naval Intelligence (DNI) 
and the Directorate of Air Intelligence (DAI). Appropriate examples will be cited 
from the Nigerian Army (NA), where necessary, to reflect the case in the Armed 
Forces of Nigeria (AFN), and NAIC to reflect the practice in the Defence 
Intelligence. Where there is divergence, examples would also be cited from the 
other agencies within the national intelligence community. References could be 
made to cases outside Nigeria. The affected establishments are illustrated in 
Figure 2.11. 
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Figure 2.11.  Nigerian Armed Forces and national security agencies: 
operational and administrative/supervisory chains of command. 
 
 
LEGEND 
 
  ...   Operational Chain of Command 
  ...   Administrative/Supervisory Chain of Command  
C in C  ...   President & Commander in Chief 
MOD  ...   Ministry of Defence 
DHQ  ...   Defence Headquarters 
NA  ...   Nigerian Army 
NN  ...   Nigerian Navy 
NAF  ...   Nigerian Airforce 
DIA  ...   Defence Intelligence Agency 
NAIC  ...   Nigerian Army Intelligence Corps 
DNI  ...   Directorate of Naval Intelligence 
DAI  ...   Directorate of Air Intelligence 
NSA  ...   National Security Adviser  
NIA  ...   National Intelligence Agency 
SSS  ...   State Security Service (Department of State Service (DSS)) 
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It is not intended to discuss the mechanical details of security operations or the 
evaluation process by the affected organisations. Rather, the general 
assessment concept, approach and the target of the assessment constitute the 
focus of this segment. 
 
The concern of this section is a case of a security assessment practice whereby 
threat analysis is usually overemphasised to the detriment of vulnerability; in 
fact, the phrase vulnerability analysis is never heard of. The threat is usually 
given the boldest heading in security evaluations, with its details and 
characterisation, while vulnerability, if mentioned at all, is accorded a mere 
casual reference. The term risk suffers the same fate as a does vulnerability. 
This is not to say that the security assessments have been useless all through, 
no; rather, the issue is that even when experts engage in security evaluations 
which unconsciously involves threat analysis, vulnerability analysis, risk 
analysis and, even, risk management -  all these have always been tagged with 
the label of threat analysis alone. The great possibility here is that it is either the 
terms are individually not critically understood or their technical inter-
relationships have never been carefully weighed. In the case of the US military, 
where vulnerability could be synonymous to threat [154], it means that threat 
would be equal to risk, for Equation (2.28) to hold; they use only the two terms 
of threat and risk (since v could be synonymous to t); due to their rather 
awkward but unique concept, where t and v are lumped up together as one and 
the same quantity [154] and they would specify when the entity is called threat 
(prior to risk assessment), distinctive from when it is referred to as risk (after risk 
assessment). That is, when v is synonymous to t in Equation (2.28), r = t, and 
vice versa; r = τ in Equation (2.29), with τ as defined.  In Nigerian case 
(Nigerian military and others not aligned with the US military), the notion is that 
at all times and in all situations, t = t (with r = 0; v = 0); this is an impossible 
arithmetic, which is not in accord with reality. This is why the very bulky and 
complex security evaluations done quarterly or annually by the DMI for the 
Chief of Army Staff’s (COAS) conferences are simply tagged ‘DMI THREAT 
ANALYSIS.’ 
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Heritage 
 
The fore-runner of the NAIC (DMI) was the Field Security Section (FSS) of the 
Royal Nigerian Army, which was established on 1st November 1962 under the 
command of Captain PG Harrington (BR) of the British Army as General Staff 
Officer Grade 2 Intelligence (GSO2 Int) [156]. Major CK Nzeogwu was the first 
Nigerian officer to hold that appointment from November 1962 to 1964 [157]. 
Evidence abound to prove that the NAIC took an active part in the training of 
officers and personnel of the DNI, DAI, the Nigeria Police (NP) and, especially, 
the SSS. In general, it could be argued that the entire Nigerian military derived 
its heritage from the British Armed Forces; Nigeria being a former British colony. 
 
Effect of Heritage and Association 
Whatever is said about the DMI above, in respect of its security assessment 
process, is also representative of the other military security agencies (DNI, 
DAI). This is also true of the other security agencies (NIA, DSS); the only 
difference might be that, while in one instance ‘Threat Analysis or Threat 
Assessment’ would be the main title heading of the assessment report itself, in 
another instance the same phrase may be a centre or group heading towards 
the end of the report in the analysis or assessment segment. In virtually all 
cases, the entire assessment is on threats, without mentioning vulnerability or 
risk; not to talk of measuring or calculating risk.  
The above contagious phenomenon is also true about the sister Services of the 
AFN {NA, Nigerian Navy (NN) and Nigerian Air Force (NAF)} represented by the 
NA. There were no provisions for risk, threat and vulnerability in the template for 
the military decision-making process (military appreciation) which the NA used 
up to March 2003. An individual expert might make casual references to some 
of these terms here and there in the appreciation process, but definitely without 
any papered calculations. In an apparent effort to improve the existing system, 
the British Army introduced what is termed the Manoeuvrist Approach in warfare 
to the NA in 2003. In the 6-step estimate process employed by this new 
approach, critical vulnerability (without threat and risk) is mentioned in Step 1, 
while risk (without threat and vulnerability) is mentioned in Steps 4 and 5. In all 
the instances, there is no provision for calculating risk.  
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A disturbing aspect of this evaluation process is that it is non-systematic, non-
quantitative and its quality is entirely dependent on the initiative, ingenuity and 
dexterity of the security ‘analyst’. Apart from some orderly arrangement of 
headings, it is essentially a haphazard process, as far as the contents and 
thought process are concerned. Most probably, what could be perceived as the 
most important shortcoming of the process is its target, which is a threat, 
instead of risk. It is clear from Equation (2.28) that threat is only one of two 
equally important components that make up a risk, and the significance of threat 
cannot be determined without an analysis on a correspondent vulnerability. 
Thus, if the focus of the evaluation process is on the threat, instead of risk, then 
it is not only misdirected but also significantly narrowed down to not more than 
about 50% of what ought to have been considered as inputs. In other words, if 
what the reports claim to have been done on paper is actually what is done on 
the ground, then, an appreciable work would have been left undone. 
 
Possible Geographical Spread of the Nigerian Practice 
In the US military, the concept of risk calculation was not used until April 1998, 
when the first Army doctrinal publication on risk management was made in the 
Field Manual (FM) 100-14 [154]. The doctrine was not fully integrated into the 
Military Decision Making process (MDMP) and the army training management 
system until 2006, when FM 100-14 was revised, expanded and re-designated 
‘FM 5-19, Composite Risk Management (CRM);’ a fall-out of the global war on 
terrorism [154]. The CRM, perceived as a significant cultural change for the US 
Army, is “not a stand-alone process, a “paperwork” drill, or an add-on feature. 
… This milestone manual outlined a framework that leaders could use to make 
force protection a routine part of planning, preparing, and executing operational, 
training, and garrison missions [154].” 
 
The fact that the US Army knew nothing about risk management as part of 
MDMP, until 1998, is a comfortable indication that the culture of neglect in the 
incorporation of risk evaluation and management into the military security 
assessment, appreciation or estimate process, is global. This position, which is 
also re-enforced by the fact that the Nigerian military might not have been 
alone, having derived its heritage from the British Armed Forces (BAF), is, 
93 
 
unfortunately, contrary to the military strategic reasoning that is as old as Sun 
Tzu (about 500 BCE) [26]. Possible reasons behind this anomaly and its major 
implications are highlighted below. 
 
Possible Reasons and Implications 
It is recalled that most military security operatives/analysts started their career 
as intelligence operatives/analyst, and the first thing any intelligence operative 
learns on his mission to become a spy is the intelligence process, as illustrated 
in the Intelligence Cycle [155]. The most crucial stage in the intelligence 
process is the “intelligence analysis,” as defined above. Unfortunately, the 
military tradition of learning on the job, with few or no questions and as little 
room for prior theoretical knowledge as the situation permits, encouraged most 
amateur intelligence “analysts” to progress into “analytical experts” without 
adequately appreciating the meaning of the term analysis. Thus, while in 
actuality, they engage in more of synthesis than analysis, everything is lumped 
up together under intelligence analysis, to the detriment of synthesis. With time, 
the word analysis became bastardised in its usage, without regard to the fact 
that synthesis is the direct opposite of analysis; this anomaly is not exclusively 
limited to the military and intelligence organisations.  
 
As at today, it would seem as if analysis is the only evaluation and examination 
tool in existence. Thus, virtually, evaluators have all become unconscious 
reductionists. It is common to hear of data analysis, political analysis, security 
analysis, scientific analysis, economic analysis, and demographic analysis, 
etcetera; while, in fact, all these evaluation processes involve both analysis and 
synthesis. Of all the literature search for this work [34], examining about 200 
Intelligence Cycle models [155, 158-160], the word synthesis never appeared in 
any of them, except for the Indian Army [161], while analysis appeared in all of 
them; either as a heading or at least in the explanations. In the researcher’s 
entire life (at 53), he has never come across the noun synthesist (the same is 
true of his computer, which rejects it as an English word: thanks to Encarta and 
Oxford dictionaries; otherwise, he would have been lost). On the other hand, 
hardly does a day pass by without one seeing or hearing the noun analyst. This 
original misconception in the assessment skill of the intelligence officer, which 
resulted in referring to the function of synthesis as analysis, and having no idea 
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about synthesis at all, was progressively transferred and inherited from 
generation to generation. Some of the intelligence officers might have never 
been conscious of the technical meaning of the term analysis, standing alone, 
without any linkage as in the phrase intelligence analysis. In other words, they 
might know what the phrase intelligence analysis means, as part of a 
professional heritage, but they might not even understand what the operating 
term analysis, itself, stands for.  
 
In the process, this evolved a culture of non-systematism and haphazardness in 
the perception and attitude of most of the intelligence officers in relation to 
assessment processes. Since there is a very thin or no dividing line between 
the intelligence operative/analyst and security operative/analyst, this culture 
was transmitted in situ; from intelligence analysis to security 
analysis/assessment. Thus, the terms vulnerability and risk in security 
assessment have suffered the fate that is almost identical to that of synthesis in 
intelligence assessment, while threat in security assessment enjoys the 
undeserved dominance of analysis in intelligence assessment. This appears to 
be the crux of the matter with all public defence, intelligence and security 
heritages around the world, except for some of those aligned with the US and 
who are amenable to quick adaptation [34]. It is the same reason that is most 
probably responsible for the divergence in the security assessment practices 
between the two segments of the security industry. 
2.5.3 Security Assessment Practice in the Private Security Industry 
The security assessment procedure in the private security sector of the security 
industry is governed by the relationship established in Equation (2.28), as 
illustrated in Figures 2.10 and 2.12 (a, b) [152, 162]. It is highly systematised, 
with a very clear sequence of actions, and a check-back procedure which 
enhances review. It focuses on risk as the output, with threat and vulnerability 
as inputs.  The risk assessment and management processes are similar for all 
organisations, though implementation may depend on the nature of the risks in 
question [163]. Consider the following: 
 
 
95 
 
 
 
 (a)  
 
 
    (b) 
 
Figure 2.12: (a) Risk management overview (b) A flow chart for risk 
mitigation action points [152, 162] 
 
 
Approaches 
The US approach employs the Military Standard (MIL-STD-1629) procedure for 
performing Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) [164]. This is 
an evaluation technique which charts the probability of failure modes within a 
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system against the severity of their consequences in a Risk Assessment Matrix 
[165]. The key objective of FMECA is to systematically evaluate and document 
the potential impact of each functional or hardware failure on mission success, 
personnel and system safety, system performance, maintainability and 
maintenance requirements. The UK approach, on the other hand, uses the Risk 
Priority Number (RPN) methodology [163]. This is a method for evaluating the 
risk associated with potential problems identified during a Failure Mode and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA). An FMEA can be performed to identify the potential 
failure modes for a product or process. The RPN method then requires the 
assessment team to use past experience and engineering judgment to rate 
each potential problem according to the following rating scales[165]:   
o Severity -  which rates the severity of the potential effect of the failure.  
o Occurrence -  which rates the likelihood that the failure will occur.  
o Detection -  which rates the likelihood that the problem will be detected 
before it reaches the end-user/customer.  
 
2.5.4 The Risk Assessment Matrix 
In a systematic risk analysis to determine the potential problems in the security 
of a system, it is useful to create a matrix of the various threats and 
vulnerabilities associated with the system (Risk Assessment Matrix).  
Before Using the MIL-STD-1629 procedure, two attributes are required to carry 
out a risk assessment using the risk assessment matrix. Kara-Zaitri [164] 
enumerated these as follow: 
 The Severity, Effect or Impact of the event; if it occurs. 
 The Likelihood of each event in terms of a probabilistic value or class. 
 In this approach, the probabilities that risks would result from certain 
events are assigned for each event (i.e., the likelihood that a given threat would 
exploit a particular vulnerability) and the effect of the impact of the occurrence is 
also defined. For instance, for a 3 x 3 Risk Assessment Matrix in Table 2.5, let 
the probability levels, with corresponding values, be High (1.0), Medium (0.5) 
and Low (0.1); and the corresponding threat impact levels be High (100), 
Medium (50) and Low (10). Depending on the organisation’s requirements and 
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the granularity of risk assessment desired, a 4 x 4 or 5 x 5 matrix may be used 
[152]. In which case, Very Low/Very High threat probability and a Very 
Low/Very High threat impact to generate a Very Low/Very High risk level can be 
incorporated into the matrix. The resultant matrix for this example is in Table 2.5 
[152, 154].  
 
 
Table 2.5. Risk assessment matrix [149] 
 
PROBABILITY 
SEVERITY (IMPACT) 
Low (10) Medium (50) High (100) 
 
High (1.0) 
 
(10 x 1.0) = 10 
 
(50 x 1.0) = 50 
 
(100 x 1.0) = 100 
 
Medium (0.5) 
 
(10 x 0.5) = 5 
 
 
(50 x 0.5) = 25 
 
(100 x 0.5) = 50 
 
Low (0.1) 
 
(10 x 0.1) = 1 
 
(50 x 0.1) = 5 
 
(100 x 0.1) = 10 
 
       Risk Scale: High (50+ to 100); Medium (10+ to 50); Low (1 to 10)  
 
Having assessed the risk, one of the following risk management decisions or 
mitigation options will have to be considered. Risk mitigation, the second 
process of risk management, involves prioritising, evaluating, and implementing 
the appropriate risk-reducing controls recommended from the risk assessment 
process [152]. Kara-Zaitri [166] stated that these mitigation options include: 
o Avoid  -  Redesign the process to avoid particular risks with the plan of 
reducing overall risk.  
o Diversify  -   Spread the risk among numerous assets or processes to 
reduce the overall risk of loss or impairment.  
o Control  -  Design activities to prevent, detect or contain adverse events 
or to promote positive outcomes.  
o Share  -  Distribute a portion of the risk through a contract with another 
party, such as insurance.  
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o Transfer  -  Distribute all of the risks through a contract with another 
party, such as outsourcing.  
o Accept  -  Allow minor risks to exist to avoid spending more on managing 
the risks than the potential harm. 
 
The goals and mission of an organisation should be considered in selecting any 
of these risk mitigation options. Since it may not be practicable to address all 
identified risks, priority should be given to the threat and vulnerability pairs that 
have the potential to cause a more severe impact on the organisation. In 
addition, due to peculiarities of different organisations, the option used to 
mitigate the risk and the methods used to implement controls may vary [163]. 
Usually, the best approach is to have a mix of appropriate technologies from 
among the various vendor security products, along with the appropriate risk 
mitigation option and nontechnical, administrative measures [152]. 
2.5.5  Findings and Innovative Propositions 
A culture of non-systematism, haphazardness and lack of accountability in the 
perception and attitude of most intelligence officers, in relation to assessment 
processes, has persisted for long [34]. This most probably resulted from the 
original misconception surrounding the opposite functions of analysis and 
synthesis, which was facilitated by the tradition of ‘learning on the job’ with few 
or no questions (the copycat syndrome inherent in military regimentation); thus 
virtually obliterating the term synthesis/synthesist from the professional 
dictionary, and over-emphasising analysis/analyst out of proportion in the 
process. Since there is a very thin or no dividing line between the intelligence 
operative/analyst and security operative/analyst, this culture was transmitted, in 
situ, from intelligence analysis to security analysis/assessment. Thus, the terms 
vulnerability and risk in security assessment have suffered the fate that is 
almost identical to that of synthesis in intelligence assessment, while threat in 
security assessment enjoys the undeserved dominance of analysis in 
intelligence assessment. This appears to be the crux of the matter with all public 
defence, intelligence and security heritages around the world, with probable 
exceptions of Indian Army and the armies of those aligned with the US; those 
amenable to quick adaptation. 
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In an effort to resolve this anomaly, the following suggestions would be 
advanced, based on an analysis of the implications enumerated by Adeka [34], 
as follows: 
 
 In the intelligence process, the function usually referred to as intelligence 
analysis is actually a synthesis function; it should be renamed intelligence 
synthesis, which would be carried out by synthesists, and accorded a 
definition similar to that of the Indian Army. (The Indian Army’s Combat 
Intelligence Précis defines the concept of synthesis in its model of 
Intelligence Cycle as, ‘the process of putting together all intelligence (that is, 
evaluated and interpreted information, including the intelligence staff’s 
assessment) pertaining to a combat area; to analyse the 
strengths/weaknesses of the enemy and predict the manner in which he is 
likely to conduct his operations’). 
 
 Intelligence products should be amenable to re-evaluation and accountability. 
This is in line with the current thought, as from the 1970s, necessitated by 
scandalous revelations mostly characterised by high-handedness on the part 
of intelligence agencies or treacherous manipulations by political leaders, 
globally [167]. 
 
 In military and security operations, the object of security assessment should 
be the risk, which is quantitatively measured via the Risk Assessment Matrix 
approach, using threat and vulnerability as inputs; threat and vulnerability 
should be uniquely defined and differentiated, contrary to the practice in the 
US military. Thus, where there is presently Threat Analysis or Threat 
Assessment as a heading in an estimating process or security report, it 
should be replaced with Risk Analysis or Risk Assessment; and where there 
is none, one should be created as necessary. In other words, the highest 
security assessment heading in an estimating process or security report 
(whether it is a main, group, paragraph, sub or sub-sub-paragraph heading) 
should discuss the risk, with threat and vulnerability as sub headings or 
considerations under it. 
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 A risk assessment security report should reflect the process that produced it; 
both should agree. Depending on the extent of complexity or level at which 
the assessment is made, there may be a need to attach a risk assessment 
worksheet as an annexure or appendix to the reports. 
 
Thesis, Synthesis and Innovative Propositions 
 
As a ripple effect of this investigation, it has become necessary to devise some 
new terminologies and adjust the context of others to cater for some of the 
problems identified. It is recalled that analysis and synthesis ought to go hand in 
hand for optimum results, and that one technique may predominate in certain 
instances. Thus, instead of lumping up everything together, calling it Data 
Analysis, and then be accused of suffering from the hangover of the intelligence 
officers’ culture of complacency, it should be possible to communicate the exact 
technique being employed: such as data analysis; data synthesis; data analysis 
and synthesis; and in what relative proportions, if necessary.  
 
It would not be satisfactory if this effort is concluded without taking a second 
look at the word thesis in the context that it is a synonym of dissertation. As 
defined, etymologically, the prefix ‘syn-’ is of Greek origin, meaning ‘together’, 
‘together with’ or ‘united.’  Similarly, the word ‘thesis’ comes from ‘tithenai’, 
which is Greek for ‘to put or lay down.’ A careful examination of the research 
process reveals that it would pass through some or all of the following stages 
and more [147]: 
 
 Data Collection/Organisation  -  Make data manageable. 
 Data Mining  -  Identify what you see. 
 Data Sorting and Clustering  -  Manipulate or reframe and integrate data as 
necessary. 
 Identification of Insights - Discuss, articulate, incubate and socialise the 
insights. 
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All of the above stages in the research process, and other minor processes 
would precede the final process; which is the harmonisation of all the bits into a 
single report which is popularly referred to as thesis or dissertation. However, 
even before the research proposal is completed, the process of putting down 
(thesis) notes of different lengths and forms would have already commenced. 
So, whether on a board/wall as in Figure 2.13 or in notebooks, digital data 
repositories of all kinds - including the computer, as well as in the researcher’s 
brain, there would have been theses all over the place already. Hence, it would 
be more meaningful to distinguish the final dissertation from all the other pieces 
of theses. Thus, the synonym of dissertation ought to be termed a Synthesis, 
rather than a Thesis. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.13.  Open card sort arrayed on a wall; showing some Theses [147] 
 
2.5.6 Neologies 
The neologies, which emerged as a consequence of the risk assessment 
discoveries outside the main research focus, are as proposed and defined 
below: 
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 Analosynthesis - A data evaluation method which employs both analysis 
and synthesis, but it is analysis-heavy or the analysis approach 
predominates. 
 Synthonalysis - A data evaluation method which employs both synthesis 
and analysis, but it is synthesis-heavy or the synthesis approach 
predominates. 
 Equisynalysis - A data evaluation method which employs both analysis and 
synthesis, where both techniques are almost equally employed; about fifty-
fifty. 
  Synthesis4 - This term should replace analysis in the Intelligence Cycle; the 
phrase ‘Intelligence Analysis’ now becomes ‘Intelligence Synthesis’. 
 Socio-cryptanalysis - This refers to social or human hacking, using social 
engineering techniques. 
 Implications – N.B: It should be noted that the ripple effects of the above 
propositions would also apply; i.e., other terms corresponding to the above 
terminologies are also inherently proposed. For instance: analyst, analytic 
and analytical correspond to analysis, similarly, synthesist, synthetic and 
synthetical  are also assumed to have been catered for (where they never 
existed), corresponding to synthesis as defined herein; and ditto for all the 
other terminologies.  
 
The proposed shift in nomenclature, from a threat to risk, would not only 
facilitate a better understanding of the entire processes but also propel the need 
to employ relevant evaluation tools, as expected of professionals. Again, risk is 
a function of the likelihood that a given threat-source would exploit a particular 
existing/potential vulnerability, and the resulting impact of that adverse event on 
the target of interest. Threat and vulnerability, as defined, do not belong to the 
same environment and are generally of different characterisation. Threats come 
from the usually unknown/known adversary or accident which may be artificial 
or natural, all of which are external to the asset that is being protected, and are 
meant to harm it, either intentionally or otherwise. Vulnerabilities, on the other 
hand, are faults/weaknesses due to a failure or inadequacy which are inherent 
                                                     
4
Etymologically, a very close and careful examination of the above definitions might even 
suggest that the word Thesis, as a synonym of Dissertation, should be replaced with 
Synthesis. This becomes evident, if it is accepted that what the Greeks refer to as thesis is as 
reflected in Figure 2.13. 
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to the asset that is being protected.  A threat would remain a threat distinct from 
vulnerability, and it would remain insignificant unless there exists a relevant 
vulnerability that corresponds to it. The two concepts should never be grouped 
together as one concept (as employed in the US military doctrine), as this would 
compound the assessment process; since it would be difficult to eliminate all the 
risks, where a threat lacks a corresponding vulnerability, it would cancel out 
naturally and simplify the risk assessment process.  
 
It should be noted that this proposal does not eliminate threat analysis, but it will 
bring into pragmatic focus the relevance of threat itself, by highlighting its 
natural and indispensable relationship with vulnerability in the security 
assessment context. Similarly, it compels the threat to take its proper place, at a 
lower level, as one of two equally important inputs in the security assessment 
process. 
 
After going through the concept of security and its assessment procedures in 
the last two segments, cyber/cyberspace and its threat landscape are discussed 
in the next segment. This will underscore the significance of cryptography, 
cryptanalysis and social engineering concepts that are treated immediately 
afterwards. It is an appreciation of this significance that instigated the measures 
proposed in Chapter 6 to drive home the danger inherent in the apparent 
negligence of exploitation of trust by confidence artists with negative 
implications on cybersecurity. 
 
2.6 The Concepts of Cyber and Cyberspace 
As a prefix, ‘cyber-’ is used in an increasing number of terms to describe new 
things that are being made possible by the spread of computers. For instance, 
cyber-phobia means an irrational fear of computers [168]. The term originated 
from kybernetes, the Greek word for steersman or governor [169]. Its 
contemporary usage dates back to 1948 when it was first used in cybernetics, a 
word coined by Norbert Wiener and his colleagues [15]. ‘Cyber’ is mostly used 
as a prefix to describe a person, thing, or idea as part of the computer and 
information age. Thus, the word ‘cyber’, almost a synonym of the computer, 
could be defined as something of, relating to or involving computers/computer 
104 
 
networks [144].  It is in this context that the Internet is described as the cyber 
marketplace.  
 
Closely related to cyber is the concept of cyberspace, a metaphor for describing 
the non-physical terrain (a virtual world) created by computer systems [170].  
For instance, online systems create a cyberspace within which people can 
communicate with one another (via e-mail), do research, or simply window-
shop. Like physical space, cyberspace contains objects (which include files, 
mail messages, and graphics) and different modes of transportation and 
delivery. Unlike real space, however, exploring cyberspace does not require any 
physical movement other than pressing keys on a keyboard or moving a mouse. 
Defined as “the online world of computer networks and especially the Internet” 
[144], the term cyberspace was coined by William Gibson. He first used it in his 
story "Burning Chrome", in 1982 [171], [172], and it appeared in his science-
fiction novel, Neuromancer, in 1984 [173].  The US National Military Strategy for 
Cyberspace Operations defines cyberspace as “the domain characterised by 
the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify and 
exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures.”  
This leads to a brief highlight on network security. 
 
2.6.1 Network Security 
 
In computer networking, network security [174] consists of the measures taken 
by the network administrator to prevent and monitor unauthorised access, 
misuse, modification, or denial of the computer network and network-accessible 
resources. It is the granting of access to data in a network for authorised users 
and denial of same for unauthorised users, as determined by the network 
administrator. Users are assigned an ID and password that allows them access 
to information and programmes within their authority. A glossary of cyber-
network and Internet-related terminologies is in Appendix 1; network security is 
in the third transport layer as illustrated in the appendix – Figure 1-2. 
 
2.6.2 Constituents of Cyber Warfare 
 
It is difficult to come by a globally accepted definition of cyber warfare, since the 
UN has none [175].  It is even being debated as regards the correctness of the 
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term cyber warfare.  Instead of calling it a form of warfare, some believe that all 
politically motivated cyberattacks are merely sophisticated versions of three 
activities that are as old as warfare itself. Thus, what should really be talked 
about are cyber-sabotage, cyber-espionage, and cyber-subversion, instead of 
cyber warfare [176]. However, in line with the opinions of other experts, 
Pentagon has formally recognised cyberspace as a new domain in warfare; the 
5th Domain, after land, sea, air and space [177-179]. 
 
In view of the above, cyber warfare may be defined as "actions by a nation-state 
to penetrate another nation's computers or networks for the purposes of 
causing damage or disruption" [180]. This seems to situate cyber warfare as a 
form of cybercrime which includes an activity crossing international borders and 
involving the interests of at least one nation-state [181]. This concept seems to 
be in tune with the two historical standards for warfare doctrine [175]: “War is 
nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. … war, therefore, is an act of violence 
to compel our opponent to fulfill our will,” [26] and “One hundred victories in one 
hundred battles is not the most skillful. Seizing the enemy without fighting is the 
most skillful” [182].  
 
2.6.3 The Threat Landscape in Cyber Warfare 
 Whether it was under Sun Tzu, Napoleon Bonaparte, Alexander the Great or 
own contemporary world, no analysis of war can be made without an 
understanding of the enemy forces and their composition, disposition, strength, 
centres of gravity and terrain [175]. In this virtual warfare, the battle space 
consists of the cyberspace as defined in Section 2.6, while the weapons consist 
of the various cyber tools, especially the computer/Internet, employed in 
cybercrimes. These crimes include hacking, botnet, phishing, cyberbullying, 
cyber stalking, virus attacks, malware/spyware attacks, fraudulent websites, 
denial-of-service attacks, ID theft (impersonation to commit fraud), cyber 
terrorism, and cyber war.  
 
The threats are classified into the most active threats (in terms of actors) and 
the most dangerous threats (in terms of impact) [175]. In descending order, the 
threat landscape in terms of the number of cyber activities is dominated by the 
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script kiddy, criminal, hacker groups, insider, political/religious groups and 
APT/Nation-state (Advanced Persistent Threat; military and affiliated groups 
that may receive support from the government). Of these, the malicious insider 
is adjudged to be the most dangerous group; they are estimated to represent 
only about 20% of the threat but cause about 80% of the damage [175].  
Researchers have shown that, in terms of damages caused, the impact of the 
activities is almost in reverse order, compared to the prevalence of activities. 
Thus, in descending order, the threat landscape in terms of the impact of cyber 
activities is dominated by APT/Nation state, insider, terrorism, 
physical/environmental attacks (both natural and man-made), criminal/phishing 
attacks, hacker groups, unintentional actions, hacktivism and Noob/Script kiddy. 
The motivations for cyberattacks are varied. They are however influenced by 
the number of activities in descending order as follows: money, espionage, 
skills for employment, fame/status, entertainment, hacktivism, terrorism, and 
war. 
 
2.6.4 National Cyber Threats 
This section will briefly discuss the national cyber threats, vulnerabilities, motivations 
for cybercrimes, and the DDoS attacks. In the US, the concept of having a 
programme for the protection of national or critical infrastructure against 
cyberattacks has been in place since 1996. In 2001, the Patriot Act defined 
critical infrastructure as those “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, 
so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems 
and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic 
security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.” 
 
Any of the common security concerns of modern computer security, as 
highlighted in Section 2.7, threatens mostly cyber-based national infrastructure. 
These include confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, non-repudiation 
and identity theft [1, 183, 184]. These are the primary considerations or pillars in 
modern computer communications security. They manifest via an ever-growing 
list of cybercrimes, as highlighted in Sections 2.6 and 2.6.4, the worst of which 
is the DDoS attack [15]. 
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In addressing these pillars of security concerns, which may involve both 
technical and nontechnical measures, the following means would also need to 
be provided: identification – who does the client claim to be; authentication – 
how could it be established that the client is actually who he claims to be; 
authorisation – now that the client has been verified, what is he/she allowed to 
do; accountability – who did what, and, perhaps, who pays the bill? Measures 
aimed at addressing some of these concerns are discussed in Section 2.7. 
 
National Cyber Vulnerabilities 
 
Unlike threats, vulnerabilities are not easily amenable to grouping in taxonomy. 
Howev er, the national infrastructure would need to address obvious problems 
like improperly configured equipment, poorly designed LANs, unpatched system 
software, exploitable bugs in application code, and locally disgruntled 
employees. It is recalled that of all the malicious actors, the malicious trusted 
insiders are the most dangerous. The most fundamental vulnerability in national 
infrastructure is the pervasive complexity underlying the system. The staggering 
complexity is such that, many times, it is unpalatable security incidents that 
uncover aspects of computing functionality that were not previously known to 
anyone; including the system designers, at times [183, 185]. In addition, it is 
most discomforting to note that, in some cases, the optimal security solution 
requires the simplification and cleaning up of poorly conceived infrastructure; 
most large organisations are not amenable to this approach. 
 
In most cases, the best way to ensure a comprehensive assessment of 
vulnerabilities associated with national infrastructure is to take care of their 
relative exploitation points. In order to appreciate this approach, an abstract 
national infrastructure cybersecurity model is illustrated in Figure 2.14.  It 
comprises of the external adversary (hackers on the Internet), the internal 
adversary (trusted insiders), and supplier adversary (vendors and partners). 
The model also shows three exploitation points, namely; remote access 
(Internet and telework), system administration and normal usage (management 
and use of software, computers, and networks), and supply chain (procurement 
and outsourcing). The three exploitation points and types of adversaries could  
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be associated with different types of possible motivations, for either a full or test 
attack on national infrastructure, as highlighted in the next segment. 
 
 
Figure 2.14. Adversaries and exploitation points in national 
infrastructure [16] 
 
  
Whenever vulnerability is identified within an organisation, it is necessary for an 
appropriate authority to make a public vulnerability advisory if the benefits of 
notifying the system maintenance engineers outweigh the risk of alerting the 
intruders. This cost-benefit calculation is particularly important where many 
other organisations can directly benefit from the information by taking 
immediate remedial actions. The timing and manner of issuing a vulnerability 
risk advisory, or whether it should not be issued at all, must be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, depending on the threat and situation [183]. 
 
Motivations for Cyber Attacks 
Possible motivations for cyberattacks on an infrastructure may include the 
following [183]: 
 
 Country-sponsored Warfare - A cyberattack that is sponsored and 
funded by enemy countries and directed at the national infrastructure 
ought to be considered as the most important potential motivation. This is 
because the willingness and intensity of such an adversary’s capacity to 
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deal a deadly blow are potentially unlimited. The Estonian case of April 
2007 provides a good example for this category. 
 Terrorist Attack - The terrorist motivation is also significant because 
terrorist groups can easily acquire sufficient capability and funding to 
conduct dangerous attacks on infrastructure. From experience, a terrorist 
motivation may decompose into ethnoreligious and socio-cultural 
components.  
 Commercially Motivated Attack - When a company chooses to employ 
cyberattacks to secure a commercial advantage, it could become an 
incident of national infrastructure dimension if the target constitutes a 
national asset. 
 Financially Driven Criminal Attack - Identity theft is the commonest 
example of a financially motivated criminal attack. However, other cases 
may include the intimidation and extortion of companies to avoid cyber 
incidents. 
 Hacking  -  It is instructive to note that many types of attacks are still 
driven by the motivation of hackers, who are usually mischievous youths 
trying to learn or build a reputation for themselves among hackers. This 
is a much less sinister motivation which national leaders can find better 
ways to tap this boundless energy that is characteristic of youthful 
exuberance.  
 
Distributed Denial of Service Attack 
A Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack is effected by bombarding the target (e.g. 
website) with such a volume of requests that it cannot cope with the quantum 
rise in demand. The website will be slowed down, and, in extreme cases, it will 
be overwhelmed to the point where it simply stops working [16].  This results in 
complete service denial for the clients using the website; hence, the term DoS.  
 
The DoS attack is usually carried out by a remotely controlled network of 
compromised or possessed computers (bots, zombies; in a botnet) which are 
distributed (scattered) across geographic, political and service provider 
boundaries; hence, the term DDoS. The end-users whose machines (PCs) are 
employed are innocent of the attack, as their machines are remotely 
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programmed to attack a target that is designated by the botnet controller. These 
machines are usually broadband-connected. This cyber traffic jam, considered 
as the most insidious type of attack that exists today [15, 183], is virtually 
unstoppable because of the ineffective administration of the end-user machines 
and ubiquity of the botnet coverage. This is further compounded by the fact that 
bots are programmed to take commands from multiple controller systems. Thus, 
any successful attempts to destroy a given controller result in the bots simply 
homing to another controller.  
 
The bot recruitment is implemented by using Trojan horses or viruses, sent to 
the user in e-mail. The email content automatically forwards itself to all the 
destinations that are stored in the victim’s address book. This attack will 
continue by the virus propagating itself throughout a system, and subsequently, 
infect one organisation after the other. Examples of this kind are the ‘I Love 
You’ and ‘Internet Worm’ viruses [178]. The five entities that may constitute a 
botnet attack are [183]: 
 Botnet Operator  -  This is the individual, group or country that creates the 
botnet, including its setup and operation. It is the operator that benefits from 
financial gains when used for the purpose. Evidence-backed identification of 
botnet operators has been very difficult for both the law enforcement and 
cybersecurity initiatives. 
 Botnet Controller  -  The set of servers that command and control botnet 
operations. Usually, this is a server that has been maliciously compromised 
for this purpose, without the knowledge of the real owner. Controller activities 
include all recruitment, setup, communication and attack. Typical botnets 
include a handful of controllers distributed across the globe in a non-obvious 
manner. 
 A Collection of Bots  -  These are the end-user broadband-connected PCs 
infected with botnet malware. They are usually owned and operated by bona 
fide citizens who are unconsciously used as instruments in a botnet attack. 
When a botnet includes a concentration of PCs in a given region, observers 
often incorrectly attribute the attack to that region. It is projected that the use 
of smart mobile devices in a botnet will grow as upstream capacity and 
device processing power increase. 
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 Botnet Software Drop  -   Most botnets include servers that are designed to 
store software that might be useful for the botnets during their life-cycle; this 
is akin to a military arsenal. Like controllers, botnet software drop points are 
usually servers that have been compromised for this purpose; often unknown 
to the normal server operator.  
 Botnet Target  -  This is the location that is targeted in an attack. It is usually 
a website, but, in practice, it can be any device, system or network that is 
visible to the bots. Mostly, the targets are prominent and controversial 
websites, simply because they are visible via the Internet and have a great 
deal at stake in terms of their availability.  
 
The victims of cyberattacks via the DDoS mechanism are countless and their 
heterogeneous list is endless.  Examples include attacks against Iranian nuclear 
facilities in 2009/10 and the planned cyber war against Iran (“Olympic Games”) 
published by New York Times in February 2016, the compromised computers of 
the Climate Research Unit (CRU) at the East Anglia University (2009) and the 
nearly 4,000 individual victims of the defunct British tabloid, the News of the 
World (2002- 2011; about 11,000 documents). Other high-profile victims are 
NATO (2011), CIA (2011) and Nigerian Army Education Corps Website (2011).  
 
Recent attacks include the DDoS attacks against JANET (UK) in February and 
April 2016, Israel’s CCTV Systems (February 2016), University of Central 
Florida (February 2016), Ex-Israeli Army Chief of Staff (February 2016), South 
Africa’s Department of Water Affairs (DWA) (February 2016) and the Hillary 
Clinton Campaign, as part of attacks on Democrats (June 2016). These are in 
addition to thousands of botched/successful hacking attempts/attacks against 
various other critical national infrastructural facilities  in the US, UK, Europe and 
other countries [19-21]. Yet, the latest and one of the most significant DDoS 
attacks in recent years, covering both the US and Europe simultaneously, is the 
one which occurred on Friday, 21st October 2016, as reported by ‘The Guardian’ 
under the heading: “Major cyberattack disrupts Internet service across Europe 
and US” [186]. The list of popular sites affected by the attacks includes Netflix, 
Twitter, Spotify, Reddit, CNN, PayPal, Pinterest, AirBnB, Github Fox News, The 
Guardian, New York Times, Wall Street Journal and the Amazon.  
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The attacks seemed to have been mainly directed at ‘Dyn’, one of the 
companies that run the Internet’s Domain Name System (DNS); it is 
headquartered in Manchester, New Hampshire (US). Millions of IP addresses 
were affected. Its unique significance lies in the fact that it occurred at a time 
when the US Presidential campaign of 2016 was at its climax amid 
reinvigorated rhetoric about allegations of electoral rigging by one of the major 
candidates. It is possible that these widespread DDoS attacks could have been 
part of an ongoing rehearsal for a possible plot to rig the US Presidential 
elections which would be due in about eighteen days; the FBI and other US 
security agencies were still investigating the incidence as at the time of this 
report. Details of cyberattacks timeline are available in Hackmageddon [187]. 
The statistics for February 2016 highlighted above represents only a tip of the 
iceberg for that month alone.  
 
In the Global Risk Report 2015, it is highlighted that large-scale cyberattacks, 
characterised by DDoS bombardment, were among the prominent risks in 2015 
[16, 188]. With the successful attacks on JANET(such an elitist infrastructure; 
twice within three months at attacker’s own prime chosen time), the successes 
against NATO and Pentagon, the ease with which Iranian nuclear facilities  
were diminished by some 20% and the glamorous US “Olympic Games” lying in 
wait for the total incapacitation of the nuclear programme, should diplomacy fail, 
coupled with the alleged dabbling into the US democratic process by an 
antagonistic foreign power, it is clear that the 5th warfare domain (the 
cyberspace warfare) has become a reality – it is the most likely candidate that 
would replace the defunct Cold War. 
 
The security and financial implications of these compromises can only be best 
imagined. That is, given the growing sophistication of cyberattacks, the rise of 
hyper-connectivity with a growing number of physical objects connected to the 
Internet, and increasing quanta of sensitive personal data being stored by 
companies in the cloud, it is obvious that the risk of large-scale cyberattacks 
remains high; with respect to both impact and probability. For instance, in the 
United States, the economic cost of cybercrime is estimated at $100 billion each  
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year [188]. According to the first official government estimate on the issue, 
published in February 2011, cybercrime costs the British economy some £27.00 
billion ($35.902 billion) a year [189]. As at June 2015, this estimate rose to 
£34.00 billion  ($45.20 billion) [190]. 
 
From the foregoing, any serious present study on cybersecurity must 
acknowledge the unique threat posed by botnets, because virtually every 
Internet-connected system is vulnerable. The arithmetic of the situation is 
especially intimidating [183]; a botnet that might steal about 500 Kbps of 
upstream capacity from each bot would only need three bots to collapse a 
targeted T1 connection. Thus, only 16,000 bots would be required, theoretically, 
to fill up a 10-Gbps connection [183]. The threat is obvious since most of the 
thousands of botnets that have been observed on the Internet are at least of 
this size; many prominent botnets like Storm and Conficker have several million 
bots. Thus, the national infrastructure faces a severe threat; especially with the 
threats posed by DDoS at a time when IP traceback mechanism is not yet a 
market reality. These two concepts are illustrated below. 
      
 Illustration of DDoS 
 
As an example, consider a hypothetical gateway which allows for 1.5 Gbps of 
inbound traffic, and a botnet creates an inbound stream much larger than 1.5 
Gbps. It is obvious that a logjam would result at the inbound gateway, and a 
DoS condition would occur as illustrated in Figure 2.15 [183]. 
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Figure 2.15. A sample DDoS attack from a botnet [183]  
 
 
 IP  Mechanism 
The problem of finding the source of a transmission packet is called an IP 
Traceback problem. Thus, IP traceback is a means or method for “reliably 
determining the origin of a packet on the Internet” [191]. The relevance of IP 
Traceback technology can only be fully appreciated if the prevalence of the 
variety of active cyberattacks on the Internet is reflected upon. Specifically, 
operators of every Internet Services Provider (ISP) consider the Distributed 
Denial of Services (DDoS) attacks as the most potent in this regard [15]. The 
detection and countering of a DDoS attack source is particularly difficult 
because the IP network is basically stateless with multi-management domains, 
and the source IP spoofing (camouflaging or faking) is easy. Thus, the IP 
Traceback Technology is designed to trace and locate the source(s) of packet 
transmissions with a focus on countering DDoS attacks [15, 191]. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 2.16, in the IP traceback mechanism, the user (victim) at 
a linked terminal unit first issues a tracking request for a packet that is 
considered to be an attack. A piece of packet data is encoded with a  
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unidirectional hash function and transferred to a trace-back system within an 
Autonomous System (AS) to which the user belongs. The requested trace-back 
system examines each packet to determine whether it is coming in from an 
external source or from its own system. When the issued packet is coming from 
a neighbouring AS, a trace request is queried to the AS. This process is 
repeated recursively until the trace-back system identifies an actual AS to which 
the attack source belongs [15]. Although practical tests have demonstrated that 
tracing the original source of Internet communications is feasible, there are still 
loose ends to be tied up before the technology becomes a market reality [15]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure2.15. Mechanism of IP traceback technology [23] 
 
2.7 Cryptographic Solutions for the Technical Threats to Cybersecurity 
  
This section highlights cryptographic solutions for the technical threats to 
communication security. Obviously, as soon as the first literate human realised 
that it was necessary to write down a piece of information, either for storage or 
transmission/ transportation, and there would be undesirable consequences 
should that bit of information be exposed to his antagonists, the challenge of  
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cryptology became manifest. As people started figuring out ways of encoding 
information or trying to understand others’ encoded messages, the field kept on 
developing until it reached the current level of complexity; and the development 
continues [1]. The common technical problems that have been identified in the 
course of this development relate to the threats of eavesdropping, modification, 
replay, masquerading (impersonation, identity theft), penetration and 
repudiation, as well as their highly sophisticated techniques of accomplishment. 
From inception, cryptography has been struggling to find solutions to these 
problems. The cryptographic countermeasures designed to meet these 
challenges include mechanisms aimed at ensuring confidentiality, integrity, 
availability and authenticity, as discussed herein [178]. 
 
2.7.1 Confidentiality 
The confidentiality of a message in any form is guaranteed by encryption with a 
secret key, as long as only the legitimate users have access to that key. Thus, 
symmetric encryption can provide confidentiality of a message. An 
eavesdropper would not be able to read the plaintext without the key, even if he 
acquires the ciphertext. Although asymmetric encryption could also be used to 
achieve the same objective, it is strongly argued that, for the purpose of 
confidentiality, symmetric encryption is favoured over its asymmetric 
counterpart. This is mainly because of its relative advantage in the speed of 
execution. However, as the characteristics of both methods are useful in 
message protection, hybrid systems are often employed to combine their 
relative advantages. 
 
2.7.2 Integrity 
Messages and files require protection against surreptitious modification. While 
confidentiality procedures offer protection against eavesdroppers, they give little 
protection against modification and integrity of the message or file. This is 
critical for text and data messages which are vulnerable to this form of attack. 
This is particularly instructive in the banking and other financial arenas, where 
an intruder may be able to change monetary values and account numbers, in a 
standard transaction form, without the need to actually read it (except for non- 
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malleable encryption algorithms). The solution to integrity threat is to employ 
digital signatures, MACs or some other redundancy scheme in the plaintext 
prior to encryption. In summary, digital signatures serve the following purposes: 
 
 Public Verifiability - Anybody in possession of the authentic public key 
can verify the signature. 
 Authenticity and Integrity - Modification of a message or its 
replacement can be detected. 
 Non-repudiation - The signatory of a message cannot deny having 
signed the document. 
 
2.7.3 Availability 
A basic but very fundamental essential in communication security is the control 
of availability and access to the medium, sensitive data, and cryptographic 
equipment. This involves mainly the issues of physical access control, PINs, 
and passwords. While physical access control is beyond the scope of this 
discussion, password is reserved for a special attention in Chapter 3. 
 
2.7.4 Authentication 
In voice transmission using high-quality transceivers, voice recognition is the 
obvious authentication method, where the receiver is familiar with the voice of 
the sender. However, if the two parties are not familiar with each other or the 
voice quality of the transmission medium is not reliable, other measures would 
be required to ensure mutual authentication. Using symmetric or asymmetric 
encryption and suitable key management, the basic problem of message 
authentication can be resolved. The employment of digital signatures is one 
approach. However, the problems associated with replay or spoofing, where a 
third party taps into the medium, records the transmitted message and 
retransmits it at a later time or date, remain unresolved. Just imagine the 
confusion that would arise at Station B, Figure 2.17, if Station A sends the 
encrypted message “ENEMY ATTACKING YOUR LOCATION NOW!” by 8:00 
AM and Station Z (an eavesdropper), who could not even understand the 
message due to lack of key, records it and retransmits it to Station B at 8: PM  
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on the same day; note that Station B would receive this as an authentic 
message, since it has not been modified. This highlights the need for time 
authentication to be included in the security package, such that replayed 
messages would not be decode-able. 
 
 
Figure 2.17. The need for time authentication [151] 
 
Time authentication as a method of message authentication is often associated 
with voice and fax encryption equipment. The protection is achieved by either 
introducing a time slot of typically 5 min after the original encryption or 
modifying the key generator process so that the generator at the receiver will 
not synchronise with the original generator position at the transmitter. That is, all 
equipment within the network must have the same ±5 min time setting to be 
able to decode the ciphertext. The use of time slot is, however, tricky, in the 
sense that the receiver must have the capacity to check several time slots at the 
same time since two stations with very similar times can be in different time 
slots. Other authentication methods include the use of time stamps and mutual 
key agreement. 
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2.8 Security Engineering in Context 
Security engineering deals with the building of systems that would remain 
dependable in the face of malice, error, and mischance. It concentrates on the 
tools, processes and methods required to design, implement and test complete 
systems, as well as to adapt existing systems as their environment changes. 
These require cross-disciplinary expertise covering cryptography, computer 
security, hardware temper-resistance, knowledge of economics, applied 
psychology, organisations and the law [192]. On its own, modern cryptography 
intersects the disciplines of mathematics, computer science, and electrical 
engineering. Thus, a good security engineering requires an amalgamation of 
four elements [192].  There is a need for the policy; the objectives set out for 
achievement. Then the mechanism; such as the ciphers, access controls, 
hardware tamper-resistance, and other machinery that would be gathered in 
order to implement the policy. Another requirement is the assurance; the degree 
of reliance to be placed on each mechanism. Lastly, there is the incentive; the 
motives which the people protecting and maintaining the system have to 
enhance optimum performance, as well, as the motives that the attackers have 
in trying to defeat the policy. All of these elements must interact as illustrated in 
Figure 2.18 
  
  
 
      
  
 
Figure 2.18. Security engineering analysis framework [175] 
 
There is always the tendency to build security around technology, thereby 
neglecting the most important factor of any security system; the human factor. 
Security revolves around people; both the people who attack the systems, as  
Policy Incentives 
Mechanism Assurance 
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well as the trusted ones who defend those systems.  The people, who must be 
trusted, in order for the system to function, constitute the most critical element 
of any security system. This is because they are the most resilient and the only 
ones endowed with real initiatives.  They take decisions, they improvise and 
they are the most skilled at detecting attacks. However, as components of a 
security system, human beings are double-edged swords. They suffer from 
fatigue and can be distracted, tricked and even compromised. Due to their 
privileged access, when trusted people become compromised they can carry 
out attacks that outside criminals might find difficult to even contemplate. 
Therefore, the best trick is to design security systems that maximise the positive 
aspects of people, while minimising their negative aspects [193]. 
 
2.9 Context of Cryptography 
Cryptography is the art and science of keeping messages secured [146]; 
encryption is its original goal [23]. It is the science of using mathematics to 
encrypt and decrypt data, thereby making it possible to store sensitive 
information or transmit it across insecure networks (e.g. Internet), such that it 
cannot be read by anyone except the intended recipient; with the appropriate 
decryption key. It is about constructing and analysing protocols that overcome 
the influence of adversaries and which are related to various aspects of 
information security, such as data confidentiality, data integrity and authenticity 
[56]. Modern cryptography intersects the disciplines of mathematics, computer 
science, and electrical engineering [25]. There are several ways of classifying 
cryptographic algorithms. Figure 2.19 shows 3 categories [25] based on the 
number of keys that are employed for encryption and decryption. Basically, as 
illustrated in Figure 2.19, cryptography is the conversion of information from a 
readable state (plaintext) to an apparent nonsense (ciphertext) with the aid of 
an encryption key at the source.  
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              (b) 
 
      
           (c) 
Figure 2.19. Cryptographic settings for secret key, public key, and hash function  
(a, b and c respectively) [184]  
 
The resultant ciphertext is converted back to the original plaintext with the aid of 
a decryption key (which may or may not be the same as the encryption key) at 
the sink.  Depending on the strength of the encryption key, some ciphertexts 
may be easily broken, such as some mono-alphabetic substitution ciphers (e.g. 
the Caesar Cipher). Others may appear unbreakable, at least within the 
relevant timeframe. For instance, the Necronomicon of Al-Hirra, or Book of the 
Dead (The Voynich Manuscript) has remained unbroken since 730 CE [194]. 
 
Cryptography could be likened to a lock in the physical world. A lock, on its own, 
is useless until it is part of a larger physical system, such as a door on a 
building, a chain, a safe, a car, and etcetera. This larger system also includes 
the people whose roles are crucial in order for the lock to function at all, and to 
do so effectively. Similarly, cryptography on its own is useless until it forms part 
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of a larger security system; and it is only a very small part of it. As illustrated in 
Section 2.8, it is only one item under the security mechanism, while the entire 
mechanism itself is only one out of four major areas of security engineering 
concerns. However, though it is a small part, cryptography is nonetheless a very 
important part because, unlike the lock which only denies or grants access to 
all, cryptography also performs the sensitive function of distinguishing between 
good access and bad access [23]. 
 
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the effectiveness of a cryptosystem can 
only be assessed within the context of the entire security system, of which the 
human factor is the weakest link. Again, it must be noted that the human factor 
is the most critical factor in the security system for at least three possible 
reasons; it is the weakest link, the only factor that exercises initiatives, as well 
as the factor that encompasses all the other elements of the entire system. This 
underscores the significance of social engineering in every security 
arrangement. 
 
2.9.1  General Model of Cryptosystems 
 
Figure 2.20 illustrates the flow of information in a general cryptosystem. Given 
the following denotations: 
 
 
  M = P = Plaintext (Message)  
  E = Encryption Function 
  D = Decryption Function 
K₁ = Encryption Key 
  K2 = Decryption Key 
  C = Ciphertext (Encrypted Message) 
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Figure 2.20. Characterisation of a General Cryptosystem 
 
The encryption and decryption operations are respectively governed by the 
equations: 
 
 
  EK₁ (M) = EK₁ (P) = C              (2.30)  
DK₂ (C) = DK₂ {EK₁ (M)} = M = P            (2.31) 
 
 
Where K1 may or may not be the same as K2; for Symmetric and Asymmetric 
Cryptography respectively [146]. Where K1 = K2 for a symmetric operation 
 
 
EK (M) = EK (P) = C               (2.32) 
DK (C) = DK {EK (M)} = M = P             (2.33) 
 
 
For symmetric cryptography, the key, which is kept secret, is known only to the 
sender and receiver. Thus, for ‘n’ users, the number of keys required is [195]]: 
 
 
n C2  = n(n-1)              (2.34) 
      2 
 
 
For asymmetric cryptography, however, the encryption key K1 is publicised 
while the decryption key K2 is kept secret by the owner [23]. 
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Eavesdropping or wiretapping is the interception of an information data by an 
unauthorised third party monitoring a communication channel [195]. The 
traditional practice in cryptographic analysis is to depict Alice as the sender at 
the Source, Bob as the receiver at the Sink and Eve as the intruder or 
eavesdropper between the source and the sink [23].  
 
A cryptographic algorithm is a mathematical function used for encryption and 
decryption [146, 196] The decryption algorithm is usually the reverse of its 
encryption counterpart; for instance, addition and subtraction. As an illustration, 
assume the number 786 is to be sent using a cryptosystem, and both parties 
have agreed on a key value of 019. Using an encryption algorithm, which is the 
addition of the message (786) and the key (019), the ciphertext is 805. Since 
the recipient knows the key (019) and the encryption algorithm (addition), the 
message can be decrypted from the ciphertext by doing the reverse operation; 
subtracting 019 from 805 to get the plaintext message 786. Anybody 
intercepting the communication should have some difficulty in figuring out the 
plaintext from the ciphertext without the key, even if the encryption technique is 
known [196, 197]. 
 
2.9.2  Cryptographic Key Management 
The most secure cryptographic algorithm/protocol is virtually useless without an 
efficient and effective key management system. It is understood that key 
management is the Achilles heel of most secure communication systems [182]. 
Available records indicate that the most effective way to attack a secure 
communications system is to influence the system’s personnel and exploit 
weaknesses in its management; this again underscores the importance of 
human trust and other human factors in cybersecurity. It is clear from Table 2.6 
that, even for a known algorithm, in order to break a key by brute force, an 
incredible amount of effort, in both time and logistics, is required. Thus, rather 
than spending a stupendous amount of money on analytical tools to gain 
information on a 128-bit key, which is statistically impossible within a useful time 
frame, it is much easier and less expensive to exploit the weaknesses in the 
human infrastructure; the weakest link in the security system (due to operational  
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deficiencies and compromise reasons). The purpose of key management is to 
reduce the risk associated with these threats/vulnerabilities to the barest 
minimum and to process secret keys in such a manner that it is transparent to 
both the user and the network. The issues that relate to key management 
include key generation, distribution/installation, activation/use, 
expiration/revocation and destruction. 
 
       Table 2.6. Estimates of time required to break keys by brute force [178] 
Key Length 
(bits) 
Key 
Variety 
Tests/Sec/ 
Computer 
Number of 
Computers 
Time Used 
40 1.1 x 1012 109 103 1.1 s 
56 7.2 x 1016 109 103 20 h 
80 1.2 x 1024 109 103 38,000 years 
128 3.3 x 1038 109 103 1.1 x 1019 
years 
128 3.4 x 1038 109 7 x109* 1.5 x 1012 years 
         *World population 
 
2.9.3  Cryptanalysis 
It is recalled that the main purpose of cryptography is to keep the plaintext 
and/or key secret from eavesdroppers (adversaries, attackers, interceptors, 
interlopers, intruders, opponents, or enemies). Eavesdroppers are assumed to 
have complete access to the messages in the communication channels, as well 
as having complete knowledge of the algorithm. The science of recovering an 
encrypted message without having the decryption key is called cryptanalysis. 
For cryptanalysis to be adjudged as successful, it may recover the plaintext or 
the key. It may also find sufficient weaknesses that could lead to the breaking of 
the cryptosystem. If the key is lost through a non-cryptanalytic means, this is 
termed a compromise, while an attempted cryptanalysis is known as an attack. 
There are four general types of cryptanalytic attacks; namely, ciphertext-only 
attack, known plaintext attack, chosen-plaintext attack and adaptive-chosen-
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plaintext attack. Other types of attacks include chosen-ciphertext attack, 
chosen-key attack, and robber-hose cryptanalysis [195, 196, 198]. 
 
2.10 Social Engineering: the Art of Human Hacking 
Social engineering is the act of influencing people’s behaviour through the 
manipulation of their emotions; this is used as a means to gain and betray their 
trust in order to have access to their system. This is done over the phone, via 
an email, through social media or in person and a variety of other methods. The 
major difference between social engineering and other attack methods is the 
use of human beings as a vector for the attack; the wetware in hackers’ 
parlance. Some people are naturally gifted in the science of social hacking, but 
the art could also be taught and learned. The use of wetware, which has grown 
rapidly in recent years, is said to be the dominant technique in attacking some 
target sets [18, 175]. Most modern attacks employ a blend of technical and 
social engineering techniques. Social engineering covers what is popularly 
called ‘419’ (advance fee fraud), a unique form of confidence artistry, whose 
antidote is proposed in Chapter 5. Hence, conceptual clarifications relevant in 
the treatment of Chapter 5 are highlighted next.  
 
2.10.1  Conceptual Clarifications 
 The term cyberspace does not have a standard and objective definition [199, 
200]. Generally, it is used to describe the virtual world of computers. In other 
words, while the term ‘cyber’ denotes the computer and anything that relates to 
it, cyberspace refers to the notional environment in which communications over 
computer networks occur [201]. It is “the domain characterised by the use of 
electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify and exchange 
data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures” [202].  
 
Computerisation is to cause certain operations or processes to be performed by 
a computer, particularly, as a replacement for human labour. Digitisation is the  
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process of converting real-world analogue quantities (texts, images, audio, 
video, etc.) into a digital format [203]. In this format, information is organised 
into discrete small units of data (bits) which are grouped into bytes. This is the 
binary data that computers and several devices with computing capacity can 
process. Thus, digitisation involves a process that results in the breaking down 
of a given whole into its smaller parts. 
 
Miniaturisation is the continuous reduction in the sizes of manufactured items, 
regardless of whether they are mechanical, optical/electronic products and 
devices; e.g., mobile phones, computers, vehicle engine downsizing, etc. [204]. 
This trend is made possible by the emergence of micro and nanotechnologies. 
Authentication is the process of establishing the true identity of a user or an 
entity [205]; i.e., to prove that a person/an entity is indeed the one whom he/that 
it claims to be.   
 
Tele-density used to be computed as the number of fixed telephone lines per 
hundred inhabitants. With the advent of GSM, where mobile cellular subscribers 
outnumber the fixed line connections in some countries, the term Mobi-density 
is preferred in such countries; i.e., mobile cellular subscribers per hundred 
inhabitants. Since the two terms may lead to mutual disadvantages for countries 
with well-established fixed lines and those whose GSM network is still at the 
initial stage of development, ITU has proposed the use of Effective Tele-density; 
defined as either fixed line connections or mobile subscribers per hundred 
inhabitants – whichever of the two is higher [206, 207]. 
 
Advance fee fraud (alias 419), which is also known as the Nigerian Scam, has 
grown into an epidemic [24]. The term ‘419’ was coined from Section 419 of the 
Nigerian Criminal Code (part of Chapter 38: Obtaining Property by False 
Pretences; Cheating) [208]. Basically, 419 is a form of confidence trick which 
the confidence artists use to defraud unassuming innocent business partners, 
both locally and globally. An example of a 419-transaction is illustrated in Figure 
2.21, where Caller 2 gives his fake location as KANO (Location E; circled in 
Red) in his mobile phone conversation with Caller 1 at IBADAN (Location B), 
while he is actually speaking from LAGOS (Location A). Please note that Caller  
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2 could have given his fake location as KUMASI (Location C) in Ghana or 
NIAMEY (Location D) in Niger or anywhere in the world, claiming to have 
roamed his mobile service. This necessitates some discussions on LBA in 
Chapter 5 and underscores the significance of trust-centred human attributes in 
cybersecurity designs.  
 
These conceptual clarifications under social engineering, which serve as a 
prelude for tackling the confidence artists in Chapter 5, bring the extensive 
literature review to a close. The lessons learned from the review on trust in 
Sections 2.3.2 – 2.3.4 of this chapter will be invaluable in the study, 
understanding and practical implementation of the antidote against the 419 style 
of fraud in Chapter 5. Before then, the relevance of password security, as the 
first line of defence in cyberspace, within the context of human factors is treated 
in Chapter 3 immediately after the deductive summary for the literature review 
in the last section of this chapter. This would have provided sufficient 
background for the presentation of the main research design and 
implementation with result analyses in Chapter 4, prior to Chapter 5. Next is the 
deductive summary of the literature review. 
 
 
Figure 2.21. A 419 mobile phone conversation: giving a fake caller’s location 
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2.11 Deductions 
 
Chapter 2 covers literature review. It discussed secret sharing schemes, the 
concepts of trust and the extension of human security perimeter through a web 
of trust. It also discusses the concept of security and the military security 
assessment process, a 3-factor security assessment process (risk-centred 
security assessment technique) and analysis/synthesis. This is followed by the 
concepts of cyber/cyberspace with its threat landscape and national cyber 
threats/vulnerabilities. The chapter ended with highlights on 
cryptography/cryptanalysis and social engineering before deductions. The 
deductions hereunder are given sequentially. 
  
2.11.1  Secret Sharing Schemes 
 
This segment covers reviews on the theories of secret sharing schemes. It 
highlighted the theoretical basis for SSSS, a global overview of Secret Sharing 
Schemes and cryptographic key management, with a focus on key recovery 
schemes. The chapter undertook this review in search of an appropriate 
technological model or algorithm that could use technology in conjunction with 
trust-centred human factors to enhance cybersecurity, and thus extend the 
human security perimeter. The perception resulting from the theoretical analysis 
in this chapter prepares ground for a web design and development to practically 
implement a multi-authentication web-based secret sharing scheme - the 
CDRSAS-PT.  
 
The SSSS is hereby chosen, as a guide for implementation in this work, 
because of its originality, simplicity, flexibility, security, and popularity, after 
examining the three main categories of secret sharing schemes: namely, 
perfect, non-perfect and ramp secret sharing schemes. This choice also comes 
after reviewing other (k, n)-threshold schemes, including those of Blakley, 
Asmuth/Bloom, and Mignotte. The SSSS was also selected and used as one of 
the cryptographic primitives in the implementation of the CDRSAS-PT, the main 
research design.  
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The main theory behind the SSSS is based on polynomial interpolation. The 
polynomials could be replaced by any other functions which are easy to 
evaluate and to interpolate. This idea is rooted in the notion that two points are 
enough to define a line, three points are required to define a quadratic 
expression and four points are needed to define a cubic function, etc. In other 
words, it requires ‘k’ points to define a polynomial of order ‘k-1’. 
 
With the theoretical background relating to secret sharing schemes and 
cryptographic key recovery techniques covered in this chapter, the research 
effort appears set for its main design and implementation, as would be 
presented in the next chapter; i.e., devising or adapting an appropriate 
technological scheme that would use technology in conjunction with the human 
factor of trust to enhance cybersecurity; and thus extend the human security 
perimeter.  
2.11.2   Trust, Human Factors Human infrastructure 
The value of trust in the process of all forms of human interaction is as 
significant as aptly described by Russell [99] in her book titled: “Trust: The New 
Workplace Currency;” i.e., it is the medium of exchange among humans, 
without which no trade, whether in kind or cash, can take place with positive 
results. Trust may be defined as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to 
the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform 
a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or 
control that other party” [2, 102].  
Human infrastructure refers to those inherent requisite human inputs (e.g., trust 
and other human attributes) without which any technological 
design/device/system that is emplaced would not attain necessary quality 
assurance and would not yield optimum results.  
The concept of human factors, as employed in this research work, relates to all 
the trust-enhancing (beneficial) and trust-diminishing (detrimental) human 
attributes. It is then posited that the consideration of applicable elements of 
these attributes, both the positive and negative, is a ‘sine qua non’ in the design 
and functioning of all aspects of human endeavours in order to realise optimum  
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output; with particular emphasis on technological systems. 
 
 After introductory discussions on trust, human factors, human infrastructure 
and the web of trust, this section covers a number of issues related to the study 
of trust in an organisational setting. Each is considered and dealt with, leading 
to the adoption of a model of dyadic trust in an organisational context. This trust 
model, as proposed by Mayer et al. (Figure 2.8) is the first that explicitly 
considers both characteristics of the trustee as well as the trustor. It clearly 
distinguishes trust from the factors that contribute to it, and as well differentiates 
trust from its outcome of risk taking in the relationship. The model defines trust 
in such a way that distinguishes it from other similar concepts (cooperation, 
confidence, predictability), which have often been confused with trust in the 
literature. Additionally, the critical role of risk is clearly specified in this model. 
The model presents a versatile and dynamic definition of trust with a set of its 
determinants on the part of the trustee (ability, benevolence, and integrity) and 
the trustor (propensity to trust). It is noteworthy that the model also highlights 
the significance of context and long-term effects in the evolution of trust. The 
differentiations between factors that cause trust, trust itself, and outcomes 
(RTR) of trust are critical to the validation of the model; all the three component 
elements must be measured in order to fully test the model. The most 
problematic component of the model from the standpoint of measurement is 
trust itself; because trust is a willingness to be vulnerable, a measure that 
assesses that willingness is needed.  
Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale was also highlighted; it is used to measure 
generalised trust of others. Lastly, Adeka’s statistical and graphical approaches 
at estimating the measure of trust in Section 2.3.3 apply only to the case of 
secret sharing. This merely proves that the amount of trust in the secret sharing 
process is directly proportional to its number of participants (trustees). 
 
2.11.3  The Three-Factor Security Assessment Process 
The discovery of the 3-factor security assessment process, and its revolutionary 
derivatives calls for a redefinition or new understanding of the relationship 
between the terms ‘Analysis’ and ‘Synthesis’, as well as the intricate 
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relationship among the security assessment factors of risk, threat, and 
vulnerability, especially in the military.  
 
A look up on security in dictionaries yields a general view that security is 
“freedom from danger, risk or loss.” In the context of this research work, the 
concern is about dangers, risks, and losses associated with computers, its 
information/data and network transactions. Fundamentally, the need for 
cryptography arose in response to the requirements to secure information, 
whether in storage or transit. The most primary security needs it sets out to 
address are confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authenticity. 
 
In assessing security problems in a system, it is important to appreciate several 
characteristics of the system’s security posture. These must include the threats, 
vulnerabilities, and risks. Usually, in a systematic risk analysis to determine the 
potential problems in the security of a system, it is useful to create a matrix of 
the various threats and vulnerabilities associated with the system (Risk 
Assessment Matrix). 
 
The object of every security assessment is the determination of possible Risk(s) 
relative to the asset to be protected, and that this risk could be systematically 
calculated quantitatively, using the Risk Assessment Matrix approach; with 
Threat(s) and Vulnerability (ies)y as inputs – hence, a 3-facor security 
assessment approach. This position is a direct consequence of the pragmatic 
conclusion in the last paragraph of Section 2.4. Other than this approach, the 
security assessment process could be anything but systematic; haphazard, 
uncoordinated and stressful. Though this approach is not entirely new in the 
civil security sector of the security industry, it is contrary to the norm in most 
armies throughout the world, with the exception of the US military (probably, 
with some allies), which discovered the anomaly in 1998 and took steps to 
rectify it by 2006. 
 
As regards the reason (s) for the disparity in the practice between the civil and 
military elements of the security industry, the researcher discovered that  
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possible misconceptions (with the exception of Indian Army) surrounding the 
terms ‘Analysis’ (as employed in the treatment of the Intelligence Cycle; i.e., 
Intelligence Analysis) and ‘Synthesis’, were most probably responsible. This, in 
turn, is most probably a direct consequence of the military tradition of learning 
on the job, with few or no questions and as little room for prior theoretical 
knowledge as the situation permits. Hence, as a by-product or derivative of this 
research effort, Adeka [34] gives a detailed treatment of the security 
assessment/management processes and the intricate relationship that exists 
between the two evaluation terms/techniques of analysis and synthesis, with 
some revolutionary results which led to about five neologies listed in Section 
2.6.6. The synopsis on the 3-factor security assessment process, as presented 
in Section 2.6.1., incorporates the novel Adeka’s Twin Risk Equations (ATREs) 
– Equations (2.28) and (2.29). Equation (2.28), the substantive equation, is 
illustrated in Figures 2.10 and 2.12. 
 
The factual reality is that analysis and synthesis, as scientific methods, always 
go hand in hand; they complement each other. Every synthesis is built upon the 
results of a preceding analysis, and every analysis requires a subsequent 
synthesis in order to verify and correct its results. While analysis is a means to 
an end, synthesis is the actual end or resides at the end. This intricately 
interwoven relationship is aptly illustrated in Figure 2.9. 
 
In an effort to resolve the anomalous disparity between the public and private 
segments of the security industry, it is posited that the public security industry 
should borrow a leaf from its private counterpart, by adopting the risk-based 3-
factor security assessment process; as already done by the US Army. 
 
The concepts of the human security perimeter and Adeka’s Web of Trust, as 
contained in the subtitle of this Thesis, “Extending the Human Security 
Perimeter through a Web of Trust”, are expounded in Section 2.4.3. At the heart 
of security concern is the issue of trust that is associated with the active 
variables in a system. Since the human factor is the most critical element in 
security systems, security perimeter could be defined in relation to the human 
trust level; via mutual positive identification of the correspondents/devices, 
using various means of authentication.  
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Adeka’s concept of the web of trust has two component elements. The first 
element relates to a network (web) of trustees or participants in the business of 
secret sharing as expounded by Shamir. The second element has to do with the 
security which results from the web implementation of this research effort, which 
serves to enhance secret sharing via a secure and trusted website. The same 
trust instruments (a web of trusted associates and secure website) that 
engender the emergence of such a secure and healthy business environment 
could also be responsible for the extension of the individual human security 
perimeter, as a consequence of increased human confidence that the secret 
would be better secured. 
 
A statistical proof for estimating the measure of human trust from the web is 
presented in Section 2.6.1. As illustrated in Figure 2.7, it could be proved that 
mathematically and sensibly speaking, as n increases in the (k, n) threshold 
secret sharing scheme, independent of ‘k’, the joint probability for the Secret 
getting lost/damaged or compromised decreases exponentially. By implication, 
since the joint probability of the Secret being safe is inversely proportional to 
that of its loss/damage ( nJLTP  + nJSTP  = 1.0), it follows that the joint probability 
for safety increases exponentially, as n increases. Therefore, it would be 
reasonable to posit that, secret sharing increases or extends the human 
confidence/trust that is to be associated with the safety/security of the Secret 
Data, when compared to a situation where an individual keeps the Secret all 
alone. The resultant increased confidence/trust, due to enhanced 
safety/security, is engendered by the involvement of the network (web) of ‘n’ 
trusted associates or participants/trustees in the sharing scheme; and hence, 
the subtitle of this Thesis– ‘Extending the Human Security Perimeter through a 
Web of Trust. 
2.11.4   Cyber Threats Landscape 
In the global village, the cyberspace, characterised by the prevalence of 
computer/Internet, is synonymous to ubiquity. In such a system, dominated by 
sundry criminals, where the IP traceback technology to every individual host is 
not yet a practical reality due to the ease with which IPs can be spoofed, the  
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turbulence in the cyberspace, given the prevailing threat landscape, could only 
be best imagined. Putting cryptography and the entire concept of security in 
proper perspectives, it must be noted that the human factor is the most critical 
factor in the security system for at least three possible reasons; it is the weakest 
link, the only factor that exercises initiatives, as well as the factor that 
transcends all the other elements of the entire system. Due to its importance, 
the human factor could serve as a barometer for defining security perimeter. 
This underscores the significance of social engineering in every facet of security 
arrangement. As components of a security system, human beings are double-
edged swords. They suffer from fatigue and can be distracted, tricked and even 
compromised. Due to their privileged accesses, when trusted people become 
compromised they can carry out attacks that outside criminals might find difficult 
to even contemplate. It is thus not surprising to discover that malicious insiders 
who represent only about 20% of actors in the cyber world are responsible for 
some 80% of the damages caused. This might spell doom for the prospect of a 
successful defence against socio-cryptanalysis (social hacking) when the trade 
becomes perfected.  
 
It is noteworthy that, while technical means continue to improve in technical 
cyber defence, a lot needs to be done in social engineering to checkmate the 
rising trend of socio-cryptanalysis. The need to step up efforts at improving the 
security of passwords and pass-phrases, as it affects human attitude, cannot be 
over-emphasised. 
 
2.11.5. Advance Fee Fraud (419) 
 
Advance fee fraud (alias 419), which is also known as the Nigerian Scam, has 
grown into an epidemic [24]. The term ‘419’ was coined from Section 419 of the 
Nigerian Criminal Code (part of Chapter 38: Obtaining Property by False 
Pretences; Cheating) [208]. Basically, 419 is a form of confidence trick which 
the confidence artists use to defraud unassuming innocent business partners, 
both locally and globally. An example of a 419-transaction is illustrated in Figure 
2.21, where Caller 2 gives his fake location as KANO (Location E; circled in 
Red) in his mobile phone conversation with Caller 1 at IBADAN (Location B),  
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while he is actually speaking from LAGOS (Location A). Please note that Caller 
2 could have given his fake location as KUMASI (Location C) in Ghana or 
NIAMEY (Location D) in Niger or anywhere in the world, claiming to have 
roamed his mobile service. This necessitates some discussions on LBA in 
Chapter 5 and also underscores the significance of trust-centred human 
attributes in cybersecurity designs. 
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Chapter 3 
 
PINs, Passwords and Password Security Purgatory  
 
This brief treatment of password security will cover definition, significance, 
history, categories of access control tools, factors in the security of a password 
System, multiplicity of passwords with associated problems (storage, length, 
composition, and attitude), password repositories, security guidelines on 
password usage, security versus human factors and training/security 
awareness education. Deductions will close the chapter after an analytical 
presentation of a password survey on Africa, using Nigeria as a case study. 
3.1 Definition and Significance 
A summary of definitions indicate that a password or passphrase is a secret 
word/phrase, a string of characters, or some form of an interactive message or 
signal that is used for authentication; to prove identity or gain access to a 
resource/place [209, 210]. Thus, in a nutshell, a password is a basic method of 
access control. The main function of an access control system is to restrict the 
use of the resources to authorised users alone. In addition, it limits or defines 
the degree of access granted to every authorised user [211]. The word 
purgatory, in the context of this chapter, denotes a miserable situation that is of 
critical, complex and/or unusual difficulty [209].  
3.2 History 
From Polybius’ description of the system for the distribution of watchwords in 
the Roman military [212], it is obvious that passwords or watchwords have been 
used since ancient times. In the military tradition, the password system operates 
as a pair of secret words or phrases; a challenge and response. For instance, in 
the opening days of the Battle of Normandy, paratroopers of the US 101st 
Airborne Division used the password flash, which was presented as a 
challenge, and answered with the correct response, thunder. The challenge and 
response were changed every three days. Similarly, the US paratroopers also 
used a device known as a "cricket" on ‘D-Day’, in place of a password system, 
as a temporarily unique method of identification; one metallic click given by the 
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device in lieu of a password challenge was to be met by two clicks in response 
[210]. 
 
Passwords have been used with computers since the earliest days of 
computing. MIT's Compatible Time-Sharing System (CTSS), one of the first 
time-sharing operating systems, was introduced in 1961. It had a login 
command that requested a user password. When the user typed in a password, 
the system would turn off the printing mechanism, so that the user might type in 
his password with privacy" [213].  The idea of storing login passwords in a 
hashed form as part of the Unix operating system was invented by Robert 
Morris in the early 1970s [214].  The system was based on a simulated Hagelin 
rotor crypto machine and first appeared in 6th Edition Unix in 1974. A later 
version of his algorithm, known as crypt (3)5, used a 12-bit salt6 and invoked a 
modified form of the DES algorithm 25 times to reduce the risk of pre-computed 
dictionary attacks [213].  
 
3.3 Categories of Access Control Tools 
 
Citing Furnell et al. [215], Jeslet et al. [118] noted that the means of user 
authentication include the following: 
 Smart card or other tokens 
 Fingerprint, Retinal image, {Iris & retinal identification and vein patterns 
[83]}, Voice and Facial pattern 
 Password or PIN (Personal Identification Number) 
 
Each approach has its strong and weak points. Regardless of the approach that 
is selected by an organisation, there is a trade-off between the value of the 
resources and the effectiveness and cost of implementation and maintenance. It 
                                                     
5
 In Unix computing, crypt is the name of both a utility program and a C programming function. 
Though both are used for encrypting data, they are otherwise essentially unrelated. To 
distinguish between the two, writers often refer to the utility program as crypt(1), because it is 
documented in section 1 of the Unix manual pages, and refer to the C library function as 
crypt(3), because its documentation is in manual section 3. [Online]. Available: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypt_(Unix). [Accessed: 21 Oct. 2012]. 
 
6
 In cryptography, a salt consists of random bits, forming one of the inputs to a one-way 
function. The other input is usually a password or passphrase. The output of the one-way 
function can be stored with the salt rather than the password, and still be used for authenticating 
users (“ISC Diary – Hashing Passwords”. www.Dshield.org). [Accessed: 24 Sep.,2012]. 
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is also noteworthy that, despite significant advances in graphic-based 
approaches, the password remains the most common means of authentication 
[211], as well as the first line of defence against intrusion into a computer 
system [216]. 
3.4 Factors in the Security of a Password System 
The security of a system that is protected using passwords depends on several 
factors. Among these is the need for the overall system to be designed for 
sound security, with protection against viruses, eavesdroppers and similar 
threats. Physical security against threats like shoulder surfing, video camera 
and keyboard sniffers should also be taken care of. Passwords should also be 
chosen such that they are hard to guess and also hard for an attacker to 
discover using any of the available automatic attack schemes. It is now 
common practice for the computer to hide passwords as they are being typed 
as a measure against bystanders reading the passwords. Since this practice 
may lead to errors and stress, thereby encouraging users to choose weak 
passwords, experts are now of the view that the system should be designed 
such that users have the option to show or hide the passwords as they are 
being typed [217].  
 
Password strength is a measure of how effective is a password in resisting 
guessing and brute-force attacks. Usually, this is an estimate of how many trials 
an attacker who does not have direct access to the password would need, on 
average, to guess it correctly. The strength of a password is a function of 
length, complexity and unpredictability [218]. There are two main factors to 
consider in determining password strength. These are the number of guesses to 
find the correct password and the ease with which an attacker can check the 
validity of each guessed password. The first factor is determined by password 
length and its measure of randomness; this factor is under users’ control. The 
second factor is determined by how the password is stored and used; this factor 
is determined by the password system design and beyond the control of the 
user. Effective access control may force extreme measures on criminals 
seeking to acquire a password or biometric token [219]. Less extreme 
measures may include extortion, rubber hose cryptanalysis, and side channel 
attack. 
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3.5 Multiplicity of Passwords and Associated Problems 
The measure of carelessness associated with the use of passwords is amazing. 
However, studies have shown that most of the problems associated with the 
users’ care-free attitude in respect of password usage have a lot to do with the 
multiplicity of passwords used by an individual [179].  Experience has shown 
that an active Internet user could have over 60 passwords and PINs for various 
applications and services; of these, those with the best memories might not be 
able to memorise up to 25% [220]. Thus, the resultant problems include 
storage, password length, and composition. As a result, in order to relieve the 
brain of undue stress, password users resort to attitudes that are inimical to the 
security of the passwords, and, by extension, security of the system they were 
designed to protect. These negative attitudes include: 
 
 Writing all passwords in a diary 
 Using the same password for all applications 
 Relating the password to the particular application, e.g., using the room 
number and occupant’s initials as access to the office door. 
 Using very simple configurations such as 12121212, 12345678, or 
1a2b3c4d. 
 Pasting passwords on the wall, board or computer, etcetera.  
The security risk associated with this practice is widespread, as a study showed 
that 50% of users wrote their passwords down [216].  
3.6 Password Repositories 
The multiplicity of passwords has engendered the problem of password storage. 
This has given rise to many software applications designed to facilitate 
password management. These are collectively called wallets and are in two 
different varieties. The first is a username/password repository; an encrypted 
file kept in one’s computer that holds information which one needs to log into 
one’s various accounts. The most prominent of these is Darn! Passwords! [220, 
221].  It has a password generator that can make up passwords for various 
applications and allows one to drag one’s passwords into the application or 
Web site that one is using. It allows one to remember only one password  
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instead of many. Similar applications are Password Safe [222] and QWallet 
[223], both for windows. Selznick PassWallet [224]  provides similar functionality 
on the Macintosh and Palm OS. Apparently, no similar product exists for Unix or 
Linux.  
 
In addition to a password, the other type of wallet programme holds other 
information that a user might need in accessing a Web site, and also aims at 
moving from one site to the other without re-entering the information [220]. The 
most prominent application in this category is Microsoft’s Passport [225] which 
is targeted at consumer-oriented shopping sites. The Passport server maintains 
personal information about the customer (e.g., credit-card numbers, shoe size, 
etcetera) and passes on this information, with permission, to the sites that the 
customer visits. Passport works only with participating merchant site, so the 
user still needs to keep track of passwords and usernames to other sites. Note 
that in an effort to make the service as general as possible, Microsoft did not 
protect the re-direction at the beginning of a Passport session by SSL [226], this 
is one of the several risks in its protocol [220]. From the foregoing, the problem 
of password storage remains unresolved, since the computer itself could be 
stolen, damaged or hacked. 
3.7 Security Guidelines on Password Usage 
It is usually better to have passwords centrally controlled, if possible. Whatever 
the case, in order to improve the strength of access security, the following 
guidelines should be followed in the use of passwords [179]: 
 It should be kept absolutely secret; not divulged to any other user 
 It should not be written down or recorded where it can be accessed by 
other users.  
 It must be changed if there is the slightest indication or suspicion of a 
compromise. 
 It must be changed when a member of the organisation leaves the group 
or changes task 
 It should be at least eight characters long (alpha-numeric with mixed 
case/symbols) [210]. 
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 It should not be formed from any obvious source; e.g. username or 
group/company/project name, family name or initials or partner’s name, 
months of the year or days of the week, car number plate registration, 
nicknames/pet names, telephone numbers, all numeric or all alphabetic 
characters and more than one consecutive identical characters). 
 It must be changed monthly or at least bi-monthly. 
 It must be changed more frequently the greater the risk or more sensitive 
the assets being protected. 
 It must not be included in an automated log-in procedure, i.e. not stored 
in a macro function. 
 It should not be a dictionary word [210].  
 
3.7.1 Guidelines for Strong Passwords 
Guidelines for choosing good passwords are designed to make passwords less 
easily discovered by intelligent guessing. Common guidelines include [227], 
[228]:  
 A minimum password length of 12 to 14 characters if permitted 
 Generating passwords randomly where feasible 
 Avoiding passwords based on repetition, dictionary words, letter or 
number sequences, usernames, relative or pet names, romantic links 
(current or past), or biographical information (e.g., ID numbers, 
ancestors' names or dates). 
 Including numbers and symbols in passwords if allowed by the system 
 If the system recognises case as significant, using capital and lowercase 
letters 
 Avoiding using the same password for multiple sites or purposes 
 Avoid using something that the public or workmates know you strongly 
like or dislike 
 Use acronyms of mnemonic words/phrases 
 Providing an alternative to keyboard entry (e.g., spoken passwords, or 
biometric passwords). 
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 Requiring more than one authentication system, such as 2-factor 
authentication (something you have and something you know). 
 Write Down Passwords  
From the above, it is clear that experts are now divergent  as regards whether it 
is better to write down the passwords or not. Some guidelines advise against 
writing passwords down, while others, noting the large numbers of password 
protected systems users must access, encourage writing down passwords as 
long as the written password lists are kept in a safe place, such as a wallet or 
safe, not attached to a monitor or in an unlocked desk drawer.  Schneier [228]  
noted that:  
“Simply, people can no longer remember passwords good enough to 
reliably defend against dictionary attacks and are much more secure if 
they choose a password too complicated to remember and then write it 
down. We're all good at securing small pieces of paper. I recommend that 
people write their passwords down on a small piece of paper, and keep it 
with their other valuable small pieces of paper: in their wallet.” 
In addition, some even argue that the concept of password expirations is 
obsolete [229], for the following reasons: 
 Asking users to change passwords frequently encourages simple and 
weak passwords. 
 
 If one has a truly strong password, there is little point in changing it. 
Changing passwords which are already strong introduces the risk that 
the new password may be less strong. 
 
 A compromised password is likely to be used immediately by an attacker 
to install a backdoor, often via privilege escalation. Once this is 
accomplished, password changes won't prevent future attacker access. 
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 Mathematically it does not gain much security at all. 
 
o Moving from never changing one's password to changing the 
password on every authenticate attempt (pass or fail attempts) only 
doubles the number of attempts the attacker must make on average 
before correctly guessing the password in a brute force attack; one 
gains much more security by just increasing the password length by 
one character than changing the password on every use. 
However, Password expiration serves two purposes [230]: 
 If the time to crack a password is estimated to be 100 days, password 
expiration times fewer than 100 days may help ensure insufficient time 
for an attacker. 
 If a password has been compromised, requiring it to be changed 
regularly should limit the access time for the attacker. 
 
3.7.2 Guidelines on Password Management 
A password management system is an administrative arrangement aimed at 
providing an effective interactive resource that ensures the quality of the 
passwords and enforces their use in tune with the security manager’s policy. In 
general, password management should enable secure login procedures and 
protect passwords against unauthorised use and access [179]. This includes 
measures which ensure that passwords are stored in files that are separate 
from the main application system data, using a one-way encryption algorithm. 
These measures offer some protection against password cracker programs and 
dictionary attacks. 
 
As part of the separation process between the client and the producer, the initial 
(default) passwords from the manufacturer must be replaced after equipment 
installation. The management must ensure that no protected asset is accessed 
without submission of the correct password. Where users are allowed to choose 
their own passwords, a re-confirmation, by re-typing a new password definition, 
should be made compulsory. Password changes should be enforced at 
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predetermined intervals and a record of the changed passwords should be kept 
to prevent recycling [179]. 
 
While users may be allowed the choice of password data, password policy and 
implementation should be centrally controlled and formally managed as follow: 
 
 Users should sign a declaration, undertaking to keep personal 
passwords confidential 
 Passwords should be conveyed in a secure manner, and avoid 
distribution by telephone, third parties, e-mail and normal internal mail; 
receipt of the password should be acknowledged by users. 
 Initial passwords should be forcibly changed after the first usage 
 Temporary passwords should be issued, in the event that a user forgets 
his password. 
 
Apart from gaining intrusion through the access indiscipline of security 
personnel, there are many logic approaches of gaining unauthorised access to 
security equipment and protected data. The challenge and response procedure 
is an accepted way of dealing with the logic intruders. This is discussed in the 
next section [179]. 
3.7.3 Logic Challenge and Response Procedure 
The challenge/response control is a form of access control which is designed to 
resist the threats to user authentication by such activities as spoofing [179]. The 
procedure is based on something known to the user (password, PIN, etc.) and 
something possessed by the user (a chip card, dongle, etc.). As illustrated in 
Figure 3.1, the user starts an entry procedure by inserting a smart card into an 
encryption device or a remote computer function to access files. The destination 
unit generates a random number which is transmitted to the user’s terminal as a 
challenge. In response, the user enters his password, and the two values are 
presented to a cryptographic algorithm, such as a hash function, which 
generates a response result to the inputs of the challenge and password. The 
resulting username response is transmitted back to the source security module 
where the remote username response is verified by comparing it with the 
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expected value stored in the source module. Upon successful verification, the 
user is allowed access to the desired function; otherwise, access is denied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.7.4 Password Security versus Human Factors 
A synthesis of security guidelines for password usage shows that there is no 
common standard for passwords; different systems have different requirements. 
If this situation is analysed against the backdrop of the fact that an average user 
has several passwords, all of which are expected to be strong, in conjunction 
with unavoidable human fallibility, it is obviously impracticable for any human 
being to combine all the conditions associated with the password system. Thus, 
since it is the security of the total system (online, offline, physical, procedural 
and logic) that is important, it is necessary to think of passwords that would take 
both human and security factors into consideration [216]. Therefore, in order to 
ensure password security, there is a need to strike a delicate balance between 
having enough rules to maintain good security and not having too many rules 
that would compel users to take evasive actions that would, in turn, compromise 
security.  
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Figure 3.1.  Challenge/response method of access control [1] 
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The above conclusion buttresses the significance of social engineering in 
security designs and the fact that security is indeed a function of both 
technology and social engineering. Unfortunately, most of the literature 
materials are only concerned with having strong enough rules; only three 
articles encountered in this research process focused on the pitfalls of having 
too stringent password regulations [216, 231, 232]. 
 
3.7.5 Training and Security Awareness Education 
Every organisation should have a security awareness training policy which 
ensures that organisations are responsible for not only training their own 
personnel but also their agents and contractors that have access to their 
facilities. Initial training will need to include a review of the requirements and 
tailored training needs to specific security policies, processes and technology of 
one’s organisation based on the level of security responsibilities for different 
segments of users. 
 
A security training program should include awareness education covering the 
organisational security policy, password maintenance, incident reporting, and 
viruses; periodic security reminders conducted as updates to the basic security 
education; user education concerning virus protection, including identification, 
reporting and prevention measures; user education in importance of monitoring 
log-in success/failure, and how to report discrepancies, including employee 
responsibility for ensuring security of information; and user education in 
password management, including organisational rules to be followed in 
creating, changing and ensuring confidentiality of passwords [233]. Personnel 
should also be informed of the need for the various techniques employed in the 
organisation’s password security architecture, which are highlighted herein, as 
an important means of checkmating social hackers (socio-cryptanalysts). 
3.7.6 Password Security Architecture 
Common techniques used to improve the security of computer systems 
protected by a password include: 
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 Not displaying the password on the display screen as it is being entered or 
obscuring it as it is typed by using asterisks (*) or bullets (•). 
 Allowing passwords of adequate length.  
 Requiring users to re-enter their password after a period of inactivity (a 
semi log-off policy). 
 Enforcing a password policy to increase password strength and security. 
 Using encrypted tunnels or password-authenticated key agreement to 
prevent access to transmitted passwords via network attacks. 
 Limiting the number of allowed failures within a given time period (to 
prevent repeated password guessing). After the limit is reached, further 
attempts will fail (including correct password attempts) until the beginning 
of the next time period. However, this is vulnerable to a form of denial of 
service attack. 
 Introducing a delay between password submission attempts to slow down 
automated password guessing programs. 
 
Some of the more stringent policy enforcement measures can pose a risk of 
alienating users, possibly decreasing security as a result.  
 
The survey on password security is discussed next. This is designed to gauge 
the attitude of computer users towards password security as a major 
vulnerability point in cyber defence. 
 
3.8 A Survey on Password Security Awareness in Developing Countries 
Internet world statistics [181] show an increase in the number of Internet users 
across the world. This is illustrated by six global statistics as follow: December 
31, 2000 – 360,985,492 (Africa: 4,514,400; i.e., 1.25%); March 31, 2011 - 
2,095,006,005 (Africa: 118,609,620; i.e., 5.66%); December 31, 2011 - 
2,267,233,742 (Africa: 139,875,242; i.e., 6.17%); June 30, 2012 - 
2,405,518,376 (Africa: 167,335,676; i.e., 6.96%); June 30, 2014 - 
3,035,749,340 (Africa: 297,885,898; i.e., 9.81%); and June 30, 2016 – 
3,631,124,813 (Africa: 340,783,342; i.e., 9.38%). These statistics show that the 
use of Internet by the developing world, using Africa as a case study, is not only 
increasing by population, but also by global percentage. Hence, this research  
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effort [234] became interested in finding out the state of Internet security 
awareness by conducting a survey between February and August 2012, in an 
African country. The target population was the organisational executives from 
the level of Senior Enterprise Officer and above. Altogether, 66 officials aged 30 
upwards responded; all these responses were used to plot Figures 3.2 and 3.3, 
while 26 responses, picked at random, were used to plot Figures 3.4 and 3.5. 
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 covered responses from 3 organisations, while Org. 4 is the 
grand total of responses from all the three organisations, to reflect the national 
statistics. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 analyse the responses by rank (and age; to some 
extent). Only three of the eleven questions in the questionnaire were used in 
this analysis; Questions 2, 4 and 5. The questionnaire is attached as Appendix 
2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Level of password awareness (2a = Yes; 2b = No) 
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Figure 3.3. Significance of password length awareness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 3.4. Significance of password length awareness 
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Figure 3.5. Significance of password complexity awareness 
 
 
Figure 3.2 reflects the answers to Question 2: “Do you have a password for 
granting or denying access to your computer?” - answer Yes or No. The bar 
labelled Variable 2a represents Yes, while the maroon-coloured bar represents 
No. Figure 3.3 reflects the answers to Question 4 by the organisation: “What is 
the length of your email password?” – Answers: Less than eight characters; 
eight characters; more than eight characters; and others (please describe). 
Figure 3.4 analyses responses to Question 4, by rank, seniority or appointment: 
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Directors downwards. Figure 3.5 reflects responses to Question 5: “What is the 
nature of your passwords?” – Answers: Meaningful/easily remembered (MF-
ER); Meaningless/easily remembered (ML-ER); Meaningless/hard-to-remember 
(ML-HR); Others (please describe). 
 
Looking at the national statistics from this survey, Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show that 
the levels of awareness are generally okay, but the percentage of users with 
passwords less than eight characters in Figure 3.3 is too high for comfort. 
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the Net but also more security-conscious; the implication is that they take 
instructions from their less security-conscious superiors. Lastly, Figure 3.5 
confirms the fear that most Internet users are inclined to choosing passwords 
that are both meaningful and easily remember-able. 
 
3.8.1 The Password Security Problem 
It is posited in this work that destitution of requisite balance between the factors 
of technology and factors of ‘humanity’, as defined by Spinellis [235], is 
responsible for the purgatory posture of password security related problems. 
 
This is because security countermeasures mostly focus on partial security in 
favour of technology, using various cryptographic encryption techniques, to the 
detriment of total security incorporating humanity; bearing in mind the 
prevalence of social engineering realities. This is contrary to the criminal 
cyberattack strategy which is mostly social engineering based.  
 
Fundamentally, the need for cryptography arose in response to the 
requirements to secure information, whether in storage or transit. The most 
primary security needs it sets out to address are confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, authenticity, theft and non-repudiation [236].  In the case of social 
engineering (SE), a  taxonomy of user vulnerabilities include dishonesty,  
honesty,  vanity,  compassion,  gullibility, curiosity, courtesy, diffidence, apathy, 
irresponsibility,  naivety and  greed [16, 17]. Thus, SE could be seen as a 
glorified nomenclature for what is popularly referred to as 419 in Nigeria. 
 
Most existing security arrangements, both in theory and practice, seem to 
underplay the significance of the social aspect of cyber defence. Examples 
include the ITU’s blueprint for ensuring a global culture of cyber-security (Table 
1.1), which failed to assign the responsibility for the social culture of cyber-
security to any group of professionals [19-21]. This underestimate of the 
significance of social engineering input in cyber defence is also indicative of the 
current UK National Cybersecurity Programme (NCSP) which has allocated 
only one percent to education [20]; out of the £650 million ($1.01 billion) 
earmarked for cyber-security in the next five years (2011-2015).  
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3.8.2 Proposal for a Suggested Solution 
In an effort to minimise the password security purgatory phenomenon, it is 
noted that the human factor is the most critical factor in the security system for 
at least three possible reasons: it is the weakest link; it is the only factor that 
exercises initiatives; and the factor that transcends all the other elements of the 
entire system. This underscores the significance of social engineering in every 
security arrangement. It is thus recommended that, in the handling of password 
security issues, human factors should be given priority over technological 
factors.  
 
It is realised that most of the password security-related problems have linkages 
with the lack of secure storage system; thus encouraging users to choose weak 
passwords and compelling security engineers and managers to insist that 
passwords must not be written down and must be changed frequently.  Hence, 
in an effort to make a contribution towards resolving this problem, this research 
[8] will explore the use of the (k,n)-Threshold Scheme, such as the Shamir’s 
secret-sharing scheme, to enhance the security of password repository. This 
presupposes an inclination towards writing down the password: after all, gold 
and silver are not memorised; they are stored. 
 
This brings the discussions on password security to a close, except for the 
deductive summary which follows immediately in the next section. This also 
completes all requisite background components for the implementation of the 
main research design on secret sharing in Chapter 4. 
3.9 Deductions 
As a basic method of access control, passwords constitute the first line of 
defence in most computer-based information security systems. However, the 
measure of user’s carelessness relative to password security is amazing. 
Studies have shown that most of the problems associated with the users’ care-
free attitude have a lot to do with the multiplicity of passwords required of every 
user. Experience shows that an active Internet user has over 60 passwords and 
PINs for various applications and services; of these, those with the best 
memories might not be able to memorise up to 25%. Thus, the resultant 
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problems include storage, password length, and composition. As a result, in 
order to relieve the brain of undue stress, password users resort to attitudes 
that are inimical to password security. The security risk associated with such 
attitudes is widespread, as a study showed that 50% of users wrote their 
passwords down. 
 
Experts are now divided as regards whether it is better to write down the 
passwords or not. Due to a large number of password protected systems that 
users must access, some experts encourage writing down passwords as long 
as the written password lists are kept in a safe place, such as a wallet or safe; 
not attached to a monitor or in an unlocked desk drawer. Similarly, some even 
argue that the concept of password expirations is obsolete because 
mathematically, the practice of changing passwords frequently does not gain 
much security at all; one gains much more security by just increasing the 
password length by one character than changing the password on every use. 
 
A synthesis of security guidelines for password usage shows that there is no 
common standard for passwords; different systems have different requirements. 
If this situation is analysed against the backdrop of the fact that an average user 
has several passwords, all of which are expected to be strong, in conjunction 
with unavoidable human fallibility, it is obviously impracticable for any human 
being to observe all the conditions associated with the password system. Thus, 
since it is the security of the total system that is important, it is necessary to 
think of passwords that would take both human and security factors into 
consideration. Hence, in order to ensure password security, there is a need to 
strike a delicate balance between having enough rules to maintain good 
security and not having too many rules that would compel users to take evasive 
actions which would, in turn, compromise security. This conclusion buttresses 
the significance of social engineering in security designs and the fact that 
security is indeed a function of both technology and social engineering. 
 
As part of security training and security awareness education, organisational 
personnel should also be acquainted with the need for the various techniques 
employed in the organisation’s password security architecture, as an important  
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means of checkmating social hackers (socio-cryptanalysts). From the foregoing, 
the security of passwords remains a purgatory issue. Thus, the significance of 
continual security training and awareness education in all organisations cannot 
be over-stressed. 
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Chapter 4 
Cloud Data Repository Secure Access Prototype Design, 
Implementation, Practical Results and Discussions 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the Cloud Data Repository Secure Access Scheme 
Prototype (CDRSAS-PT), which is a web-based authentication system. It is 
primarily designed to implement the sharing, distribution and reconstruction of a 
sensitive secret data; e.g., a combination key for firing a nuclear missile, the 
access code for a flow station, the Coca-Cola formula or any highly sensitive 
data that could compromise the functioning of an organisation, if leaked to 
unauthorised person (s), and the loss of which spells doom for the organisation. 
This is carried out in a secure web environment, globally. It is a threshold secret 
sharing scheme, designed to extend the human trust security perimeter. 
Though primarily designed as a secret-sharing system, it could be adapted to 
serve as a cloud data repository and secure data communication scheme.  
 
A secret sharing scheme is a method by which a dealer (appointed by an 
organisation) distributes pieces (shares) of a secret data to a group of people 
(trustees), such that only authorised subsets of the trustees can reconstruct the 
secret. Secret sharing schemes are important tools in cryptography which are 
used as a building block in many secure protocols; e.g., a general protocol for 
multiparty computation, Byzantine agreement, threshold cryptography, access 
control and attribute-based encryption. 
 
This chapter highlights the web design concept, the design/implementation and 
presents its performance characteristics, practical results and discussions. In a 
nutshell, the chapter is a brief summary of the layout and functions of the 15-
page secure server website prototype. This is the main focus of the PhD 
research effort titled, ‘Cryptography and Computer Communications Security: 
Extending the Human Security Perimeter through a Web of Trust.’ These 
include the Admin, Login, Secure Share, and Secret Data web pages. Apart 
from issues relating to connectivity and database, some of the prototype 
functions are also represented in the Use Case Diagram, Sequence Diagram  
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and State Diagram, as contained in Figures 6.5 – 6.8, which also illustrate the 
design steps. It also highlights the novelties or areas of new knowledge that 
have been accomplished in the secret sharing scheme as at date. This chapter 
ends with a basic comparison of the CDRSAS-PT and the SSSS algorithm, 
using security and four QoS metric parameters; namely, server bandwidth, 
system scale, service capacity ratio and real-time performance (time delay). 
 
4.1 Web Design and Implementation 
The design concept envisaged the engineering and development of a web-
based system that displays a real-time digital clock (showing the GMT or UTC 
timing), with some form of authentications (password, username, SMS code, 
GPS location data and share code) prior to access authorisation, for security 
purposes. It should also display a timer (down counter). Supposing that a secret 
item (e.g., a password) is shared among five participants who are scattered 
around the world; say one each in Russia, China, Nigeria, USA, UK, etc., and 
each of them has only a fraction of the Secret, which is grossly insufficient to 
determine the whole secret. It is required that at least three or more fractions of 
the password domiciled in any three or more of the above countries must be 
assembled in order to reconstruct the whole password. In the event that the 
password in use by the rightful owner or authority is missing or gets destroyed, 
some of the participants with fractions of it would be required to recombine or 
reconstruct it from their different locations around the world. Each of them would 
be required to enter his/her own fraction of the password on the website within a 
specified period of time (say a 5-minute time window; e.g., between 1420 and 
1425 hours GMT of a given date) so that the entire password would be 
reconstructed at a designated GPS location, as may be directed or configured 
by the Dealer (share coordinator or administrator of the website).  
 
The website, as conceived above, was designed and implemented using 
HTML5, PHP, Java, Servlets, JSP, Javascript, MySQL, JQuery and CSS. It was 
also launched and successfully tested for various performances. The codes are 
written in Eclipse IDE. These are running on Tomcat and Apache databases 
using XAMPP Server. For the prototype, the input data (the Secret to be 
shared) is generated by the computer and divided into ‘n’ Shares (n = 5), and at  
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least ‘k’ or more Shares (k =3) are required to reconstruct the secret data; each 
of the three Shares is logged into the prototype web page using a different web 
browser window, to simulate different locations. If the computer hosting the 
server can be port-forwarded, the CDRSAS-PT utilises Shamir’s Secret Sharing 
Algorithm, MD5 encryption and user registration methods to securely create and 
share data through a web browser in a Wi-Fi configuration; or using the local 
host in a wired LAN. Such transmitted shares could be received anywhere in 
the world, provided there is Internet accessibility. A summary of the detailed 
functions of the CDRSAS-PT is in Appendix 6, while its JUnit test results are in 
Appendix 7. 
 
Screenshots of real web pages from the CDRSAS-PT are also displayed in this 
chapter. In order to run the server via the localhost: start up the Tomcat server 
(Java) in Eclipse, Apache (PHP) and MySQL (database). Point the browser to 
http://localhost:8080/secretshare/ (‘secretshare’ being the appropriate file name; 
this could be changed). Each user must be registered to access the system. 
When the user registers, the password and GPS coordinates could be 
encrypted using MD5. 
 
The pictorial impression of the layout for the CDRSAS-PT, when in operation, is 
as presented in Figure 4.1. Its geographical coverage is depicted in Figure 4.2, 
while its equipment components and requisite input data necessary to enable a 
user to gain access to the system are as shown in Figure 4.3. All the 
components used in building the system are open-source. 
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Figure 4.1. Pictorial impression of the layout for the CDRSAS-PT; 
when in operation 
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Figure 4.2. CDRSAS-PT employing a secure server at the School of Electrical 
Engineering and Computer Science, Faculty of Engineering and Informatics, 
University of Bradford, United Kingdom, with a client each at Los Angeles, USA; 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Abuja, Nigeria; Canberra, Australia; Beijing, China; and 
Moscow, Russia. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Equipment components and requisite input data necessary  
to enable a user to gain access to the CDRSAS-PT 
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4.2 Connectivity 
 
The system currently runs on a laptop via local host within a typical home 
router, using Wi-Fi. Remote access to this system can be achieved by setting 
up port forwarding on the router. This is required because the IP address in the 
home environment is usually dynamic. The laptop running the server will have 
an internal IP address: 192.168.x.x (which can be viewed in the command 
prompt by typing ipconfig). This IP needs to be registered in the router settings 
for port forwarding. Once this is set, the router will forward any requests on port 
8080 (port could be different) to the local host on 192.168.x.x:8080/secretshare/ 
- which is the login page.  The next stage is to find the external IP address of  
the local router, which can be obtained via a simple Google search. Then any 
remote users can point their browsers to <router-ip-address>:8080/secretshare/ 
and start using the sharing system. The server can also be remotely accessed 
through a wired LAN with an appropriate switch. The prototype has been 
successfully demonstrated using both techniques. Using port forwarding as 
described above, the server can be accessed from anywhere in the world. 
 
4.3 Database 
The database, Java class structure, has the main class DB_SecureShare that 
extends the MYSQLDB connection class. It also implements the UserDAO 
interface to allow for extension and maintainability. The Apache database 
currently stores prototype trial personal information for five users; Username, 
Password and GPS data. The setting is illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
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4.4 Summary of Design Steps 
Generally, the design steps follow the Waterfall model, which is illustrated in 
Figure 4.5.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Java class structured database 
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Figures 4.6 – 4.8 show the Use Case Diagram, Sequence Diagram and the 
State Diagram for the CDRSAS-PT, respectively.  It is clear from these 
illustrations that, the prototype algorithm requires three security data entries to 
accomplish a successfully authenticated entry by every user. These are in 
addition to the usual login details, such as passwords and username. 
Planning and Analysis 
Requirements 
Requirements Specification 
Design 
Implementation 
Testing and Integration 
Operation and Maintenance 
Figure 4.5. Web design steps: the waterfall model 
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Figure 4.6. Use case diagram 
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Figure 4.7. Sequence diagram (nb: ‘restart’ is a default after the recovered data 
has been shown, following the submissions of all keys, GPS and SMS codes) 
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Figure 4.8. State diagram 
 
4.5 Admin Web Page 
The Admin web page can only be viewed by the user on the server side within 
the local host; any external connections are denied. This page must be fully 
configured before a session can commence. For instance, if the start time on 
the Admin page has not been set, then the user cannot log in. When the Admin 
sets the start time and the time duration is specified, the end time which is 
automatically calculated from these is also displayed. The default format for 
HTML5 date-picker is used for the date and user display time. All the values can 
be set as in Figure 4.9 (a); illustrating a quorum of one out of one shares (this is 
a default setting for testing purpose; the setting may also be used when an 
individual wishes to adapt the system for use as a cloud data repository 
scheme). It is also on this page that the sharing process can be restarted to 
begin another session, after a successful recovery of a secret data in the 
previous session, or to repeat the previous session in the event of a failure.  
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Point 3 allows the user who is authorised to view the data to be selected. Point 
8 allows the keys to be assigned to specific users; in a given situation where not 
all registered users participate, and the shares are not serially assigned 
according to the database serialisation. Page 2 of the Admin web page (Master 
Share Details) displays part of the results of the settings configured in Figure 
4.9 (a), as shown in Figure 4.9 (b); this is to assist while testing the prototype. 
Once the form in Figure 4.9 (a) is submitted, the system sends the information 
to Shamir’s Secret Sharing Algorithm.  
 
 
(a) 
Figure 4.9: (a) Part of page 1 of Admin page; (b) Part of page 2 of Admin page 
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This encrypts the data and returns a number of keys based on the setting 
above. The system uses HTTP GET request to use SSSS API. The system 
uses the GSON library to parse the data into a DTOSecret object. A sample 
JSON is:  
 
{“timeStart”:”1368221578”,”secretKeys”:[“0101596f75”],”numberOfShares”:”1”,”q
uorum”:”1”} 
 
As part of the user data displayed in Figure 4.9 (b), this is a sample response 
from the SSSS algorithm, where it has split the secret data into a single key; as 
set in the Admin. In the illustrated example herein, only the first two lines of 
these sample data, assigned to the first user ‘a’, are shown at the bottom of 
Figure 4.9 (b). After this stage, all the data needed for a session is set and the 
system is ready to handle users and share secret data. 
 
(b) 
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4.6 Login Web Page 
The opening web page (home page) on the client side allows the user to log in 
and register; he registers only for the first time, which could be edited afterward 
if he wishes. Here the user input is entered through the hashed keypad. Once 
the login has been submitted, using a POST request through HTTP, it gets 
passed through the MD5 function and compared with the MD5 value stored in 
the database. In order to prevent an SQL Injection Attack, the system uses 
prepared statements [160]. In logging in, for example, security verification 
checks are carried out to prevent security breaches: e.g., does the entered 
name exist and does the md5 password match? A ‘Yes’ leads to the opening of 
the next web page; the Secure Share page. The Login page uses a hashed 
map keypad, where JQuery is used to get the keypad values and input them 
into the text box when the text field is clicked. The registration and login forms 
are shown in Figures 4.10 (a) and 4.10 (b) respectively. 
 
(a) 
Figure 4.10: (a) Page 2 of Login page (Registration Form); (b) Part of page 1 of 
Login page (Login Form) 
170 
 
 
 
 
(b)   
 
4.7 Secure Share and other Web Pages 
Secure Share page is where the users log into to add their keys, GPS data, and 
mobile authentication code. Similar verification checks are again carried out, 
using MD5 hashes and other data in the database, as done in the login page, to 
ensure that the data added meet the criteria. That is, does the GPS match; has 
the correct user entered the correct key assigned to him; and does the 
verification code sent to the user match? The page also makes provision for 
editing of personal data, if the user wishes to do so. Part of the Secure Share 
web page is shown in Figure 4.11 (a). The result of a successfully authenticated  
entrance by a user into a share/reconstruction session for all users, except the 
authorised user, is also shown in Figure 4.11 (a) – where ‘c’ is the username of 
the Client; that of the authorised user is as in Figure 4.11 (b). The prototype 
system generates a Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) and sends it to the 
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mobile number registered by the user for additional authentication purposes. 
The SMS message contains the passcode for the data share. 
 
 
(a) 
 
     
(b) 
 
Figure 4.11: (a) Secure share page; (b) Secret data viewing page 
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This is implemented using a built-in java UUID generator. The Secure Share 
page has a countdown clock, which expires based on the share duration set in 
the Admin page. Once all the shares (or the required threshold) have been 
added, the data can be unlocked. The authorised user gets to see a page with a 
countdown and a button to reveal the secret data. Once the authorised user 
clicks the View Data Button (which appears only on his own screen), various 
checks are carried out; to ensure that each user has added the key and code 
assigned to him correctly, his GPS data is correct, the quorum (threshold) has 
been met and if within the time limit; i.e., the countdown clock is still counting as 
at the time the last user successfully enters his data. Finally, the keys are sent 
back into the SSSS algorithm for a final check. 
 
4.8 Secret Data Web Page 
If all went well without any error, a successful sharing process will display the 
Secret Data page when the authorised user clicks the View Data Button; 
otherwise, an appropriate error message is displayed on the page. If the display 
shows success, the system is restarted, ready for the next share session; if it 
shows a message that indicates failure, the system is restarted, ready to repeat 
the failed session. The authorised user can view the reconstructed secret data 
one time only. The system gets wiped out as soon as the secret data has been 
unlocked and displayed. Any page refreshment or re-attempt will result in an 
error message. A sample result of this page is shown in Figure 4.12 – where ‘b’ 
is the username of the authorised Client (Authorised User).  
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Figure 4.12. Secret data page displaying success 
 
Next is the identification of novelties in this research implementation, followed 
by a quantitative analysis of the results compared with the SSSS. The Thesis 
also highlights the challenge encountered in the research process and suggests 
the scope for future work. 
 
4.9 Areas of New Knowledge (Novelties) 
 The CDRSAS-PT has modified the SSSS algorithm by sharing a much 
shorter (than most secret data) randomly generated key that is used to lock up 
the secret data; as opposed to encrypting/sharing the secret data itself. This 
would be extremely significant in cloud computing, especially if homomorphic 
encryption becomes a reality. In a nutshell, it costs more in terms of bandwidth 
and delay in a typical communication link to encrypt the data and share the 
resulting information among servers (as done in SSSS) compared to sharing 
the keys only (as proposed in the CDRSAS). Theoretically, the strong points of 
this modification are demonstrated in Section 4.10, using four QoS metric 
parameters; namely, server bandwidth, system scale, service capacity ratio and 
real-time performance (time delay).  
 
 
 
b,  
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 Other novelties associated with the CDRSAS-PT include the following: 
 
 The geographical spread of participants (trustees) which is now global in 
nature as against a one-location based recombination process envisaged 
in previous secret sharing schemes. This revolution in the science of 
secret sharing is illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
 As a consequence of globalisation, location-based user authentication 
techniques are introduced. These are the employment of the GPS 
coordinates and SMS text mobile authentication codes; thus greatly 
enhancing the security of the system. 
 Inherent capability for location-based automatic mutual authentication; a 
novelty in the public civil domain. 
 In an effort to minimise the chances of hacking, a dynamic time window is 
introduced within which secret sharing and recombination processes must 
be accomplished. Consequently, a digital clock and timer (down counter) 
are incorporated into the system, since time restriction is among the logic 
tests in the greatly enhanced Shamir’s secret sharing algorithm. 
 Other long-standing unresolved issues in relation to secret sharing, which 
have now been resolved in the Cloud Data Repository Secure Access 
Scheme (CDRSAS), include the following: 
 
o Who is the Combiner;  
o Where should the recombination take place; and  
o Who is entitled to have access to the reconstructed secret? 
 
These questions have now been resolved with the designation of an 
Authorised User (non-permanent) in the scheme, to be programmed by 
the Admin for every secret sharing session, as would be dictated by 
particular circumstances. 
 It is also instructive to note that the practical implementation of a web-
based authentication secret sharing scheme, with all the complements of 
the CDRSAS, has no precedence. 
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4.10 Quantitative Assessment Relative to the SSSS Algorithm 
In making this comparative analysis, the main difference in the technical 
approach between the SSSS and CDRSAS-PT should be borne in mind. As 
highlighted earlier, the CDRSAS-PT has modified the SSSS algorithm by 
sharing a much shorter (than most secret data) randomly generated key that is 
used to lock up the secret data. This is contrary to the approach employed in 
the SSSS, which encrypts the secret data itself, and shares the encrypted 
output as keys.  
 
4.10.1  Real-Time Performance and Server Bandwidth Cost 
Consider a peer-to-peer network in which there exists some data, D, sharing for 
instance. The servers holding the data must be explored in terms of bandwidth 
and the data propagation delay over the network in real-time. In such case, the 
scalability (i.e. number of peers in the system) problem in the sharing of the 
secret data is considered useful in evaluating the Quality of Service (QoS) of 
the concerned network. Four QoS metrics are involved, namely, server 
bandwidth, system scale, service capacity ratio and real-time performance (time 
delay) [237]. 
 
Here, real-time performance refers to the average delay of all the peers in a 
system between the time a data was sent from a source and when it finally 
arrives its destination. 
 
Consider some data “D” divided into chunks of the form 
 
n
n xaxaxaaxP  
2
210)(  
(4.1) 
 
having a constant bit rate (CBR) of R. If the time length of each of the data is Tc, 
then the whole data from which the chunks are obtained is RTc . Note that each 
of the data chunks in the polynomial of Equation (4.1) can be described as a 
vector-matrix of the form 
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(4.2) 
Thus, the data chunks can be formed into a matrix of the form 
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In a typical communication system, the data chunk kja , is transmitted at each 
time instant from which the data processing cost/implications can be discussed; 
metrics of discussion may include bandwidth, delay and channel capacity.  
 
Consider a case of many storing repositories, as is the case of Shamir Secret 
sharing formula. Let these repositories be servers that can be used to store the 
data chunks. On the other hand, these data chunks are the secret keys 
obtained by splitting the randomly generated key, which is used to lock up the 
secret data. 
 
It is assumed that each server receives only one chunk of the data, which could 
form a vector matrix, for instance. Let the propagation delay between server 
peers (where the data chunks can be stored) be Tt. Next, define the average 
service capacity ratio (SCR) as  ; the ratio of a peer’s upload-bandwidth to the 
streaming bitrate. Define  nbt , as the average delay of all peers in the system, 
then the relationship between real-time performance and server bandwidth cost 
can be expressed as [161]:  
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(4.4) 
 
where b is the ratio of server bandwidth cost to streaming ratio, n is the scale of 
the system.  
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The first relation in Equation (4.4) can be explored in cases where there are 
equivalent bandwidth and number of participating secret data repositories. For 
instance, consider a case where there are 5 participating servers (as it has 
been used in this thesis); 5 servers have been used for the feasibility of 
practical real-life implementation. On the other hand, as short as the data length 
is, the security strength in the length of such data chunks is quite vulnerable (a 
corollary is in a password whose length is 5 characters). Thus, for scalability 
and better security strength, a consideration is therefore given to a case where 
there are much more peers than the bandwidth (that is the second case in 
Equation (4.4)). This is a minimisation problem. Hence, the solution to the 
minimisation problem of Equation (4.4) reduces to [237]: 
 







b
n
nbt log),(  
(4.5) 
 
As an example and typical of the proposal in this Thesis, suppose that the 
cryptographic encryption keys are divided into 1000 (i.e. n = 1000), then Figure 
4.13 describes the effects of the system scale (i.e. number of peers) on delay 
and the bandwidth cost over a communication link/network. 
 
 
Figure 4.13. Impact of system scale on delay and server bandwidth 
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From Figure 4.13, it can be observed that the bandwidth involved increases with 
increasing number of server peers (i.e. the scale). For instance, considering a 
case where there are 1000 peers (servers) to which the data chunks (i.e. the 
shared keys) will be shared at 0.4 real-time performance and where there are 
5000 peers (servers); it costs 50% of the bandwidth in the case of 5000 peers 
while it costs only 20% of the bandwidth when there are 1000 peers. The 
variation provides 30% bandwidth saving in favour of the smaller data chunks. 
Also, at constant bandwidth cost, for instance, 50%, the delay incurred for 
sharing the data into 5000 is 0.4 while that of 1000 peers is 0.3. Thus, it costs 
more in terms of bandwidth and delay in a typical communication link to encrypt 
the data and share the resulting information among servers (as done in SSSS) 
compared to sharing the random key only (as proposed in the CDRSAS). 
Ordinarily speaking, the SCR is the base of the logarithmic function described in 
Equation (4.5). The SCR reveals the allowable downloadable data bits per 
chunk; measured in bits/chunk. It translates that using higher SCR saves both 
the bandwidth and real-time performances; as illustrated in Figure 4.14.  
 
 
Figure 4.14. Impact of service capacity ratio on delay and server bandwidth 
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4.10.2   Channel Capacity Performance 
From information theory, it is well-known that the channel capacity of a 
communication link can be described as [238, 239]: 
 
 SNRBC  1log2          in bits/second (4.6) 
 
where C is the channel capacity that is measured in bits/second and B is the 
bandwidth measured in Hz. SNR represents the ratio of signal to noise powers 
measured in dB.  
Now, consider the data chunks as binary data. For the two data lengths 
discussed in Section 4.10.1, namely, 1000 and 5000 bits; if they are transmitted 
over channel bandwidths of 1000 Hz and 5000Hz respectively, then for varying 
SNR values the channel capacities can be represented as in Figure 4.15.  
 
 
Figure 4.15. Capacity performance at different bandwidth allocations 
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a smaller bandwidth. If both data chunks are expected to be transmitted over 
fair (equal) resource allocation, the 5000 data chunks will be starved thus 
leading to delay, data loss and overall slow communication. In essence, over 
the 5kHz bandwidth, the 1000 data chunks will consume only 20% of the 
bandwidth resources. On the other hand, over the 1kHz bandwidth, the 5000 
data chunks will require 500% of the bandwidth resources. 
 
The expression in Equation (4.6) can be used to discuss the spectral efficiency 
which is measured in bits/second/Hz as (dividing both sides by B): 
 
 SNR
B
C
 1log2        in bits/second/Hz 
(4.7) 
  
Again, consider the data chunks as binary data; over a 1 kHz bandwidth. Then 
for varying signal to noise power ratio (in dB), the maximum channel spectral 
efficiencies are shown in Figure 4.16. 
 
Figure 4.16. Variation of spectral efficiency with bits-(signal)-to-noise power ratio 
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The plot divides the area into two interesting regions; the upper region shows 
where data transmission is not possible while the lower region represents where 
data transmission is possible. The graph itself exemplifies maximum spectral 
allowance for data transmission under the Shannon criteria.  
 
4.10.3  A Unique Advantage in the CDRSAS-PT 
The CDRSAS-PT has a unique advantage compared to the SSSS. In both 
schemes, the length of the shared keys is proportional to the size of the secret 
data and the random key respectively. This is considered a unique advantage in 
the CDRSAS-PT because there is liberty to make the random key as short or 
long as possible (much shorter than the secret data) independent of the secret 
data to be secured. Thus, the CDRSAS can handle a much larger secret data 
than the SSSS; it can attach a whole file as a secret data, while the SSSS 
cannot. Similarly, this advantage has another connotation. As analysed in 
Sections 3.4 and 3.7.1, the strength of a password is directly proportional to its 
length. Therefore, since the length of the stream of random characters that is 
shared as secret keys in the CDRSAS-PT can be pre-determined by design, it 
follows that, when above fact is applied to the secret keys, a longer key would 
be more secure than a shorter one. In this way, the designer of CDRSAS-PT is 
at liberty to generate a short or long key (independent of the size of the secret 
data that is to be protected); depending on the security sensitivity of the 
application. This flexibility, which is not possible with the Shamir’s algorithm, 
becomes an added advantage in the CDRSAS-PT. In this way, the designer is 
then at liberty to decide on a trade-off between security demands and other 
performance metric parameters. 
 
4.11 Technical Challenge 
In the process of implementing the research design, one technical challenge 
that took time to overcome was how to accurately determine the distance in 
kilometres between two GPS coordinates. This was very crucial because, 
without it, the CDRSAS-PT would not be able to test for the satisfaction of a 
location boundary condition by comparing the registered GPS data with the real 
login GPS data that would be keyed in by Clients for location-based 
authentication; the system is designed to permit location errors within a 
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maximum tolerance of 30 metre radius only. The search for a solution led to the 
discovery of the Haversine Law and Haversine Formula [240]. 
 
The Law of Haversines 
For a unit sphere, a triangle on the surface of the sphere is defined by the great 
circles connecting three points; u, v and w on the sphere, as illustrated in Figure 
4.17 [241].                                        
 
 
 
Figure 4.17. Measuring a distance between two GPS coordinates [241]  
 
If the lengths of the three sides are a, b and c as shown, and the angle of the 
corner opposite c is C, then the law of haversines states that: 
 
)()sin()sin()()( Chavbabahavchav       (4.8) 
 
Where ‘hav’ is the haversine function 
 
Since this is a unit sphere, the lengths a, b and c are equal to the angles (in 
radians) subtended by those sides from the centre of the sphere {for a non-unit 
sphere, each of these arc lengths is equal to its central angle (in radians) 
multiplied by the radius of the sphere)}. 
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The Haversine Formula 
 
Given any two points on a sphere, the haversine of the central angle between 
them is given by: 
 
       122112 coscos  





havhav
r
d
hav    (4.9) 
 
where: 
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
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 d  is the distance between the two points (along a great circle of the 
sphere; using spherical distance) 
 r is the radius of the sphere 
 
1 , 2 : Latitudes of Point 1 and Latitude of Point 2, respectively 
 
21,  : Longitude of Point 1 and Longitude of Point 2 
 





r
d
is the central angle, assuming angles are measured in radian (NB: 
and   can be converted from degrees to radians by multiplying  by 
180

 as 
usual). 
 
The solution for d can be found by applying the inverse haversine (if available) 
or by using the arcsine (inverse sine) function: 
 
 hrhhavrd arcsin2)(1         (4.10) 
 
Where h is haversin (d/r), or more explicitly: 
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With this result, it is now possible to test and find out if a particular GPS location 
data entered into the system satisfies the limit imposed by the system or not, 
and hence, decide whether access should be granted or not; location-based 
authentication/authorisation. 
 
Apart from the foregoing, the only challenge worth mentioning is a general one; 
i.e., how to cope with the rate of increase in cybercrimes - both in frequency and 
intensity – with world powers like the US, Russia, China, UK, North Korea, Iran, 
etc., being perceived as both victims and aggressors. In the Global Risk Report 
2015, a baby of the World Economic Forum based in Geneva, it is highlighted 
that large-scale cyberattacks are among the prominent risks in 2015. That is, 
given the growing sophistication of cyberattacks, the rise of hyper-connectivity 
with a growing number of physical objects connected to the Internet, and 
increasing quanta of sensitive personal data being stored by companies in the 
cloud, it is obvious that the risk of large-scale cyberattacks remains high; with 
respect to both impact and probability. For instance, in the United States, the 
economic cost of cybercrime is estimated at $100 billion each year [188]. 
  
4.12 Limitation 
The main limitation of secret sharing is the presumption that all participants are 
equally trustworthy; in practice, this may not be the case. George Orwell 
observed that “some animals are more equal than others” [65]. Similarly, some 
participants would be more equal than others. In other words, in most 
circumstances, some participants are trusted more than others. For instance, in 
a network of computers, where each computer represents a participant, a 
higher security threshold might be required for the computers that are more 
likely to be corrupted, like those connected to the Internet, and a lower 
threshold for the more trusted computers. That is, it might be necessary or 
better to define differently sized subsets of the participants needed to 
reconstruct the secret. The structure consisting of all these sets is called an 
access structure. 
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4.13 The Way Forward 
Practically speaking, the CDRSAS-PT has gone beyond meeting the full 
requirements of the research design as conceived. However, it remains a 
prototype and would require further work to make it viable for practical 
deployment in the market. Further work could focus on the following:  
 
 Having a managed area to set up future shares at a given period;  
 Having more than one different share sessions happening simultaneously; 
  Capturing all the user interactions in a database;  
 Other incorporations aimed at making the system more robust and versatile;  
  Further practical system performance tests for high volume traffic, when 
adapted and adopted for public deployment.  
 
This, in effect, completes the full implementation of the PhD research design 
with a fully tested functional scheme – the CDRSAS. However, there is still 
scope for future work to further enhance the performance and security of the 
system. The details   of the scoped items are as suggested in Appendix 8 
(every item asterisked therein is a projected future characteristic for the 
envisaged CDRSAS-DT). The deductive summary for this chapter now follows 
prior to Chapter 5. Chapter 5 employs the lessons learned from this research 
effort to focus on the possible measures designed to checkmate the confidence 
artists’ use of technology to manipulate human trust in their perpetration of 
fraudulent crimes. 
4.14 Deductions 
The web-based authentication CDRSAS prototype employs various building 
blocks, including the SSSS algorithm, MD5 and various libraries. Its 
programming elements include HTML5, PHP, Java, Servlets, JSP, MySQL, 
JQuery, and CSS. These are running on Tomcat and Apache databases using 
XAMPP Server. The source code is object oriented and adheres to software 
engineering tools and principles [242], [243]. 
 
The prototype system does work and the data can be shared across the globe 
through a web page; using a secure server. It passed all the JUnit tests but has  
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not been tested under heavy traffic. The phone number is registered during the 
registration process but the user is allowed to edit it along with other existing 
user details; these are potential areas of security concern subject to 
modifications. The Admin page can be used to easily reset and create shares 
for users, and reconstruct same. The share settings are easily configurable. The 
Admin page (accessible with local access only) can be refreshed to display the 
data in the system; who has logged in and has entered what. 
 
Hacking into the system to illegally access the data would be a very tough task. 
There are many checks to ensure that every condition has been met before the 
data is unlocked. SMS-text-verification-based authentication gives an added 
level of security and a modern touch. The same is true of GPS coordinates.  
 
As regards novelty, the CDRSAS-PT has modified the SSSS algorithm by 
sharing a much shorter (than most secret data) randomly generated key that is 
used to lock up the secret data; as opposed to encrypting/sharing the secret 
data itself. This would be extremely significant in cloud computing [244], 
especially if homomorphic encryption becomes a reality [244]. In a nutshell, it 
costs more in terms of bandwidth and delay in a typical communication link to 
encrypt the data and share the resulting information among servers (as done in 
SSSS) compared to sharing the keys only (as proposed in the CDRSAS). 
 
The CDRSAS Prototype has also expanded the secret sharing system by 
incorporating a dynamic time window, digital clock/timer (down counter), GPS 
data authentication and SMS text mobile authentication into the secret sharing 
process. The difference between the SSSS algorithm and the CDRSAS 
prototype secure server is akin to the difference between the vacuum tube 
diode/semiconductor transistor and a radio transceiver system. Similarly, the 
design has resolved some long-standing issues by answering the questions: 
Who is the Combiner; Where should the recombination take place; and Who is 
entitled to have access to the reconstructed secret? It does this by designating 
an Authorised User in the scheme, to be programmed by the Admin for every 
sharing session, as would be dictated by particular circumstances. Lastly, this 
scheme has globalised the practical implementation of secret sharing for the 
first time. 
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Further work would focus on the following: having a managed area to set up 
future shares at a given period; having more than one different share sessions 
happening simultaneously; capturing all the user interactions in a database; 
other incorporations aimed at making the system more robust and versatile; and 
subjecting the system to various practical performance tests, for high volume 
traffic, when adapted for public deployment. Details of future work to enhance 
the performance and security of the system are in Appendix 8 (every item 
asterisked therein is a projected future characteristic). 
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Chapter 5 
 
Location-Based Authentication as an Antidote against GSM-
Dependent Advance Fee Fraud in the Cyberspace 
 
The degree of cyber-related insecurity occasioned by fraudulent practices in 
Africa has been an issue of great concern economically, especially as it relates 
to foreign direct investments and dealings with other international partners. 
Apart from the economic costs to the nations, corporate organisations and 
individuals, it has also been an image problem for some of the countries in 
various international fora. It was in an effort to find ways of using technology, 
within the context of its interplay with human trust and other trust-centred 
human attributes, to mitigate the negative effects of this state of insecurity that 
this chapter was designed. Although it was tailored, specifically, for the West 
African environment, using Nigeria as a case study, the results are applicable to 
all countries with similar situations in Africa, with global implications. 
 
Based on a survey involving two field trips to Nigeria (in November 2013 and 
December/January 2015/16) and the knowledge acquired via the 
implementation of CDRSAS-PT in Chapter 4, among other resources, this 
chapter begins by examining the general security situation in the sub-regional 
environment, with a focus on cyber-security, especially as it relates to the use of 
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM). The cybersecurity aspect of 
the survey facilitated the discussions in Section 5.4; using data from official 
security agencies (NP, SFU, NFIU, EFCC and NCC). Details of the GSM 
roaming aspect of the survey will be discussed (Section 5.6.2), after highlighting 
Location-Based Authentication (LBA), advance fee fraud (419), digitisation and 
teledensity. The survey data primarily affect the sub-Saharan nations, with 
Nigeria as the hub of activities. It is recalled that some requisite conceptual 
clarifications relevant to this chapter were treated in Section 2.10.1; including 
cyberspace, computerisation, miniaturisation, 419, digitisation and teledensity. 
Next, both the forward and backward effects of these technological 
developments are then assessed vis a vis the national security posture with a 
focus on the security of cyberspace. This would be followed by discussions on 
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identifiable measures aimed at countering or mitigating possible security threats 
in the cyberspace. These would include the possibility of using LBA and further 
digitisation of the GSM Mobile country codes down to City/Area codes along 
with GSM Mobile/Global Positioning System (GPS) authentications. Where 
necessary, these could be combined with the use of a web-based Secret 
Sharing Scheme for services with very high security demands. Possible 
challenges to the suggested mitigating measures would also be considered. 
The LBA techniques are discussed next. This will be followed by the basics of 
GPS techniques and its capabilities /limitations. 
 
5.1. Location-Based Authentication Techniques 
Due to the ubiquity of wireless communication systems, culminating in the 
global Internet, modern technology dictates that reliable means for explicit 
identification be emplaced between/among interacting entities. The process of 
user identification is generally called authentication. To ‘authenticate’ is to 
establish the validity of the claim of a user or an entity. In the cyber world, it 
means positive verification of a user, device, or other entity in a computer 
system, often as a prerequisite for granting access to resources in a system 
[245]. According to Jaros and Kuchta [93], it is referred to as message origin 
validation, while Zhen et al. [3] defines it as an affirmation of the identity of an 
object in centralised systems. Authentication is among the three processes of 
AAA (Authentication, Authorisation, and Accounting) [3, 4], as illustrated in 
Figure 5.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When a user requests for access to the restricted area, he is first authenticated, 
based on which access is granted or denied. Where access is granted, the 
controller establishes a connection between the user and the restricted area; 
Figure 5.1. A General AAA system  
 Authenticator Authority Accounting 
Controller 
Restricted Area 
(Database) 
 
 
 User 
 
 
[3, 4] 
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whether access is granted or not, an account which records the information 
concerning the user’s actions is created.  
 
These days, authentication techniques are divided into four main categories, 
based on related authentication factors. These respectively employ the 
following [246]: what the user knows - this is based on knowledge of confidential 
information (e.g. password); what the user has - techniques using tokens, smart 
cards, RFID (Radio Frequency Identification Device), hardware keys, etc.; what 
(or who) the user is – these deal with biometric techniques that are limited to a 
human authentication, using parameters like the eyes, fingerprints, etc; and 
where the user is located – this technique is based on the user’s physical 
location; it is a new authentication factor [246, 247]. 
 
Location-Based Authentication (LBS) encourages new service concepts in 
tracking applications, with the potential to make many messaging and mobile 
Internet services more relevant to customers as information is adjusted to 
context. In this way, location information can considerably improve service 
usability. Due to the multidimensional benefits of location information, operators 
now consider it as their third asset besides voice and data transmission, with 
important investment opportunities [248]. These include services related to 
directions, emergency, transportation of sensitive goods/asset tracking and 
personal/car navigation; where accuracy is high [248]. A brief review of some 
location-based authentication techniques now follows. 
 
5.1.1  N-Kerberos Protocol 
The N-Kerberos protocol is basically a location-based Kerberos protocol. This is 
a cryptographic protocol where it is imperative for users to use a very secure 
location signature created using the P(Y) code (derived from the GPS signal). 
This is used in an authentication technique to reduce the possibility of replay 
attacks. In order for this technique to function well, the server must have a list of 
the physical addresses of the legitimate participants in its database. Possible 
disadvantages here would relate to the fact that a fraudulent user could give a 
false location after reading it from the GPS receiver which he carries about all 
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the time. In addition, the GPS signals are not available indoor without costly 
installation of appropriate sensor networks [247]. 
 
5.1.2  STAT I and STAT II Schemes 
STAT I (Space-Time Authentication Technique I) and STAT II are multifactor 
location-based authentication schemes. Both employ an authentication terminal 
(a pocket device that is connected to user’s terminal via USB) which acts the 
most key roles in these techniques. The user himself must be authenticated 
first, via his fingerprints, followed by his space-time information authentication. 
STAT I technique uses GPS system to determine the user’s position, while 
STAT II uses active infrastructure {proprietary communication technology 
IQRF(Information Query Radio Frequency)} to provide space-time information. 
Some of the limitations of these techniques are inherently obvious from their 
mechanisms [93]. 
 
5.1.3 Main Location Technique Principles 
Basically, the location of a mobile user can be determined in one of two ways; 
tracking and positioning. If a sensor network determines the location, the 
mechanism is termed tracking; in which case the user must wear a tag or badge 
to enable the sensor network track his position. The location information is first 
stored in the sensor network; it is sent to the mobile user on request, via 
wireless communication. On the other hand, if the mobile system determines 
the location itself, the mechanism is called positioning. In this case, a system of 
transmitters or beacons sends out radio, infrared, or ultrasound signals. 
Location information is directly available on the mobile system and does not 
have to be transferred wirelessly. Similarly, location information is not readable 
for other users, thus privacy issues do not arise [248]. 
 
Tracking and positioning systems are based on the following basic techniques 
[248]: 
Cell of Origin (COO) 
A technique used if the positioning system has a cellular configuration. Wireless 
transmitting technologies have a restricted range; in the sense that a radiated 
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signal is available only in a certain area, called the cell. Thus, if the cell has 
certain identifying characteristics, it can be used to determine a location. 
 
Time of Arrival (TOA) and Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) 
Electromagnetic signals move with the speed of light, assumed to be relatively 
constant at approximately 300,000 km/s. Thus, using the principle of Doppler 
Effect, the time difference between sending and receiving a signal (TDOA) can 
be used to compute the spatial distance between the transmitter and receiver. A 
similar principle can be used with ultrasound, where the signals take a longer 
time and the measurement is simpler; though ultrasound can only reach low 
distances. In GSM networks, although the term Enhanced Observed Time 
Difference (E-OTD) is often used instead of TDOA, the principle is the same. 
 
Angle of Arrival (AOA) 
If antennas with direction characteristics are used, the direction from which a 
given signal arrives can be determined. Given two or more directions from fixed 
positions to the same object, the location of the object can be computed.  
 
Measuring the Signal Strength 
The intensity of electromagnetic signals decreases with the inverse square of 
the distance from their source, even in a vacuum. Given specific signal strength, 
the distance to the sender can be computed; this technique is prone to 
inaccuracies due to obstruction-induced attenuations. 
 
Processing Video Data 
Significant patterns in a video data stream from video cameras can be used to 
determine the user's location; if users wear badges with conspicuous labels. 
Thus, positioning systems use techniques from image processing to detect and 
interpret image data. In principle, video positioning systems are based on the 
AOA technique; a specific pixel in an image represents a certain angle relative 
to the camera's optical axis.  
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Triangulation, Trilateration, and Traversing 
Generally, precise positioning methods have their roots in land surveying, 
where geometric techniques are employed to determine locations using angles 
and distances. Any positioning system that provides geographic coordinates is 
still based on these geometric principles [248]. Figure 5.2 (a-c) illustrates how 
to compute the coordinates of a location u, using triangulation, trilateration, and 
traversing respectively: 
 
 
Figure 5.2. (a) Triangulation; (b) Trilateration; and (c) Traversing. [248]. 
 
 Triangulation 
This needs two fixed positions (p1 and p2). From each position, the angle to the 
location u is measured. The location u can be determined by the intersection of 
two lines. With the help of trigonometric functions, the coordinates of u can be 
easily worked out.  
 
 Trilateration 
This also needs two fixed positions but uses two distances to the unknown 
location. The location u is obtained by the intersection of two circles. Usually, 
 
(c) 
(a) 
(b) 
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there exist two intersection points. Thus, one of the points is eliminate using 
additional information. In contrast to triangulation, trilateration leads to nonlinear 
equation systems, which have no closed solution for 3-dimensional positioning. 
Numeric methods are employed to solve the resultant equations [248]. 
 
 Traversing 
This uses several distance–angle pairs. Starting with a known point p1, the 
distance and direction to another point p2 are measured. After a few steps, the 
unknown point u is determined. It should be noted that, in principle, a single 
step could be used to move from a known point to the unknown point.  
 
It should be noted that triangulation is the generic term for any kind of 
geometric approaches for location, even though its original meaning is as 
described above. Similarly, Figure 5.2 assumes a positioning in two dimensions. 
For 3-dimensional positioning, similar mechanisms are used, but with three 
parameters (angles, distances and altitudes) in order to calculate 3-dimensional 
coordinates. 
 
In general, positioning systems are divided into three classes; satellite 
positioning systems, indoor positioning systems and systems that use an 
existing network infrastructure [248].  Of these, satellite positioning system, in 
the form of GPS, has the widest coverage, most secure and most accurate, 
where it is available; it is available everywhere except indoors and locations 
where it is screened from view by obstacles [93, 247, 248].  It is also capital 
intensive in launching/supervision. The GPS is discussed with more details in 
the next section. 
 
5.2 The Basics of GPS Techniques 
The GPS is a radio navigation system that enables land, sea and airborne users 
to determine their exact location, velocity and time 24 hours a day, in all 
weather conditions, anywhere in the world [249]. The capabilities of the modern 
system render its predecessors impractical and obsolete; e.g., magnetic 
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compass, sextant, chronometer and other radio-based devices. The GPS 
supports a variety of military, commercial and consumer applications [248]. 
 
Basically, the satellite is a self-contained communications system with the ability 
to receive signals from earth and to retransmit those signals back with the use 
of a transponder; an integrated receiver and transmitter of radio signals [249].  
There are 24 satellites in orbit. The orbital distance from earth is about 17,700 
to 20, 200 km, taking about 12 hours for a complete orbit. At least 5 and at most 
11 satellites are mostly visible over the horizon from every point on the earth's 
surface [248]. The GPS satellite constellation and triangulation process are 
shown in Figure 5.3 (a, b), respectively. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: (a) The 24 satellites in orbit; (b) GPS triangulation process [250] 
 
Each satellite has a computer, an atomic clock and a radio. Atomic clocks are 
integral parts of the GPS because extreme accuracy in timing is necessary for 
the triangulation involved in the positioning system. The satellite continually 
broadcasts its position and time; once a day, each satellite checks its own time 
and position with a ground station and makes corrections. On earth, every GPS 
receiver has a computer that triangulates its own position using bearings from 
three of the four visible satellites. The result is displayed in form of a geographic 
position; longitude and latitude. This is correct, for most receivers, within a few 
meters (10m for Google Nexus 7 Tablet). The receiver may also display maps. 
Data from the fourth satellite is used to figure out the altitude of the geographic 
position. When on the move, it may also display navigation data; speed, the 
direction of travel, and estimated times of arrival. Some specialised GPS 
receivers can also store data for use in Geographic Information System (GIS) 
and map making [250]. Nowadays, most smartphones and tablets are GPS-
compliant; e.g., Google Nexus 7 and 10 tablets – ‘Google Now’ [251]. 
(a) (b) 
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Using the GPS, it is difficult to fake location in the cyberspace. Hence, cracking 
user's position is a very complicated endeavour [247], [252]. 
 
The GPS is the most prominent example of a satellite navigation system. It is 
owned, operated and maintained by the US. In 1984, the first GPS satellites 
were launched, and 12 satellites were operational by 1990. A first operational 
status was achieved with 21 system satellites and three reserve satellites on 
December 8, 1993. The full operation capability was declared on July 17, 1995 
[248].   
 
The GPS system is divided into three segments; the user segment, the space 
segment, and the control segment. The user segment consists of the devices of 
the mobile user, the space segment consists of the satellites which are powered 
by solar cells, while the control segment (Earth Station) is used for 
administration of the satellites as well as for correction of the satellite internal 
data. The GPS signals are of two components; the encrypted Precise 
Positioning Service (PPS) exclusively for military purposes, and Standard 
Positioning Service (SPS) which is freely available for civilian users. Satellites 
use two frequencies; L1 (1575.42 MHz) for PPS and SPS, and L2 (1227.6 MHz) 
exclusively for PPS. 
 
The Russian counterpart of the GPS is GLONASS (Globalnaya Navigationnaya 
Sputnikovaya Sistema), while the EU system in the making is called Galileo ( 
otherwise called Global National Satellite System- GNSS); first launching 
started in October 2011, and the 30-satellite Galileo system is expected to be 
completed by 2019 [253]. The Chinese system consists of two separate satellite 
constellations; a limited test system that has been operating since 2000, and a 
35-satellite system full-scale global navigation system that is currently under 
construction is expected to be completed by 2020. It is called the BeiDou 
Satellite Navigation System (BDS) or the COMPASS [254]. 
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5.2.1 Basic GPS Positioning Calculations 
If a user wants to determine a position with the help of satellites, he needs the 
exact positions of the satellites ( is ) as well as the exact distances to the 
satellites ( ir ). At least three satellites are needed to determine the user's 
location u in three dimensions. Since satellites move on fixed orbits, a mobile 
user can easily compute his or her exact position at a certain time. An almanac 
contains a list of all working satellites and their orbits. It is updated when 
satellites are shut down or new satellites start functioning in new orbits. It 
should be noted that the precision of the values is  directly influences the 
precision of the location u. In order to compute the distances, ,ir  every satellite 
sends a signal, which exactly specifies the current satellite time. A receiver 
compares this time with its internal clock. The distance r can be determined 
from the time difference Δt with the formula r = c Δt; where, c ≈ 300,000 km/s 
[248].  
 
5.3 GPS Capability and Location-based Authentication 
It is clear from the foregoing that, as at date, the satellite positioning technique 
is the most reliable locating technique in terms of accuracy, coverage and costs 
(relative to the user). This is important because, for a location-based 
authentication technique to be effective, it ought to be user-centred, otherwise, 
evasive actions would render it useless. The current capability of the GPS 
dictates that positioning must be based on own location only; i.e., an entity ‘A’ 
cannot use his GPS receiver data to determine the position of another entity ‘B’ 
in a different location. That is, using the GPS in location-based authentication 
necessitates that the user must be the one to supply the own space-time 
information to the server and vice versa. Thus, a fraudulent user could supply 
fake information at will, and vice versa. This has a negative implication on the 
trust level that authentication is designed to achieve. In order to resolve this 
problem, it is either a way is found to enable the authenticator to use own GPS 
data to determine the location of the client or transceiver devices are equipped 
with GPS capabilities to facilitate automatic mutual authentication; as 
demonstrated by the Cloud Data Repository Secure Access Service – Prototype 
in Chapter 4.  
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After discussing the LBA techniques and GPS capabilities in the preceding 
sections, an area assessment of the state of cyber insecurity in Africa is 
presented in the succeeding sections. This leads to a proposal to harness both 
technology and human factors to counter or mitigate criminality in the 
cyberspace.   
 
5.4. The State of Cyber Insecurity in Africa, Using Nigeria as a Case 
Study 
Every society has its bad eggs; research estimates show that about 4% of 
Nigerians engage in cybercrimes [255]. Regardless of the magnitude of this 
percentage, Nigerian 419 Scam is a major concern, not only for the African 
Governments and their citizens but the entire global community [208]. 
 
Cybercrime refers to any unlawful act perpetrated using the computer, 
electronics and ancillary devices as tools within the cyberspace [256]. It 
involves disruption of network traffic along with virtually an endless list of major 
and sundry crimes including terrorism and outright warfare [202]. It targets 
individuals, individual properties, corporate organisations, governments, the 
entire nation and the global community at large [202, 256]. Discussions with and 
statistics from the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Abuja, 
and the Special Fraud Unit (SFU) of the NP, Lagos, Nigeria, indicate that 
cybercrimes that are prevalent in Nigeria include [257, 258]: fishing and 
spoofing activities targeting bank customers; skimming of standard issue 
magnetic-stripe ATM (Automated Teller Machine) cards; cloning and/or 
defacing of government and business websites; spamming activities involving 
419 Scam solicitations (for lottery, inheritance, charity, romance, crude oil, fund 
transfer, employment, contracts, etc.); fraudulent online purchases from e-
commerce sites made with fake foreign financial instruments and stolen credit 
card information; online investment scams targeting local victims; deployment of 
malicious programmes – mostly off-the-shelve spyware, keystroke loggers, 
Trojans and extractors on target systems; targeting of emotionally vulnerable 
persons on free social networking sites; and the use of free email services 
(especially g-mail, yahoo-mail and hotmail) in cybercrime related 
communications.  
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Cybercrimes are very common in Nigeria. Statistics reveal that these crimes are 
mostly committed by males between the ages of 20–35, and mostly based in 
University towns [257]. Nigeria currently ranks first in Africa, and third in the 
world, after the US and UK, with 5.7% cybercrime perpetrators (down by 0.2% 
from 2006), as illustrated in Table 5.1 [256].  
 
 
    Table 5.1. Top ten countries by count  
    (cybercrime perpetrators) [256] 
 
Country Percentage 
1. United States 
2.United Kingdom  
3. Nigeria  
4. Canada  
5. Romania  
6. Italy   
7. Spain  
8. South Africa   
9. Russia   
10. Ghana  
63.2% 
15.3% 
5.7% 
5.6% 
1.5% 
1.3% 
 0.9% 
0.9% 
0.8% 
0.7% 
 
 
 
From Table 5.2, all the indices for the incidence of cybercrime in Nigeria are on 
the increase for the three years; some astronomically, bearing in mind that the 
indicators for 2014 are incomplete. Virtually all researchers agree that 
globalisation occasioned by the revolution in Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) has greatly contributed to the rise in cybercrimes in Nigeria. 
However, this does not explain why Nigeria should be far ahead of South Africa, 
for instance, with 5.7% against 0.9%, given that the Internet usage in South 
Africa is about 50% compared to Nigeria [259]. Many researchers agree that it 
is Nigerian 419 Scam that has sharply differentiated from South Africa, and this 
was enhanced by miniaturisation of communication devices among other 
factors, especially the mobile phone which is very portable and more amenable 
to deception in respect of callers’ location information [208, 255, 257]. 
 
 
 
 
200 
 
      Table 5.2. Statistics of fraudulent cybercrimes  
     in Nigeria [257, 258] 
 
Year Description Quantity 
2012 No of Cases Reported   
No of Suspects Arrested 
Financial Recoveries (Naira) 
89 
100 
2.4 Billion 
2013 No of Cases Reported    
No of Suspects Arrested 
Financial Recoveries (Naira) 
99 
188 
8.4 Billion 
2014* No of Cases Reported 
No of Suspects Arrested 
Financial Recoveries (Naira) 
93 
- 
630 Million 
 
2014
*
  … For the First Quarter Only 
 
 
The implication of this finding would be fully appreciated only if it is realised that 
the annual statistics for mobile phone subscribers in Nigeria indicates a leap 
from 266,461 to 135,253,599 between 2001 and 2012, respectively. The 
teledensity for the corresponding periods also witnessed a quantum leap from 
0.73 to 80.85 respectively [260]. Nigerian Governments have been fighting 
fraudulent crimes for long without much result. This led to the establishment of 
various outfits, in addition to the Nigerian Criminal Code Act. Thus, it could be 
said that while globalisation has enhanced the socio-economic life of the 
people, it has also come along with insecurity problems that have so far defied 
solutions. The solutions designed to counter feigned-location based fraud 
related crimes will be treated next. 
 
5.5 Countering Feigned-location Based Fraud Related Crimes Using the 
Digitised (Split) Cells of Origins  
 
It is noteworthy that most of the measures so far employed in Nigeria to counter 
the cyber and other fraud-related crimes are mostly based on legal instruments; 
in terms of enactments and enforcements. Since the most valuable tool for the 
419 fraudsters is the mobile phone, it seems reasonable to approach the 
problem from a technological angle as one of the most optimistic ways forward. 
It is hereby proposed that location-based authentication be employed in two 
versions in Nigeria. While one version is to actually detect the exact physical 
location of the fraudster, the other is to deter him/her from committing the crime.  
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For actual detection, there would be a need to make all transceivers GPS-
compliant, with inherent capabilities for location-based automatic mutual 
authentication as advocated by Adeka et al. [205]. This would be able to detect 
the locations of both static and mobile cyber criminals; please note that a mobile 
phone is being treated here as a computer – smartphones are computers with 
phone capabilities.   
 
The deterrence approach would be realised by a further digitisation of the 
country codes for the GSM cellular phone systems, as explained in the next 
segment. This could be very effective against 419 fraudsters who use the 
mobile phone as their main tool. Where necessary, the two approaches could 
be combined with the use of a modified web-based secret sharing scheme for 
services with very high security demands. These would then be augmented with 
an administrative approach; which may take the form of good governance by 
way of mitigating corruption and job creation for the teaming idle youth 
populations in Africa. 
 
5.5.1 Background to the Deterrence Approach 
In the evolution of cellular phones, two major reasons for dropping certain 
standards stemmed from security limitations and incompatibility of diverse 
standards. Researches were heated up to solve these challenges. 
Breakthroughs yielded the Long Term Evolution (LTE) today [261, 262].  Since 
then, subsequent cellular standards have become more mobile, secure and 
compatible with earlier standards across different national boundaries. Aside 
from these improvements, security challenges still abound such as location 
identification of a mobile user. Recently, the 3GPP (3rd Generation Partnership 
Project) working group proposed the inclusion of the Time Difference of Arrival 
(TDOA) algorithm [263] in the LTE-Advanced (LTE-A) Release 10 and beyond 
(which has been revised to inherit Rel-8/9 features) to identify the location of a 
mobile caller [264, 265]. In cellular phone networks, although the term 
Enhanced Observed Time Difference (E-OTD) is often used instead of TDOA, 
the principle is the same [266], except that the former involves the broadcast of 
cell-ID [265]. 
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In contrast to mobile phones, fixed telephones are more secure and mostly 
preferred in official involvements, since they are trackable more accurately. Its 
address can be easily traced since the address (including the city codes) 
assigned to a user is known. This feature makes it more dependable to transact 
businesses using fixed telephones than mobile phones. This proposal considers 
mapping the security advantage of the fixed telephones on to the mobiles (with 
a variety of modifications) such that it can be more dependable than it has 
been. Of course, most business organisations would benefit, should the mobile 
lines provide a dependable security trust-head. 
 
In the meantime, area codes are known to be common and are defined 
differently for different countries [267, 268]; e.g., three digits for USA, Canada 
and Nigeria, two digits for Brazil and one digit for Australia and New Zeeland. 
Similarly, there are variable lengths for the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, 
etc. Sometimes, and in some countries also, these area codes are part of 
caller’s mobile number. It is hoped that another variety can be exploited as the 
proposed would travel with the permanent caller mobile number. Being the first 
of its kind, it is possible that this research may revolutionise area/city coding for 
mobile nodes and that the security breaches volunteered by the cellular 
telecommunication security orifice will be solved permanently, within the context 
of current technology.  
 
This proposal does not suggest any change in the numbering plan or hardware 
of any telecommunication network operator, but integration into the software 
configuration of the radio routeing elements of the network operator’s systems – 
base station (Node-B, evolved-Node B or Home-eNB). It does not affect the 
traditional design of the mobile handsets nor would the handsets be 
reconfigured for the purpose. 
 
5.5.2 Benefits to the Nations 
From experience, the duo of location-based identification and mobility has 
always been a confidence-inspiring pair of factors for criminals; the mobile 
communication technology is no exception. This is because prompt 
identification of the geographical position of the mobile phone users is still a 
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technology challenge, which is consequent upon mobility and positioning. Most 
crimes in Nigeria are therefore aided and/or perpetrated using mobile phones. 
Such crimes include kidnapping, robbery, impersonation, terrorism and all 
shades of ‘419’. Sometimes, family members masquerade to defraud own 
family. Debtors pretend to reside in Abuja while physically being in Lagos. The 
ban on the use of GSM/Thuraya services in North Eastern Nigeria (Borno, Yobe 
and Adamawa States) [25, 269, 270], in the wake of the State of Emergency 
(SoE) declared in May 2013, is a robust illustration of the argument being 
canvased in support of this proposal. Hence, this proposal means a solution for 
reducing the tendency to commit the crimes associated with the use of mobile 
phones to enhance confidence in the committing of such crimes in the country 
[186]. It is instructive to note that the deterrence effect, of the technological 
solution envisaged in the proposal, is even more than its enhancing practical 
reality in tracking down the criminals with a view to subjecting them to justice. 
This proposal could serve as an effective obituary for ‘419 and Associates,’ not 
only in Nigeria and Africa but the world at large. 
 
5.5.3  The Proposed Technology 
In the meantime, a mobile phone caller can be traced to the country of origin 
using the country calling code. It makes it very possible that fraudulent activities 
can thrive since the exact location of the mobile caller cannot be estimated by 
the ordinary users. In LTE-A Release 10 and beyond, mobile phones are 
proposed to incorporate the TDOA in determining the location of the mobile 
caller [264, 265]. This tracking functionality permits that only the network 
operators and/or the security agencies such as the police would be able to trace 
the origin of a mobile caller, depending on the TDOA parameters [263] 
extracted from the caller. It can be reasoned that this still makes the acquisition 
of the space-time information of a mobile caller vague, perilous, tedious, and 
expensive. The proximity of a caller’s location characteristics to the parameters 
extracted from the TDOA algorithm cannot define the position of a caller closer 
than 10 meters. In addition, the time it takes to compute and then trace the 
origin of the caller can as well leverage fraud. The proposed initiative can be 
combined with the TDOA to improve the identification of a mobile user’s 
geographical location faster. In fact, at least four cells are required to perform 
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Observed Time Difference of Arrival (OTDOA) [263, 271], and the 
disadvantages cannot be overstressed. 
 
Just like the landlines wherein a caller location can be easily identified, a similar 
situation is being advocated for a mobile user. This could be achieved by a 
further digitisation (splitting) of the GSM country code into city/area codes, 
corresponding to the emergent Cells of Origins, as illustrated in Figure 5.4 (c).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, the caller ID travels with the city/area codes as well, instead of country 
code alone. With proper public awareness education, it would become clear to 
all users that such phones would no longer be safely used in defrauding people 
by falsifying the city location of the caller. The exact city location can be 
extended to a mobile phone user to reduce and also discourage fraudulent 
activities among mobile phone users.  The city/area codes will be incorporated 
in the base stations within an area. Each base station will bear a code of the 
area within which it is domiciled; i.e., its cell. The radio signal originating from 
such base stations will be routed with city/area code parameters to disclose the 
  
(a) (b) 
 
 
 
(c) (d) 
Figure 5.4.  Hierarchical structure of cellular 
network: (a) Base Station (BS) for a cell; (b) 
A 7-cell cluster; (c) Cell splitting; and (d) 
Cellular network structure 
* 
 1 
4 
 7 
 3 
6  5 
 2 
Original Cell 
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origin of a call via the Cell of Origin (COO). Further binning of the available area 
codes, as defined by the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) [272], 
like in the case of USA [267], can be made to ensure discrete proximity to the 
COO of a mobile phone radio information. Thus, for each call placed by a user, 
the trunk prefix in the trunk code [272] (i.e. the ‘0’ in ‘043’ of 043-805123456, for 
example) will remain, but the trunk code will be modified to characterise the 
discrete area in the city from where a call originated. 
 
The hierarchical structure of a cellular network is illustrated in Figure 5.4 [273]. 
The structure is formed by connecting the major components like mobile 
phones, Base stations (BS) and Mobile Switching Centres (MSC). The BS 
serves a cell which could be a few kilometres in diameter as shown in Figure 
5.4 (a); instead of using a circle to depict an ideal situation, the hexagon is used 
for convenience. When the cells are grouped together, they form a Cluster as 
shown in Figure 5.4 (b). Usually, the number of cells in a cluster is limited by the 
requirement that the clusters must fit together like jig-saw pieces. The possible 
cell clusters are the 4-,7-,12- and 21-cell clusters [273]. The size of a cell can be 
changed or reduced by splitting the original cell. Figure 5.4 (c) illustrates how a 
cell can be split into four; this involves reducing the radius of the original cell by 
half [273].   As illustrated in Figure 5.4 (d), all BSs in a cluster are connected to 
the MSC using land lines. Each MSC of a cluster is then connected to the MSC 
of other clusters and a Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) main 
switching centre. The MSC stores information about the subscribers located 
within the cluster and is responsible for directing calls to them [273]. 
 
The advantage of these codes is that it will be relative to the specific 
geographical location of a mobile phone; for instance, if a user leaves 
Gwarimpa for Nyanya (two different areas in Abuja, Nigeria), the area code 
would change and would identify where the caller resides at the time of the call. 
This is also the case for interstates. Genuine privacy issues may not be relevant 
since, as in the current situation, users would be at liberty to either activate or 
de-activate the Caller ID facility [266]. In addition, it would be correct to posit 
that national/public security should take priority over the personal 
security/privacy of an individual. 
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In security related terminologies, this proposal is inherently a location-based 
authentication initiative; though it does not comprise all the ingredients of AAA 
(Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting) [4, 93, 267].  However, all the 
processes of AAA [266] would be a security requirement for the operations of 
special security agencies. These security agents and some designated top 
government functionaries could be permitted by the NCC and the network 
operators, at the instance of necessary legislations, to operate special mobile 
numbers and phones that would not reveal these city/area codes.  
 
After the treatment of the state of cyber insecurity in Africa which led to a 
proposed technological solution as presented above, the most likely challenge 
to this proposal, which is a human factor index, is catered for via a survey that is 
presented in the next section; with encouraging results.  
 
5.6 Anticipated Challenges  
Every technology evolves with its challenges; this is no exception. In this 
section, the possible challenges that may evolve with this proposal are 
enumerated, with possible countermeasures spelt out. 
 
5.6.1   Roaming 
Most times, the mobile phone user travels abroad for conferences, training, 
workshops, businesses, health, etc. Some of these users prefer to roam their 
calling IDs. This technology (if operated in Nigeria only) cannot provide the city 
codes of the foreign countries (unless it is adopted there or globally). However, 
except for the case of roaming, the proposed city codes provide well-binned 
space-time information of a mobile phone user based on city/area codes. The 
possible effect of roaming on the reliability of the proposed system was 
investigated in the course of implementing this proposal; the result is presented 
in the next section. The survey showed that users who roam their mobile voice 
communications and use the service effectively throughout their overseas 
travels are in the region of 10% for the upper-class citizens and less than 2% for 
the lower class citizens. Statistics also shows that most of those involved in 419 
Scam, as operatives, belong to the lower class. 
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5.6.2 Survey: Effect of Roaming on Location-Based Authentication 
Using the questionnaires attached as Appendix 3, two surveys were conducted, 
with field trips to Nigeria; partially in November 2013 and December/January 
2015/2016. The approaches included the use of questionnaires, structured 
interviews and examination of official records; using direct personal contact, 
email and phone calls. The data obtained from the security agencies (NP, SFU, 
NFIU, EFCC and NCC), among others, facilitated the discussions on 
cybersecurity in Section 5.4. Details of the survey on GSM roaming are now 
presented in this section. 
 
Due to lack of cooperation by Mobile Service Providers (MSPs) which frustrated 
the completion of the survey in 2013, it was decided that random samples of 
individuals be used from a population of (about 250) Nigerians of all 
designations from all parts of the country and beyond. The data was mainly 
generated using Question 18 in the structured interview sample questions for 
GSM mobile services in Appendix 3. The compiled data is as presented in 
Table 5.3 (with a legend), while the annual statistics and roaming frequency are 
plotted in Figures 5.5 and 5.6, respectively. 
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Table 5.3. Grand total of the number of subscribers who roam  
their GSM calls in Nigeria with associated statistics 
 
YEAR
S 
 
NUMBER OF ROAMING SUBSCRIBERS PER YEAR Remarks 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
Above 
5 
 
Total 
Digits 0-5 represent the no. of 
times the users against each 
year roamed their calls. 
2006 228 20 1 1 0 0 0 22 Out of 250 Samples (8.8%); 
< 2% under 30. 
2007 223 10 12 2 1 1 1 27 Out of 250 Samples (10.8%); 
< 2% under 30. 
2008 229 13 5 1 0 0 2 21 Out of 250 Samples (8.4%); 
< 3% under 30. 
2009 229 14 0 3 1 0 3 21 Out of 250 Samples (8.4%); 
< 2% under 30. 
2010 226 20 1 1 0 2 0 24 Out of 250 Samples (9.6%); 
< 2.5% under 30. 
2011 227 22 0 0 0 1 0 23 Out of 250 Samples (9.2%); 
< 2.5% under 30. 
2012 223 21 1 0 2 0 3* 27 Out of 250 Samples (10.8%); 
< 2.5% under 30. 
2013 221 19 1 3 4 1 1 29 Out of 250 Samples (11.6%); 
< 2% under 30. 
2014 197 30* 5* 4* 1* 3* 10* 53* Out of 250 Samples (21.2%); 
< 10% usage; < 2% under 35. 
2015 212 35(30*) 0 0 1 0 2 38 Out of 250 Samples (15.2%); 
< 10% usage; < 2% under 35. 
Grand 
Total 
2,215 204(60*) 26(5*) 15(4*) 10(1*) 8(3*) 22(13*) 285 Out of 2,500 Cumulative 
Samples (11.4%); < 10% 
usage; < 2.25% under 35. 
Average No. of Roaming Subscribers Per Annum 28.5 Out of 250 Samples (11.4%); 
< 2.25% under 35. This 
represents the annual average 
over the ten years for the 250 
samples considered 
 
 
LEGEND 
 
*  -   This implies automatic roaming by MSPs; this is usually the case if the 
subscriber’s credit level is high (about N5,000.00; $16.67.00; £12.50; using the 
Bureau de Change (BDC) exchange rate of 300 Naira to a US Dollar and 400 
Naira to a Pound Sterling) as at the time of embarking on overseas travels - 
where the phone setting gives the MSP a leeway to manipulate the system to 
own advantage. 
 
< x % Under 35  -  This means that less than x % of subscribers in the 
random sample were under 35 years of age. This information is relevant 
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because the NP/EFCC records show that most cyber offenders in Nigeria are 
young (between the ages of 20 and 35 years). 
 
< 10% Usage  -  This means less than 10% of subscribers actually use the 
roamed service (usually voice calls) throughout the period of their overseas 
journeys. Though the cost for SMS roaming is relatively cheaper than that of 
voice calls, some of the MSPs do not allow the use of SMS facility for automatic 
roaming – apparently, designed to leave the subscriber with no option other 
than to make voice calls at relatively high rates. 
 
Result Analysis 
From the computations in Table 5.3 (especially the remark column which is 
based on both the recorded data and personal interactions with the target 
population) and the illustrations in Figure 5.5, it is obvious that the members of 
the targeted population who roam their mobile services are in the region of 
10%. 
 
         
 
Figure 5.5. Total and average annual roaming statistics in a decade 
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Bearing in mind the fact that part of the roaming incidence is at the discretion of 
the MSPs rather than the subscribers, personal interactions also authenticated 
that the roaming subscribers are not only less than 10% of the population, their 
actual usage of the roamed services is also much less than 10% of their 
communication needs (i.e., 10% of 10% = 0.1 x 0.1 = 0.01 = 1% of the 
population). This is not an exaggeration because, in practice, most of those who 
roam their mobile services only use them to view calls; to enable them to use 
other facilities to contact their callers in the case of important calls. This is due 
to the factual belief that roamed services are extravagantly costly. Table 5.3 and 
Figure 5.6 illustrate the fact that the number of those who roamed their mobile 
services only once in a year is conspicuously much higher than those who 
roamed twice or more. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6. Annual roaming frequency 
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From the above statistics, it cannot be safely posited that the incidence of 
effective roaming is on the rise because, of recent, more roaming is done at the 
instance of the MSPs. It is noteworthy, that there were abrupt hikes in the 
number of roaming subscribers in 2014 and 2015. These could be explained by 
two possible reasons: Firstly, there were more roaming at the instance of the 
MSPs as a marketing strategy to make more money at all costs; secondly, 
these might be connected with the uncertainties associated with the general 
elections earlier scheduled for 14th February 2015 – it was postponed and later 
held on 28th March 2015. This second reason is informed by the fact that most 
of the roaming within the time frame were concentrated in the last quarter of 
2014 and the first quarter of 2015; with a good number of the affected 
individuals being politicians. 
 
From the above, it could be deduced that there remained a culture of lukewarm 
attitude towards roaming among Nigerians, throughout the decade under 
review. It is also very impressing to observe that about less than 2.25% of the 
roaming subscribers were under the age of 35; data from and discussions with 
the SFU/EFCC indicate that the effective age bracket for most cyber offenders 
in Nigeria is from 20 – 35 years. Thus, it could be concluded that, in pragmatic 
terms, about 1.0% of the targeted population roam their mobile services, and 
less than 2.25% are under the age of 35. Hence, it would be safe to posit that 
the likely negative effect of GSM roaming on the proposed LBA as a means of 
mitigating the incidence of 419 advance fee fraud, and related cyber offences in 
the world, would be negligible. 
 
5.6.3   Awareness Education 
In Nigeria, most users tend to believe that all telecommunications caller 
numbers not starting with the trunk prefix (zero) are an international call. This 
has been used to swindle victims most often than not. When this proposal is 
implemented, most users will face the challenge of adjusting to recognise that 
all numbers not beginning with the zero prefix are not foreign numbers. It is 
hoped that a sensitisation campaign will be carried out to educate the general 
public about the change using Newspapers, radio, TV stations, posters, etc. 
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The Government at all levels, NCC, MSPs and security agencies would have an 
important role to play in this regard. 
 
5.6.4 Cloning Fraud 
This is a high-tech problem that can be perpetrated only by some experts who 
are capable of knowingly, wittingly or fraudulently obtaining the factory details of 
a mobile-phone or by monitoring the radio characteristics of a particular mobile 
phone for a long time. Cloning fraud occurs when the factory-set Electronic 
Serial Number (ESN) and telephone Mobile Identification Number (MIN) have 
been dubbed and used to programme a different phone, such that when the 
legal, as well as illegal (cloned), user places a call, the ESN/MIN of the 
legitimate mobile will be transmitted [274, 275]. The transmission of similar 
ESN/MIN from different mobile nodes is already known [275] and described as 
Sybil attack in, for example, wireless sensor networks [272, 274, 276-278], and 
several solutions have been suggested [279-283]. It will be easy to identify the 
location from which the fraudulent user calls when the proposed method is 
adopted since the city/area codes would be different. This can easily isolate the 
legitimate user from the illegitimate user. Meanwhile, for cell phone cloning 
fraud, the cellular equipment manufacturing industry has deployed 
authentication systems that have proven to be a very effective countermeasure 
[274]. 
 
5.6.5 Immunity/Security of Special Security Agencies and Authorised 
Government Functionaries 
 It may be delicate to always reveal the space-time information of a security 
professional, such as agents of the State Security Service (SSS). These 
security agents and some designated top government functionaries could be 
permitted by the NCC and the MSPs, at the instance of necessary legislations, 
to operate special mobile numbers and phones that would not reveal these 
city/area codes.  
 
5.6.6 Man-in-the-middle and Rogue Base-station Attacks 
The man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack involves intercepting a call and re-routing it 
through a third party to the receiver at the other end, such that both the original 
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source and the sink do not know that the link is mutilated. This can be tackled 
by authenticating the Mobile User (MU) and a Home e-Node B (HeNB or LTE 
Femtocell) from a contractual proxy-signature already established between the 
HeNB and OAM (Operation, Admission and Maintenance) [284]. A rogue base 
station may lead to a Denial of Service (DoS). Meanwhile, DoS due to a rogue 
base station has been discovered and solution proffered in [285], including 
impersonation [286].  
 
5.6.7 Compatibility with future evolutions 
LTE-A Rel-10 and beyond, is not a new radio access technology but the 
evolution of LTE to further improve the performance [287]. This evolution 
inherited all the Rel-8/9 functionalities with additions such as carrier 
aggregation, enhanced multi-antenna support, improved support for 
heterogeneous deployments, and relaying [287]. The Rel-9 uses OTDOA for 
uplink and E-CID (Enhanced-Cell ID) for both uplink and downlink [271]. The E-
CID positioning algorithm, in addition to the serving eNB (in other words the 
radio cell) and the broadcast cell ID which was defined in LTE Rel.8, the 
information such as propagation delay calculated from the difference in timing of 
signal transmission and reception and the Angle of Arrival (AoA), are utilised to 
estimate the position of the MU [271]. For other lower standards, the proposed 
technology would comfortably fit in. 
 
5.6.8 Replacement for other positioning algorithms 
This algorithm may rather be seen as the primary algorithm to which any other 
possible geographical positioning algorithm can be appended. For instance, the 
use of GPS can be added to the city code algorithm. After all, the Rel-9 was 
defined to involve assisted-GPS (A-GPS), OTDOA and E-CID [271].  
 
5.7 The Way Forward 
An assessment of the possible solutions to the problem identified in Section 
2.10.1 (as illustrated in Figure 2.21) seems to be in favour of the solution by 
manufacturers. That is, since a fraudulent user (Client) could supply fake own 
location data at will, and vice versa, there is an urgent need to make all 
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transceiver devices GPS-compliant, with inherent capabilities for location-based 
automatic mutual authentications. This would go a long way in facilitating 
successful socio-technological countermeasures against feigned-location based 
advance fee fraud related crimes.  This recommendation is in congruence with 
[247], which posited that the P(Y) code signature should be injected into the 
user’s device to avoid carrying the GPS receiver every time.  
 
However, privacy issues might arise to oppose this recommendation. This 
would be a weak argument, given the fact that such devices could be enhanced 
with enabling/disabling capabilities at the user’s discretion; similar to the 
Bluetooth technology. In addition, privacy considerations should not be at the 
expense of the emergence of a fault-tolerant web of confidence, that is inherent 
in Zimmermann’s web of trust proposed some 20 years ago [94]. Similarly, it 
would be more proper for national/public security to take precedence over 
issues that relate to personal security/privacy of any individual. 
 
This brings to a close, the discussions on the need to employ the interplay 
among human trust, other trust-related human characteristics, and technology 
to mitigate the dangers posed by confidence artists in the cyberspace. A 
concise global conclusion for the entire Thesis and the PhD research effort will 
follow immediately after the deductive summary for this chapter. 
 
5.8 Deductions 
The main concern of this chapter is to devise a means for maximising the 
benefits of the GPS technology in optimising the effectiveness of location-based 
authentication techniques, in an effort to extend the security perimeter relative 
to human trust. The chapter reviewed the concepts/techniques associated with 
this authentication scheme and explained the current technological capabilities 
of the GPS, with some illustrations. It was observed that the effectiveness of a 
GPS-derived location-based authentication technique is being hampered by the 
fact that the user must be the one to supply the own space-time information 
(own location data) to other correspondents, and vice versa, to facilitate 
authentication; given the possibility that a fraudulent user (Client) could supply 
fake own location data at will. It recommends the urgent need to make all 
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transceiver devices GPS-compliant, with inherent capabilities for location-based 
automatic mutual authentication; as achieved by the Cloud Data Repository 
Access Service Prototype (a novelty in the public civil domain). This would go a 
long way in facilitating successful socio-technological countermeasures against 
feigned-location based fraud related crimes, especially if combined with cell-
splitting of the Cell of Origin and further digitisation of the GSM country codes 
into area/city codes. 
 
This recommendation is against the backdrop of the fact that, privacy issues 
should not be allowed to hinder the emergence of a fault-tolerant web of 
confidence that is inherent in Zimmermann’s web of trust. In addition, it would 
be more proper for national/public security to take precedence over issues that 
relate to personal security/privacy of any individual. This would be a plausible 
argument since such devices could be enhanced with enabling/disabling 
capabilities at the user’s discretion; similar to the Bluetooth technology. 
 
As this technological solution is proposed herein to check 419 and other related 
cybercrimes, let the attention of all stakeholders be drawn to the fact that, 
although security solutions have a technological component, security is 
fundamentally a people-centred problem. Hence, there would be a need to 
combine technical efforts with administrative efforts to chart a way forward; this 
could be in form of good governance by way of mitigating corruption and job 
creation for the idle youth populations in Africa. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
6.1 Summary of Conclusions 
This research was motivated by a strong belief that, solving for insecurity in 
cyber networks is more of a human-centred problem than a technology-centred 
one. In other words, pragmatically speaking, for instance, there could be no 
technical hacking in a vacuum (completely devoid of human compromise). 
Thus, the apparent lack of adequate attention on human-factor-oriented cyber 
defence inspired its conduct in the chosen topic ‘Cryptography and Computer 
Communications Security: Extending the Human Security Perimeter through a 
Web of Trust.’ This is with a view to devising a new or adapted technological 
scheme that would combine the capabilities of technology with the human factor 
of trust in order to enhance the effectiveness of cyber defence; in an effort to 
answer the main research question. This was accomplished by increasing or 
expanding the security perimeter relative to human trust, via a network of 
trustees and secure web environment in conjunction with the SSSS. 
 
In general terms, it is optimistic that the outcome of this study would be of great 
benefit to governments, corporate organisations and individuals who have one 
thing or the other to do with the ICT industry. The work is also aimed at 
stimulating interest in this subject area among the upcoming generation of 
engineers in the developing countries, especially Nigeria – the author’s home 
country, where cryptography is not a popular subject.  
 
In specific terms, the results attained in this work have uncovered many areas 
of new knowledge. The main novelties that have been accomplished in this 
work relate to modifications, in form of addition, subtraction or substitution in the 
SSSS algorithm, in an effort to resolve some of the identified weaknesses in the 
(k, n) - threshold schemes. The contributions made in the research effort are in 
two main categories – novelties and risk assessment discoveries. The key 
contributions are highlighted in the next two paragraphs. 
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The novelties include modification of the SSSS algorithm by sharing a randomly 
generated key which is used to lock up the secret data; rather than sharing the 
secret data itself. This results in improved performances in QoS metrics; which 
include server bandwidth, system scale, service capacity ratio, real-time 
performance (time delay) and enhanced security with a higher human trust 
threshold for the emergent system (CDRSAS). Other novelties in this category 
include globalisation of the science of secret sharing, application of location-
based authentication in secret sharing, inherent capability for location-based 
automatic mutual authentications, and security-enhanced secret sharing 
through the use of time window. In addition, the work has also resolved the 
following long-standing questions in the science of secret sharing: Who is the 
Combiner; Where should Recombination take place; and Who is entitled to 
have access to the Reconstructed Secret Data? 
 
The risk assessment discoveries consist of two main areas: discovering the 
need for a 3-factor (risk, threat and vulnerability) security assessment process 
and proposing the necessity for same in the military; and derivation of two new 
pairs of equations - Adeka’s Twin Risk Equations and Adeka’s Twin Probability 
Equations on Secret Sharing.  
 
Using social engineering, the confidence artists have contributed a great deal in 
perverting the cyberspace with an overwhelming negative impression on 
cybersecurity. Defeating socio-cryptanalysis in the cyberspace would require a 
combination of strategies that are centred on the interplay among human trust, 
trust-related human attributes, and technology. In this connection, there would 
be needs for the following: Making all transceiver devices GPS-compliant with 
inherent capabilities for location-based automatic mutual authentication in the 
public civil domain; further cell-splitting of the existing Cells of Origin in the GSM 
technology; further digitisation of the existing GSM country codes into area/city 
codes; and deliberate efforts at public awareness education on the significance 
and efficacy of the employment of trust and trust-related human attributes in 
countering socio-cryptanalysis in the cyberspace. 
 
 
218 
 
The above innovations are discussed in Sections 2.3 – 2.5, 4.9 and 4.10. 
Detailed chapter summaries are at the end of each chapter in the form of 
deductive summaries under the heading ‘Deductions’.  
 
6.2  Challenges 
 
In the process of implementing the research design, one major technical 
challenge that took the time to overcome was how to accurately determine the 
distance in kilometres between two GPS coordinates. This was very crucial 
because, without it, the CDRSAS-PT would not be able to test for the 
satisfaction of a location boundary condition, by comparing the registered GPS 
data with the real login GPS data that would be keyed in by Clients for location-
based authentication; within a maximum of 30-metre radius. The search for a 
solution led to the discovery of the Haversine Law and Haversine Formula, 
which facilitated the mathematical calculations, as illustrated in Section 4.11. 
 
The second challenge relates to the fluidity of happenings in the cyberspace; 
i.e., how to cope with the rate of increase of cybercrimes; both its frequency and 
intensity. Apart from individual and organisational targets, the rate at which 
apparently organised attacks are perpetrated against both national security and 
economic interests seems to buttress the fact that the Fifth Domain in warfare is 
already a reality; with the US, UK, Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, etc., being 
both perceived as victims and aggressors. In the Global Risk Report 2015, 
released by the World Economic Forum, it is highlighted that large-scale 
cyberattacks are among the prominent risks in 2015. In the US alone, 
cybercrime already costs an estimated $100 billion each year. 
 
Administrators of secret sharing should always remember to carefully define the 
access structure, in order to partially offset the limitation inherent in the fact that 
all participants are not equally trustworthy. 
 
6.3  Recommendations for Future Work 
This marks the completion of both the Thesis and the PhD research effort, 
except for the suggested scope for future work herein. The likely scope items 
for future work would focus on the need to adapt the CDRSAS-PT for high-
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volume traffic operation for possible deployment at the organisational level. The 
effort will focus on the following: 
 
 Having a managed area to set up future shares at a given period;  
 Having more than one different share sessions happening simultaneously;  
 Capturing all the user interactions in a database;  
 Other incorporations aimed at making the system more robust and versatile; 
 Subjecting the system to high-volume traffic performance tests, when 
adapted for public deployment; and 
 The upgraded system will be PHP-based, instead of a Java server, to make it 
more cost effective for hosting on the website instead of a computer-based 
server. 
 
The CDRSAS-PT originally used the Shamir’s key that is derived from the 
encrypted output of the original message itself. This would make the system 
less secure when homomorphic encryption takes off in earnest; hence, the 
Shamir’s key has now been replaced with a randomly generated key. Details of 
future work to further enhance the performance and security of the system are 
in Appendix 8 {every item asterisked therein is a projected future characteristic 
of the Deployment System Type (CDRSAS-DT) which is currently unavailable in 
the prototype (CDRSAS-PT)}. 
 
This ends the Thesis, with bibliography, eight appendices and the list of the 
author’s contributions attached. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Glossary of Cyber-Network and Internet-Related Terms 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This glossary covers computer communications protocols, computer network, 
network programming and network topology, as well as basic hardware 
components, network performance and the transport layers.7 8 9 
 
2. Communications Protocols 
  
A communications protocol is a set of rules for exchanging information over a 
network. It is usually a protocol stack, that is, a stack of protocols, in which each 
protocol uses the protocol below it. A good example of a protocol stack is the 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), an application protocol for distributed, 
collaborative, hypermedia information systems.10 HTTP is the foundation of data 
communication for the World Wide Web (WWW). Hypertext is a multi-linear set 
of objects, building a network by using logic links (hyperlinks) between the 
nodes (for example, text or words). HTTP is the protocol to exchange or transfer 
hypertext. The standards development of HTTP was coordinated by the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), 
resulting in the publication of a series of Requests for Comments (RFCs), most 
notably RFC 2616 (June 1999), which defines HTTP/1.1, the version of HTTP in 
common use. HTTP runs over TCP over IP over IEEE 802.11 (TCP and IP are 
members of the Internet Protocol Suite, and IEEE 802.11 is a member of the 
Ethernet protocol suite). This stack is used between the wireless router and the 
home user's personal computer when the user is surfing the web. 
Communication protocols have various properties, such as whether they are 
connection-oriented or connectionless, whether they use circuit mode or packet 
switching, or whether they use hierarchical or flat addressing. Of the several 
communication protocols, a few are described below: 
 
 Ethernet - Ethernet is a family of protocols used in LANs, described by a set 
of standards together called IEEE 802. This is published by the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). It has a flat addressing scheme 
and is mostly situated at levels 1 and 2 of the OSI model.11 For home users 
today, the most well-known member of this protocol family is IEEE 802.11, 
otherwise known as Wireless LAN (WLAN). However, the complete protocol 
suite deals with a multitude of networking aspects not only for home use, but 
especially when the technology is deployed to support a diverse range of 
business needs. MAC bridging (IEEE 802.1D) deals with the routing of 
                                                     
7
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_network 
8
 http://www.petri.co.il/osi_concepts.htm 
9
 New global standard for fully networked home, ITU-T, 2008-12-12, retrieved 2012-10-01 
10
 Fielding, Roy T.; Gettys, James; Mogul, Jeffrey C.; Nielsen, Henrik Frystyk; Masinter, Larry; Leach, 
Paul J.; Berners-Lee (June 1999). "RFC 2616: Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1". 
11
OSI - Open Systems Interconnection: See the transport layers at the end of this appendix. 
. 
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Ethernet packets using a Spanning Tree Protocol, IEEE 802.1Q describes 
VLANs, and IEEE 802.1X defines a port-based Network Access Control 
protocol, which forms the basis for the authentication mechanisms used in 
VLANs, but it is also found in WLANs – it is what the home user sees when 
the user has to enter a "wireless access key". 
 
 Internet Protocol Suite - The Internet Protocol Suite (IPS), often called 
TCP/IP, is the foundation of all modern internetworking. It offers 
connectionless as well as connection-oriented services over an inherently 
unreliable network traversed by datagram transmission at the Internet 
protocol (IP) level. At its core, the protocol suite defines the addressing, 
identification, and routing specification in form of the traditional Internet 
Protocol Version 4 (IPv4) and IPv6 (the next generation of the protocol with a 
much enlarged addressing capability). 
 
 SONET/SDH - Synchronous Optical Networking (SONET) and Synchronous 
Digital Hierarchy (SDH) are standardised multiplexing protocols that transfer 
multiple digital bit streams over optical fibre using lasers. They were originally 
designed to transport circuit mode communications from a variety of different 
sources, primarily to support real-time, uncompressed, circuit-switched voice 
encoded in PCM (Pulse-Code Modulation) format. However, due to its 
protocol neutrality and transport-oriented features, SONET/SDH was also the 
obvious choice for transporting Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) frames. 
 
 Asynchronous Transfer Mode - ATM is a switching technique for 
telecommunication networks. It uses asynchronous time-division multiplexing 
and encodes data into small, fixed-sized cells. This differs from other 
protocols such as the Internet Protocol Suite or Ethernet that use variable 
sized packets or frames respectively. ATM has similarity with both circuit and 
packet switched networking. This makes it a good choice for a network that 
must handle both traditional high-throughput data traffic, and real-time, low-
latency content such as voice and video. ATM uses a connection-oriented 
model in which a virtual circuit must be established between two endpoints 
before the actual data exchange begins. While the role of ATM is diminishing 
in favour of next-generation networks, it still plays a role in the last mile, 
which is the connection between an Internet service provider and the home 
user.12 
 
3. Computer Network Programming 
 
Computer network programming involves writing computer programs that communicate 
with each other across a computer network. Different programs must be written for the 
client process, which initiates the communication, and for the server process, which 
waits for the communication to be initiated. Both endpoints of the communication flow 
are implemented as network sockets; hence network programming is basically socket 
programming. 
 
 Network Socket – A network socket is an endpoint of an inter-process 
communication flow across a computer network. Today, most communication 
between computers is based on the Internet Protocol; therefore most network 
sockets are Internet sockets. A socket API is an Application Programming 
Interface (API), usually provided by the operating system that allows 
                                                     
12
 Martin, Thomas. "Design Principles for DSL-Based Access Solutions". Retrieved 18 June 2011. 
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application programs to control and use network sockets. Internet socket 
APIs are usually based on the Berkeley sockets standard. A socket address 
is the combination of an IP address and a port number, much like one end of 
a telephone connection is the combination of a phone number and a 
particular extension.13 Based on this address, internet sockets deliver 
incoming data packets to the appropriate application process or thread. 
There are several Internet socket types available: 
 
 
o Datagram Sockets - Also known as connectionless sockets, which use 
User Datagram Protocol (UDP). 
 
o Stream Sockets - Also known as connection-oriented sockets, which 
use Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) or Stream Control 
Transmission Protocol (SCTP). 
 
o Raw Sockets - Also called Raw IP sockets, typically available in routers 
and other network equipment. Here the transport layer is bypassed, and 
the packet headers are made accessible to the application. 
  
There are also non-Internet sockets, implemented over other transport 
protocols, such as Systems Network Architecture (SNA).14 We also have Unix 
Domain Sockets (UDS), for internal inter-process communication. 
 
4. Types of Computer Networks 
 
Networks are often classified by their physical or organisational extent or their 
purpose. Usage, trust level, and access rights differ between these types of 
networks. Thus, we have the following types of computer networks: 
 
 Personal Area Network - A Personal Area Network (PAN) is a computer 
network used for communication among computer and different information 
technological devices close to one person. Some examples of devices that 
are used in a PAN are personal computers, printers, fax machines, 
telephones, PDAs, scanners, and even video game consoles. A PAN may 
include wired and wireless devices. The reach of a PAN typically extends to 
10 meters.15 A wired PAN is usually constructed with USB and Firewire16 
connections while technologies such as Bluetooth and infrared 
communication typically form a wireless PAN. 
 
 Local Area Network - A Local Area Network (LAN) is a network that 
connects computers and devices in a limited geographical area such as 
home, school, computer laboratory, office building, or closely positioned 
group of buildings. Each computer or device on the network is a node. 
Current wired LANs are most likely to be based on Ethernet technology, 
although new standards like ITU-T G.hn also provide a way to create a wired 
                                                     
13
 Cisco Networking Academy Program, CCNA 1 and 2 Companion Guide Revised Third Edition, P.480, 
ISBN 1-58713-150-1 
14
 www-306.ibm.com - AnyNet Guide to Sockets over SNA. 
15
 "Personal Area Network (PAN)". Retrieved September 30, 2012. 
16
 FireWire is Apple Computer's version of a standard, IEEE 1394, High Performance Serial Bus, for 
connecting devices to your personal computer. FireWire provides a single plug-and-socket connection on 
which up to 63 devices can be attached with data transfer speeds up to 400 Mbps (megabits per second). 
The standard describes a serial bus or pathway between one or more peripheral devices and your 
computer's microprocessor. Many peripheral devices now come equipped to meet IEEE 1394. Available 
at: http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/definition/FireWire 
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LAN using existing home wires (coaxial cables, phone lines and power 
lines).17 The defining characteristics of LANs, in contrast to WANs (Wide 
Area Networks), include their higher data transfer rates, smaller geographic 
range, and no need for leased telecommunication lines. Current Ethernet or 
other IEEE 802.3 LAN technologies operate at data transfer rates up to 10 
Gbit/s. IEEE has projects investigating the standardisation of 40 and 100 
Gbit/s.[14] LANs can be connected to WAN by using routers. 
 
 Home Area Network - A Home Area Network (HAN) is a residential LAN 
which is used for communication between digital devices typically deployed 
in the home, usually a small number of personal computers and accessories, 
such as printers and mobile computing devices. An important function is the 
sharing of Internet access, often a broadband service through a cable TV or 
Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) provider. 
 
 Storage Area Network - A Storage Area Network (SAN) is a dedicated 
network that provides access to consolidated, block level data storage. SANs 
are primarily used to make storage devices, such as disk arrays, tape 
libraries and optical jukeboxes, accessible to servers so that the devices 
appear like locally attached devices to the operating system. A SAN typically 
has its own network of storage devices that are generally not accessible 
through the local area network by other devices. The cost and complexity of 
SANs dropped in the early 2000s to levels allowing wider adoption across 
both enterprise and small to medium sized business environments. 
 
 Campus Area Network - A Campus Area Network (CAN) is a computer 
network made up of an interconnection of LANs within a limited geographical 
area. The networking equipment (switches, routers) and transmission media 
(optical fibre, copper plant, Cat5 cabling etc.) are almost entirely owned (by 
the campus tenant/owner: an enterprise, university, government etc.). In the 
case of a university campus-based campus network, the network is likely to 
link a variety of campus buildings including, for example, academic colleges 
or departments, the university library, and student residence halls. 
 
 Backbone Network - A backbone network is part of a computer network 
infrastructure that interconnects various pieces of network, providing a path 
for the exchange of information between different LANs or sub networks. A 
backbone can tie together diverse networks in the same building, in different 
buildings in a campus environment, or over wide areas. Normally, the 
backbone's capacity is greater than that of the networks connected to it. A 
large corporation which has many locations may have a backbone network 
that ties all of these locations together, for example, if a server cluster needs 
to be accessed by different departments of a company which are located at 
different geographical locations. The equipment which ties these 
departments together constitutes the network backbone. Network 
performance management including network congestion are critical 
parameters taken into account when designing a network backbone. A 
specific case of a backbone network is the Internet backbone, which is the 
set of WAN connections and core routers that interconnect all networks 
connected to the Internet. 
 
 Metropolitan Area Network - A Metropolitan Area Network (MAN) is a large 
computer network that usually spans a city or a large campus. 
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 New global standard for fully networked home, ITU-T, 2008-12-12, retrieved 2012-10-2 
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  Wide Area Network - A WAN is a computer network that covers a large 
geographic area such as a city, country, or spans even intercontinental 
distances, using a communications channel that combines many types of 
media such as telephone lines, cables, and air waves. A WAN often uses 
transmission facilities provided by common carriers, such as telephone 
companies. WAN technologies generally function at the lower three layers of 
the OSI reference model: the physical layer, the data link layer, and the 
network layer. 
 
 Enterprise Private Network - An enterprise private network is a network 
built by an enterprise to interconnect various company sites, e.g., production 
sites, head offices, remote offices and shops, in order to share computer 
resources. 
 
 Virtual Private Network - A Virtual Private Network (VPN) is a computer 
network in which some of the links between nodes are carried by open 
connections or virtual circuits in some larger network (e.g., the Internet) 
instead of by physical wires. The data link layer protocols of the virtual 
network are said to be tunnelled through the larger network when this is the 
case. One common application is secure communications through the public 
Internet, but a VPN need not have explicit security features, such as 
authentication or content encryption. VPNs, for example, can be used to 
separate the traffic of different user communities over an underlying network 
with strong security features. VPN may have best-effort performance, or may 
have a defined service level agreement (SLA) between the VPN customer 
and the VPN service provider. Generally, a VPN has a topology more 
complex than point-to-point. 
 
 Virtual Network - Not to be confused with a VPN, a Virtual Network defines 
data traffic flows between virtual machines within a hypervisor in a virtual 
computing environment. Virtual Networks may employ virtual security 
switches, virtual routers, virtual firewalls and other virtual networking devices 
to direct and secure data traffic. 
 
 Internetwork - An internetwork is the connection of multiple computer 
networks via a common routing technology using routers. The Internet is an 
aggregation of many connected internetworks spanning the Earth. 
 
 Organisational Scope - Networks are typically managed by organisations 
which own them. According to the owner's point of view, networks are seen 
as intranets or extranets. A special case of network is the Internet, which has 
no single owner but a distinct status when seen by an organisational entity; 
that of permitting virtually unlimited global connectivity for a great multitude of 
purposes. 
 
 Intranets And Extranets - Intranets and extranets are parts or extensions of 
a computer network, usually a LAN.  
 
o An intranet is a set of networks, using the Internet Protocol and IP-
based tools such as web browsers and file transfer applications that are 
under the control of a single administrative entity. That administrative 
entity closes the intranet to all but specific, authorised users. Most 
commonly, an intranet is the internal network of an organisation. A large 
intranet will typically have at least one web server to provide users with 
organisational information. 
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o An extranet is a network that is limited in scope to a single organisation 
or entity and also has limited connections to the networks of one or more 
other usually, but not necessarily, trusted organisations or entities—a 
company's customers may be given access to some part of its intranet—
while at the same time the customers may not be considered trusted 
from a security standpoint. Technically, an extranet may also be 
categorised as a CAN, MAN, WAN, or other type of network, although an 
extranet cannot consist of a single LAN; it must have at least one 
connection with an external network. 
 
 Internet - The Internet is a global system of interconnected governmental, 
academic, corporate, public, and private computer networks. It is based on 
the networking technologies of the IPS. It is the successor of the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) developed by DARPA of the 
US Department of Defence. The Internet is also the communications 
backbone underlying the World WWW. Participants in the Internet use a 
diverse array of methods of several hundred documented, and often 
standardised, protocols compatible with the IPS and an addressing system 
(IP addresses) administered by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
(IANA) and address registries. Service providers and large enterprises 
exchange information about the reachability of their address spaces through 
the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), forming a redundant worldwide mesh of 
transmission paths. 
 
5. Computer Network Topology 
  
 Common Layouts - A network topology is the layout of the interconnections 
of the nodes of a computer network. Common layouts are: 
 
o Bus Network - All nodes are connected to a common medium along this 
medium. This was the layout used in the original Ethernet, called 10BASE5 
and 10BASE2. 
 
o  Star Network - All nodes are connected to a special central node. This 
is the typical layout found in a WLAN, where each wireless client 
connects to the central wireless access point. 
 
o  Ring Network - Each node is connected to its left and right neighbour 
node, such that all nodes are connected and that each node can reach 
each other node by traversing nodes left- or rightwards. The Fibre 
Distributed Data Interface (FDDI) made use of such a topology. 
 
o  Mesh Network - Each node is connected to an arbitrary number of 
neighbours in such a way that there is at least one traversal from any 
node to any other. 
 
o Fully Connected Network - Each node is connected to every other 
node in the network. 
 
Note that the physical layout of the nodes in a network may not 
necessarily reflect the network topology. As an example, with FDDI, the 
network topology is a ring (actually two counter-rotating rings), but the 
physical topology is a star, because all neighbouring connections are 
routed via a central physical location. 
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6. Overlay Network 
 
An overlay network is a virtual computer network that is built on top of another 
network. Nodes in the overlay are connected by virtual or logic links, each of 
which corresponds to a path, perhaps through many physical links, in the 
underlying network. The topology of the overlay network may (and often does) 
differ from that of the underlying one. A sample overlay network is shown in 
Figure 1-1 below. The sample shows IP over SONET over Optical. This sample 
overlay network shows IP over SONET over Optical. For example, many peer-
to-peer networks are overlay networks because they are organised as nodes of 
a virtual system of links run on top of the Internet. The Internet was initially built 
as an overlay on the telephone network.18 The most striking example of an 
overlay network, however, is the Internet itself: At the IP layer, each node can 
reach any other by a direct connection to the desired IP address, thereby 
creating a fully connected network; the underlying network, however, is 
composed of a mesh-like interconnect of sub networks of varying topologies 
(and, in fact, technologies). Address resolution and routing are the means which 
allows the mapping of the fully connected IP overlay network to the underlying 
ones. 
 
 
 
Figure 1-1. Overlay Network Broken-up into Logic Layers [Ft. Note 20] 
 
7. Networking Hardware:  Basic Hardware Components 
 
 Apart from the physical communications media themselves, networks comprise 
additional basic hardware building blocks interconnecting their terminals. These 
include network interface cards (NICs), hubs, bridges, switches, and routers. 
                                                     
18
 D. Andersen; H. Balakrishnan; M. Kaashoek; R. Morris (10-2001), Resilient Overlay Networks, 
Association for Computing Machinery, http://nms.lcs.mit.edu/papers/ron-sosp2001.html, retrieved 2012-
10-12 
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 Network Interface Cards - A network card, network adapter, or NIC is a 
piece of computer hardware designed to allow computers to physically 
access a networking medium. It provides a low-level addressing system 
through the use of MAC addresses. Each Ethernet network interface has a 
unique MAC address which is usually stored in a small memory device on the 
card, allowing any device to connect to the network without creating an 
address conflict. Ethernet MAC addresses are composed of six octets. 
Uniqueness is maintained by the IEEE, which manages the Ethernet address 
space by assigning 3-octet prefixes to equipment manufacturers. The list of 
prefixes is publicly available. Each manufacturer is then obliged to both use 
only their assigned prefix (es) and to uniquely set the 3-octet suffix of every 
Ethernet interface they produce. 
 
 Repeaters and Hubs - A repeater is an electronic device that receives a 
signal, cleans it of unnecessary noise, regenerates it, and retransmits it at a 
higher power level, or to the other side of an obstruction, so that the signal 
can cover longer distances without degradation. In most twisted pair Ethernet 
configurations, repeaters are required for cable that runs longer than 100 
meters. A repeater with multiple ports is known as a hub. Repeaters work on 
the Physical Layer of the OSI model. Repeaters require a small amount of 
time to regenerate the signal. This can cause a propagation delay which can 
affect network communication when there are several repeaters in a row. 
Many network architectures limit the number of repeaters that can be used in 
a row (e.g. Ethernet's 5-4-3 rule). Today, repeaters and hubs have been 
made mostly obsolete by switches. 
 
 Bridges - A network bridge connects multiple network segments at the data 
link layer (layer 2) of the OSI model. Bridges broadcast to all ports except the 
port on which the broadcast was received. However, bridges do not 
promiscuously copy traffic to all ports, as hubs do, but learn which MAC 
addresses are reachable through specific ports. Once the bridge associates 
a port and an address, it will send traffic for that address to that port only. 
Bridges learn the association of ports and addresses by examining the 
source address of frames that it sees on various ports. Once a frame arrives 
through a port, its source address is stored and the bridge assumes that 
MAC address is associated with that port. The first time that a previously 
unknown destination address is seen, the bridge will forward the frame to all 
ports other than the one on which the frame arrived. There are three types of 
bridges: 
 
o  Local Bridges - Directly connect LANs. 
 
o Remote Bridges - Can be used to create a WAN link between LANs. 
Remote bridges, where the connecting link is slower than the end 
networks, largely have been replaced with routers. 
 
o Wireless bridges: Can be used to join LANs or connect remote stations 
to LANs. 
 
 Switches - A network switch is a device that forwards and filters OSI layer 2 
datagrams (chunks of data communication) between ports (connected 
cables) based on the MAC addresses in the packets.19 20 A switch is distinct 
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 "Define switch.". WWW.Wikipedia.com. Retrieved  September l 8, 2012. 
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 Teletraffic Engineering Handbook, ITU-T Study Group 2, archived from the original on 2012-10-01 
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from a hub in that it only forwards the frames to the ports involved in the 
communication rather than all ports connected. A switch breaks the collision 
domain but represents itself as a broadcast domain. Switches make 
forwarding decisions of frames on the basis of MAC addresses. A switch 
normally has numerous ports, facilitating a star topology for devices, and 
cascading additional switches.21 Some switches are capable of routing based 
on Layer 3 addressing or additional logic levels; these are called multi-layer 
switches. The term switch is used loosely in marketing to encompass devices 
including routers and bridges, as well as devices that may distribute traffic on 
load or by application content (e.g., a Web URL identifier). 
 
 Routers - A router is an internetworking device that forwards packets 
between networks by processing information found in the datagram or packet 
(IP information from Layer 3 of the OSI Model). In many situations, this 
information is processed in conjunction with the routing table (also known as 
forwarding table). Routers use routing tables to determine what interface to 
forward packets (this can include the "null" also known as the "black hole" 
interface because data can go into it, however, no further processing is done 
for said data). 
 
 Firewalls - A firewall is an important aspect of a network with respect to 
security. It typically rejects access requests from unsafe sources while 
allowing actions from recognized ones. The vital role firewalls play in network 
security grows in parallel with the constant increase in cyberattacks for the 
purpose of stealing/corrupting data, planting viruses, etcetera. 
 
 Network Performance - Network performance refers to the service quality of 
a telecommunications product as seen by the customer. It should not be 
seen merely as quantum of message or data through the network. Two 
illustrations using circuit-switched network and one type of packet-switched 
network(ATM) are: 
  
o Circuit-Switched Networks - In circuit switched networks, network 
performance is synonymous with the grade of service. The number of 
rejected calls is a measure of how well the network is performing under 
heavy traffic loads.[14] Other types of performance measures can 
include noise, echo and so on. 
 
o Asynchronous Transfer Mode - In an ATM network, performance can 
be measured by line rate, Quality of Service (QoS), data throughput, 
connect time, stability, technology, modulation technique and modem 
enhancements.22 
 
There are many different ways to measure the performance of a network, as 
each network is different in nature and design. Performance can also be 
modelled instead of measured; one example of this is using state transition 
diagrams to model queuing performance in a circuit-switched network. These 
diagrams allow the network planner to analyse how the network will perform 
in each state, ensuring that the network will be optimally designed.23 
  
 
                                                     
21
 Basic Components of a Local Area Network (LAN)". NetworkBits.net. Retrieved September 8, 2012. 
22
 Telecommunications Magazine Online, Americas January 2003, Issue Highlights, Online Exclusive: 
Broadband Access Maximum Performance, Retrieved on September 20, 2012. 
23
 State Transition Diagrams". Retrieved July 13, 2003. 
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8. Network Security 
 
In the field of networking, the area of network security24 consists of the 
provisions and policies adopted by the network administrator to prevent and 
monitor unauthorised access, misuse, modification, or denial of the computer 
network and network-accessible resources. Network security is the 
authorisation of access to data in a network, which is controlled by the network 
administrator. Users are assigned an ID and password that allows them access 
to information and programs within their authority. Network Security covers a 
variety of computer networks, both public and private that are used in everyday 
jobs conducting transactions and communications among businesses, 
government agencies and individuals. 
 
 
 
9. The Seven Transport Layers 
 
The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model (ISO/IEC 7498-1) is a product 
of the Open Systems Interconnection effort at the International Organisation for 
Standardisation. It is a prescription of characterising and standardising the 
functions of a communications system in terms of abstraction layers. Similar 
communication functions are grouped into logic layers. A layer serves the layer 
above it and is served by the layer below it.  For example, a layer that provides 
error-free communications across a network provides the path needed by 
applications above it, while it calls the next lower layer to send and receive 
packets that make up the contents of that path. Two instances at one layer are 
connected by a horizontal connection on that layer.  
 
The OSI model defines a networking framework for implementing 
protocols in seven layers. Control is passed from one layer to the next, starting 
at the application layer in one station, and proceeding to the bottom layer, over 
the channel to the next station and back up the hierarchy. These layers are: 
  
 Layer 1 (Physical) - This layer conveys the bit stream - electrical impulse, 
light or radio signal through the network at the electrical and mechanical 
level. It provides the hardware means of sending and receiving data on a 
carrier, including defining cables, cards and physical aspects. Fast Ethernet, 
RS232, and ATM are protocols with physical layer components. 
 
 Layer 2 (Data Link) - At this layer, data packets are encoded and decoded 
into bits. It furnishes transmission protocol knowledge and management and 
handles errors in the physical layer, flow control and frame synchronisation. 
The data link layer is divided into two sub layers: The Media Access Control 
(MAC) layer and the Logic Link Control (LLC) layer. The MAC sub layer 
controls how a computer on the network gains access to the data and 
permission to transmit it. The LLC layer controls frame synchronisation, flow 
control and error checking. 
 
 Layer 3 (Network) - NFS uses IP as its network layer interface. IP is 
responsible for routing, directing datagrams from one network to another. 
                                                     
24
 Simmonds, A; Sandilands, P; van Ekert, L (2004). "An Ontology for Network Security Attacks". 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3285: 317–323. 
doi:10.1007/978-3-540-30176-9_41. ISBN 978-3-540-23659-7. 
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The network layer may have to break large datagrams, larger than MTU, into 
smaller packets and host receiving the packet will have to reassemble the 
fragmented datagram. The Internetwork Protocol identifies each host with a 
32-bit IP address. IP addresses are written as four dot-separated decimal 
numbers between 0 and 255, e.g., 129.79.16.40. The leading 1-3 bytes of the 
IP identify the network and the remaining bytes identify the host on that 
network. The network portion of the IP is assigned by Inter-NIC Registration 
Services, under the contract to the National Science Foundation, and the 
host portion of the IP is assigned by the local network administrators. For 
large sites, the first two bytes represents the network portion of the IP, and 
the third and fourth bytes identify the subnet and host respectively. Even 
though IP packets are addressed using IP addresses, hardware addresses 
must be used to actually transport data from one host to another. The 
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is used to map the IP address to its 
hardware address. 
 
 Layer 4 (Transport) - Transport layer subdivides user-buffer into network-
buffer, sized datagrams and enforces desired transmission control. Two 
transport protocols, Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram 
Protocol (UDP), sit at the transport layer. Reliability and speed are the 
primary difference between these two protocols. TCP establishes 
connections between two hosts on the network through sockets which are 
determined by the IP address and port number. TCP keeps track of the 
packet delivery order and the packets that must be resent. Maintaining this 
information for each connection makes TCP a stately protocol. UDP on the 
other hand provides a low overhead transmission service, but with less error 
checking. NFS is built on top of UDP because of its speed and statelessness. 
Statelessness simplifies the crash recovery. 
 
 Layer 5 (Session) - The session protocol defines the format of the data sent 
over the connections. The NFS uses the Remote Procedure Call (RPC) for 
its session protocol. RPC may be built on either TCP or UDP. Login sessions 
use TCP whereas NFS and broadcast use UDP. 
 
 Layer 6 (Presentation) - This layer provides independence from differences 
in data representation (e.g., encryption) by translating from application to 
network format, and vice versa. The presentation layer works to transform 
data into the form that the application layer can accept. This layer formats 
and encrypts data to be sent across a network, providing freedom from 
compatibility problems. It is sometimes called the syntax layer. 
 
 Layer 7 (Application) - This layer supports application and end-user 
processes. Communication partners are identified, quality of service is 
identified, user authentication and privacy are considered, and any 
constraints on data syntax are identified. Everything at this layer is 
application-specific. This layer provides application services for file transfers, 
e-mail, and other network software services. Telnet and FTP are applications 
that exist entirely in the application level. Tiered application architectures are 
part of this layer. 
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Understanding how the OSI Model works is not only useful for theoretical 
purposes, but also for real life scenarios. The graphical representation of the 7-
layer OSI model is shown in Figure 1-2.25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-2.  The Seven Transport Layers: Graphical Representation of the 7-Layer OSI Model 
[Ft. Note 27] 
 
  
                                                     
25
This graphic is taken from The Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics. 
(http://www.petri.co.il/osi_concepts.htm) 
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Appendix 2 
 
Online Password Security Survey Questionnaire 
 
Title: Password Security Survey 
 
Objective: To establish the level of importance attached to Passwords and the 
awareness on the need for strong passwords. 
 
Target Audience:  Business and other Organisational Executives in Nigeria. 
 
N.B.: Sir/Madam, Please note that you are neither required to write any of your 
passwords in the questionnaire below nor disclose your identity. This is not a 
means for procuring people’s passwords for criminal intent. It is a means to 
facilitate an investigation which is part of an ongoing PhD research programme 
on the topic: Cryptography & Computer Communications Security; Social and 
Technological Aspects of Cyber Defence. Do please spare me some 5 minutes 
of your precious time to answer the eleven questions in the questionnaire and 
send to the returning email address at the end: Just select ‘Forward’ at the top 
of this email, insert ‘X’ in the ‘Choice’ column to reflect your choices, copy the 
returning email address at the end of the questionnaire on Table 2-1 and paste 
in the addressee space for sending emails (To: ………….), and select ‘Send’. 
The questionnaire is also attached to this mail, hence, you may choose to download 
the attachment, complete it, and then forward the completed attachment to the 
returning email address, depending on your convenience. With the Highest Regards for 
your Assistance. 
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Table 2-1. Questionnaire on Password Security Survey 
 
S/N QUESTION ALTERNATIVES CHOICE 
(Please insert ‘X’ 
against your chosen 
alternatives in this 
column or specify 
as requested) 
1. Which of the following 
describes you best? 
a. Director or above 
b. Deputy Director 
c. Assistant Director 
d. Senior Enterprise Officer  
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
 
2. Do you have a password for 
granting or denying access to 
your computer? 
 
a. Yes 
b. No 
a.  
b.  
3. If yes, what is the length of the 
password? 
 
 
a. Less than 8 characters 
b. Eight characters 
c. More than 8 characters  
d. Others: please specify 
a.  
b.  
c.  
d.  
4. What is the length of your 
email password? 
a. Less than 8 characters 
b. Eight characters 
c. More than 8 characters  
d. Others: please, specify 
a.  
b.  
c.  
d 
5. What is the nature of your 
passwords? 
a. Meaningful/easily-remembered  
 
b.  Meaningless/ easily-remembered  
 
c. Meaningless/hard-to-remember  
 
d. Others: please describe 
a.  
b.  
 
c.  
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6. What is the composition of 
your passwords? 
 
a. Words or names 
 
b. Words or names and figures 
 
c. Lower or upper case Letters and 
figures 
 
d. Mixed case letters and figures 
 
e. Mixed case letters with figures and 
symbols (other characters on the 
keyboard) 
a.  
b.  
c.  
 
d.  
 
e.    
7. How often do you change your 
passwords? 
a. Daily 
b. Weekly 
c. Monthly 
d. Quarterly 
e. Annually 
f. Permanent (no change) 
g. Change only when compromised 
a.  
b.  
c.  
d.  
e.  
f.  
g.  
8. What is the significance of 
passwords? 
In very few words, state what a 
password means to you (definition) 
 
9. How or where do you store 
your passwords? 
a. In your memory 
 
b. In your computer memory 
 
c. Pasted on your computer or around 
the computer 
 
d. Elsewhere: please specify 
a.  
 
b.  
 
c.  
 
d.  
10. Do you, or does your 
organisation or any superior 
executive in your organisation 
care about the security of 
passwords used by employees 
and take steps to ensure that 
they are strong and secure?  
a. Yes 
 
b. No 
a.  
 
b.  
11. How many people do you 
share your passwords with? 
a. Nobody 
 
b. Everybody 
c. Others: please specify 
a.  
b.  
c.  
 
Returning Email Address:  miadeka@student.bradford.ac.uk  
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Appendix 3 
Structured Interviews: Sample Questions for GSM Mobile 
Services Survey 
 
1. When was the GSM system introduced in Nigeria? 
2. How many GSM service providers were there at inception, and how many 
are there now? 
3. How has the GSM service contributed (positively/negatively) to the lives 
of Nigerians – commerce; education; governance; organisation; individual; and 
security? 
4.   How many customers (phone users) does your organisation have? 
5. On the average, how many mobile phones does an individual have? 
6. Is roaming of mobile services a common practice among Nigerians? 
7. Which category of your customers roams their mobile services most 
frequently? 
8. Which category of your customers roams their mobile services least 
frequently? 
9. What is the incidence of roaming among your customers; is it season-
discriminatory? 
10. On the average, what percentage of your customers roam their mobile 
services – monthly; quarterly; and/or annually? 
11. Would you say that your organisation encourages or discourages the 
roaming of mobile services? 
12. What is the financial implication of roaming on the users? 
13. What is the effect of roaming on the quality of communication (Quality of 
Service)? 
14. What challenges do your organisation and/or customers face in 
connection with the roaming of services, and how are these challenges 
overcome? 
15. As a service provider, can you identify the geographical location of your 
customers by merely receiving their calls: - if ‘yes’, how easy, accurate and fast 
is the process; if ‘no’, what can you do to facilitate this process? 
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16. How is the GSM mobile phone market in Nigeria; is it expanding or 
shrinking?  
17. How do you differentiate between a local call and an international call? 
18.* About how many times did you roam your GSM Phone Number (s) for 
phone calls while abroad in the following years? Please tick the appropriate 
column in the questionnaire in Table 3-1 below. Do please remember to indicate 
your age. You are also assured that your identity remains anonymous. 
 
Table 3-1. Questionnaire for GSM Call Roaming in Nigeria 
 
 
 
 
Your Age: …………………… 
 
  
YEARS 
 
NUMBER OF ROAMINGS PER YEAR Remarks 
0 1 2 3 4 5 Above 5 Digits 0-5 represent the no. of 
times you  roamed your   calls in 
each year   
2006         
2007         
2008         
2009         
2010         
2011         
2012         
2013         
2014         
2015         
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STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS: SAMPLE QUESTIONS FOR  
CYBERSECURITY SURVEY  
 
1. When did computer literacy begin in the Nigerian society? 
2. Compare the prevalence in the use of computers at inception with now. 
3. When did Internet culture begin in Nigeria? 
4. Would you say that Nigeria is now a member of the Global Village? 
5. Briefly comment on the rate of Internet usage in Nigeria; comparing the 
situation at inception with the present experience. 
6. How important is the Internet in the lives of Nigerians – Commerce; 
education; governance; organisation; individuals; and security? 
7. Does your organisation or you face any challenges in the use of 
cyberspace? 
8. What are the types of cybercrimes in Nigeria? 
9. How common or frequent are cybercrimes in Nigeria; especially fraud 
and ‘419’ (advance fee fraud)? 
10. How do you and/or your organisation fare in combatting cybercrimes? 
11. What is the incidence of DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks in 
Nigeria; cite examples, if any? 
12. Have hackers played any significant roles in the Nigerian cyberspace; 
cite examples, if any? 
13.  What challenges do you or your organisation face in combatting 
cybercrimes – at personal, organisational and national levels? 
14. What role does the government play in the Nigerian cyberspace? 
15. How successful is your organisation or are you in the war against 
cybercrimes? 
16. What do you suggest should be the way forward? 
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Appendix 4 
 
CDRSAS-PT:  Organisational Network Security Policy 
 
 Network Access and Authentication Policy   Created: 03/06/2015  
 Section of: Corporate Security Policies  Target Audience: Technical Staff 
 CONFIDENTIAL   Page 255 of 5 
 
CDRSAS-PT is hereinafter referred to as "the company." 
 
 
1.0  Overview 
 
Consistent standards for network access and authentication are critical to the 
company's information security and are often required by regulations or third-
party agreements.  Any user accessing the company's computer systems has 
the ability to affect the security of all users of the network.  An appropriate 
Network Access and Authentication Policy reduce the risk of a security incident 
by requiring consistent application of authentication and access standards 
across the network.26 
 
2.0  Purpose 
 
The purpose of this policy is to describe what steps must be taken to ensure 
that users connecting to the corporate network are authenticated in an 
appropriate manner, in compliance with company standards, and are given the 
least amount of access required to perform their job function. This policy 
specifies what constitutes appropriate use of network accounts and 
authentication standards. 
 
3.0  Scope 
 
The scope of this policy includes all users who have access to company-owned 
or company-provided computers or require access to the corporate network 
and/or systems.  This policy applies not only to employees, but also to guests, 
contractors, and anyone requiring access to the corporate network.   
 
4.0  Policy 
 
4.1  Account Setup 
 
During initial account setup, certain checks must be performed in order to 
ensure the integrity of the process.  The following policies apply to account 
setup: 
                                                     
26
 InstantSecurityPolicy.com. Custom Security Policies. Available: 
http://www.instantsecuritypolicy.com/index-uk.html?gclid=CKrV1vr8zbYCFaTItAodsTAAvA. 
[Accessed: 3 Jun. 2015] 
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 Positive ID and coordination with Human Resources is required. 
 
 Users will be granted least amount of network access required to perform his 
or her job function.   
 
 Users will be granted access only if he or she accepts the Acceptable Use 
Policy. 
 
 Access to the network will be granted in accordance with the Acceptable Use 
Policy. 
 
4.2  Account Use 
 
Network accounts must be implemented in a standard fashion and utilised 
consistently across the organisation.  The following policies apply to account 
use: 
 
 Accounts must be created using a standard format (i.e., firstname-lastname, 
or firstinitial-lastname, etc.) 
 
 Accounts must be password protected (refer to the Password Policy for more 
detailed information). 
 
 Accounts must be for individuals only.  Account sharing and group accounts 
are not permitted. 
 
 User accounts must not be given administrator or 'root' access unless this is 
necessary to perform his or her job function. 
 
 Occasionally guests will have a legitimate business need for access to the 
corporate network.  When a reasonable need is demonstrated, temporary 
guest access is allowed.  This access, however, must be severely restricted 
to only those resources that the guest needs at that time; and disabled when 
the guest's work is completed. 
 
 Individuals requiring access to confidential data must have an individual, 
distinct account.  This account may be subject to additional monitoring or 
auditing at the discretion of the ICT Manager or executive team, or as 
required by applicable regulations or third-party agreements. 
 
4.3  Account Termination 
 
When managing network and user accounts, it is important to stay in 
communication with the Human Resources department so that when an 
employee no longer works at the company, that employee's account can be 
disabled.  Human Resources must create a process to notify the IT Manager in 
the event of a staffing change, which includes employment termination, 
employment suspension, or a change of job function (promotion, demotion, 
suspension, etc.). 
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4.4  Authentication 
 
User machines must be configured to request authentication against the domain 
at start up.  If the domain is not available or authentication for some reason 
cannot occur, then the machine should not be permitted to access the network. 
 
4.5  Use of Passwords 
 
When accessing the network locally, two-factor authentication (such as smart 
cards, tokens, or biometrics) is required. 
 
4.6  Remote Network Access 
 
Remote access to the network can be provided for convenience to users but 
this comes at some risk to security.  For that reason, the company encourages 
additional scrutiny of users remotely accessing the network.  Due to the 
elevated risk, company policy dictates that when accessing the network 
remotely two-factor authentication (such as smart cards, tokens, or biometrics) 
must be used. This is in addition to a location-based authentication technique 
(using GPS). Multiple accesses and threshold accesses would be catered for as 
the need arises. Remote access must adhere to this Remote Access Policy. 
 
4.7  Screensaver Passwords 
 
Screensaver passwords offer an easy way to strengthen security by removing 
the opportunity for a malicious user, curious employee, or intruder to access 
network resources through an idle computer.  For this reason, screensaver 
passwords are required to be activated after 5 to 15 minutes of inactivity, 
depending on the security classification of the computer; all company ICT 
facilities will be security-classified by the ICT Manager accordingly. 
 
4.8  Minimum Configuration for Access 
 
Any system connecting to the network can have a serious impact on the 
security of the entire network.  Vulnerability, virus, or other malware may be 
inadvertently introduced in this process.  For this reason, users must strictly 
adhere to corporate standards with regard to antivirus software and patch levels 
on their machines. Users must not be permitted network access if these 
standards are not met. This policy will be enforced with product that provides 
network admission control. 
 
4.9  Encryption 
 
Industry best practices state that username and password combinations must 
never be sent as plain text.  If this information were intercepted, it could result in 
a serious security incident.  Therefore, authentication credentials must be 
encrypted during transmission across any network, whether the transmission 
occurs internal to the company network or across a public network such as the 
Internet. 
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4.10  Failed Logins 
 
Repeated logon failures can indicate an attempt to 'crack' a password and 
surreptitiously access a network account.  In order to guard against password-
guessing and brute-force attempts, the company must lock a user's account 
after 3 unsuccessful logins.  This can be implemented as a time-based lockout 
or require a manual reset, at the discretion of the ICT Manager; to avoid 
converting failed logins into inadvertent DoS attacks. 
 
In order to protect against account guessing, when login failures occur the error 
message transmitted to the user must not indicate specifically whether the 
account name or password were incorrect.  The error can be as simple as "the 
username and/or password supplied were incorrect." 
 
4.11  Non-Business Hours 
 
Since the company's business does not require overnight network access, the 
company must restrict account login during off hours.  In order to allow room for 
reasonable non-business-hour work, where necessary, `off hours' is defined as 
the hours between 10:00PM and 5:00AM local time on weekdays.  On 
weekends, account access should be disabled 24 hours per day.  However, this 
will be implemented at the discretion of the ICT Manager depending on the 
business need for weekend or off-hours access. 
 
Exceptions to this policy will be granted on a case-by-case basis. 
 
4.12  Applicability of other Policies 
 
This document is part of the company's cohesive set of security policies.  Other 
policies may apply to the topics covered in this document and as such the 
applicable policies should be reviewed as needed. 
 
5.0  Enforcement 
 
This policy will be enforced by the ICT Manager and/or Executive Team. 
Violations may result in disciplinary action, which may include suspension, 
restriction of access, or more severe penalties up to and including termination of 
employment. Where illegal activities or theft of company property (physical or 
intellectual) are suspected, the company may report such activities to the 
applicable authorities. 
 
6.0  Glossary 
 
Antivirus Software - An application used to protect a computer from viruses, 
typically through real time defences and periodic scanning.  Antivirus software 
has evolved to cover other threats, including Trojans, spyware, and other 
malware. 
 
Authentication - A security method used to verify the identity of a user and 
authorise access to a system or network. 
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Biometrics - The process of using a person's unique physical characteristics to 
prove that person's identity.  Commonly used are fingerprints, retinal patterns, 
and hand geometry. 
 
Encryption - The process of encoding data with an algorithm so that it is 
unintelligible without the key.  It is used to protect data during transmission or 
while stored. 
 
Password - A sequence of characters that is used to authenticate a user to a 
file, computer, or network.  It is also known as a passphrase or passcode. 
 
Smart Card - A plastic card containing a computer chip capable of storing 
information; typically used to prove the identity of the user.  A card-reader is 
required to access the information. 
 
Token - A small hardware device used to access a computer or network.  
Tokens are typically in the form of an electronic card or key fob with a regularly 
changing code on its display. 
 
Global Positioning System (GPS) – A technique used to determine the 
location of an object on earth using information acquired from a system of 
geostationary satellites in space. 
 
7.0  Revision History 
 
Revision 1.0, 03/06/2015 
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Appendix 5 
 
Assess Yourself 7: Interpersonal Trust Scale27 
 
Indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement by the 
following scale: 
 
1 = strongly agree 
2 = mildly agree 
3 = agree and disagree equally 
4 = mildly disagree 
5 = strongly disagree 
 
Once you have completed the 25 items, click ‘CALCULATE’ 
  
        1 2 3 4 5 
1. Hypocrisy is on the increase in our society.   -- -- -- -- -- 
 
2. One is better off being cautious when dealing  
with strangers until they have provided evidence  
that they are trustworthy.      -- -- -- -- -- 
  
3. This country has a dark future unless we can  
attract better people into politics.     -- -- -- -- --
   
4. Fear and social disgrace or punishment rather  
than conscience prevents most people from  
breaking the law.       -- -- -- -- -- 
  
5. An honor system in which teachers would not  
be present during exams would probably result in  
increased cheating.      -- -- -- -- -- 
   
6. Parents usually can be relied on to keep their  
promises.        -- -- -- -- -- 
  
                                                     
27
 This scale can be obtained from Dr. J. B. Rotter, Department of Psychology, University of 
Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut 06268. This scale was published in: Robinson, J. P., Shaver, 
P. R., & Wrightsman, L. S. (1991). Measures of personality and social psychological attitudes. 
San Diego: Academic Press. Available:  
http://highered.mheducation.com/sites/dl/free/0072563974/87095/ch07.html. [Accessed: 15 Oct. 2016]. 
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7. The United Nations will never be an effective  
force in keeping world peace.    -- -- -- -- -- 
8. The judiciary is a place where we can all get  
unbiased treatment.      -- -- -- -- --
   
9. Most people would be horrified if they knew how 
much of the news that the public hears and sees is  
distorted.        -- -- -- -- -- 
 
10. It is safe to believe that in spite of what people  
say most people are primarily interested in their own  
welfare.       -- -- -- -- -- 
 
11. Even though we have reports in newspapers,  
radio, TV, and the Internet, it is hard to get objective  
accounts of public events.     -- -- -- -- -- 
 
12. The future seems very promising.   -- -- -- -- --  
 
13. If we really knew what was going on in  
international politics, the public would have reason  
to be more frightened than they now seem to be. -- -- -- -- --  
 
14. Most elected officials are really sincere in their  
campaign promises.      -- -- -- -- -- 
  
15. Many major national sports contests are fixed in  
one way or another.       -- -- -- -- -- 
  
16. Most experts can be relied upon to tell the truth  
about the limits of their knowledge.   -- -- -- -- --  
  
17. Most parents can be relied upon to carry out  
Their  threats of punishments.    -- -- -- -- --  
  
18. Most people can be counted on to do what they  
say they will do.       -- -- -- -- -- 
 
19. In these competitive times one has to be alert or  
someone is likely to take advantage of you.  -- -- -- -- --  
 
20. Most idealists are sincere and usually practice  
what they preach.       -- -- -- -- -- 
  
21. Most salesmen are honest in describing their  
products.        -- -- -- -- -- 
 
22. Most students in school would not cheat even  
if they were sure they could get away with it.  -- -- -- -- -- 
   
  23. Most repairmen will not overcharge, even if  
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they think you are ignorant of their specialty.  -- -- -- -- --  
 
24. A large share of accident claims filed against 
insurance companies are phony.     -- -- -- -- -- 
  
25. Most people answer public opinion polls honestly. -- -- -- -- --  
  
  
  
  
 
  
CALCULATE 
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Appendix 6 
 
Summary of the Detailed Functions of the CDRSAS Prototype 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The key technical background functionalities of the Cloud Data Repository 
Secure Access (CDRSA) prototype are as summarised hereunder; section by 
section. These relate to the roles of softwares and programming languages, 
such as HTML/CSS, Javascripts, PHP, Java/JSP and MySQL. 
 
2. Server Side Display Functions 
 
These are carried out by a Java file which carries out the following functions: 
 
 Handles form posts: note that each Servlet has two methods; doGet 
(default) and doPost (process). 
 When a form is submitted by POST, it employs doPost method. 
 When a form is submitted as a page default, it employs doGet method. 
 
3. Client Side Display Functions 
 
These are carried out by Javascripts file, which employs JQuery library and 
other utilities to: 
 
 Implement Client side functionalities, which include- sending keypad 
values to the text box; getting GPS coordinates and placing them in 
appropriate fields; etc. 
 
4. Starting Up 
 
 On start-up, the Server loads the WebContent, WBB-INF, Web.xml, 
Project/Site title; the first page to display is the UnlockDataRegister.Java. 
 The UnlockDataRegister.Java is a Servlet which displays login.jsp using 
doGet…. (Line 36) 
 When the user fills in login details, the UnlockDataRegister.Java 
processes them using doPost. … (Line 43) 
 Failed Login: Checks if Admin has set up a Share (time); if not, sends 
error message; displays a new login page with the error message. 
 Successful Login:  
 
 All conditions met – time is set; time is within the share duration; all 
credentials match. 
 Takes the user details and encrypts the password (MD5); checks 
against the Database (Db) values. 
 In the session, sets User Logged In = True. 
 Again sets the attribute for the user; this facilitates the display of the 
User Info on the web page. 
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5. Configuring the Admin Page/Sharing the Secret Data 
 
Please note that, firstly, the Admin page must be fully configured by setting up 
all relevant data before a successful login on the client side could be carried 
out. The admin page Form is contained in admin.JSP file, while the completed 
form is processed in the Admin.Java file. The processes involved, which lead 
to the creation of shares by the Admin on the local host only, include: 
 
 Fill the form details and click submit. 
 Admin.Java doPost the details while Data.reset file resets/clears all 
previous share data. 
 Get Form Info/Parameters: 
 Put these into variable and add to the session which is stored in 
Data.Java (Lines 54-83 parse check). 
 Admin.Java (Line 76) stops processing, if any error is found. 
 Executes logic checks (Lines 84-106). 
 Line 108: all data is correct/valid; start adding the data to the session 
(Session = Data.Java; as referenced throughout the programme). 
 Get the keys from Shamir (PHP) via HTTP POST request. 
 Returns x keys; these are assigned to the users, either serially or in 
staggered form, as programmed by the Admin. 
 
 Displays Admin page (Page 2) with the master details (most pieces of 
information relative to the share session as programmed by the Admin 
(Page 1). 
 Now, the system will allow users to log in and is ready for secret data 
sharing/reconstruction; at this stage, the secret data has already been 
shared – each user can now obtain a one-time access to his assigned key. 
 
6. Secret Data Sharing/Reconstruction 
 
Note that the secret data has already been shared (Paragraph 5); data 
reconstruction can now take place or at a later time/date. These functions are 
implemented using the Form datashare.jsp and the processing file 
SetKeyForm.Java as follow: 
 
 Get all the form details (user inputs). 
 Check for any blank field; send error message, if any. 
 Check if all keys are correct and set the key data to the appropriate user in 
the session. 
 Does every key match what the assigned user entered? 
 If there are no errors in the user entries (and everything else is correct), 
display the normal page stating confirmation for all users; as for the 
authorised user (s), show the page with the View Data button. 
 For Authorised User (s) Only – Using the Form ChosenUser.jsp and 
the processing file ViewData.Java – once the View Data button is clicked: 
  
 Double-check to ensure that all of this user’s details are correct. (Line 
443) 
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 Check for minimum number of keys; i.e., quorum satisfaction. (Line 
447) 
 Check if each user has entered the correct key. (Line 455) 
 Check if the GPS coordinates are within accepted range. (Line 463) 
 Send the keys to Shamir for final checks  
 
 Display the appropriate result on the Secret Data Page; either Successful 
(secret data unlocked) or unsuccessful. 
 
7. Time Check 
 
If time runs out (expires), clear all system data relative to this session 
 
8. Functions of Server Side Processing Files 
 
The functions of the Java Server are as highlighted in this paragraph. Its Source 
(Src) Folder contains various files whose functions are as noted herein. 
 
8.1 Source (Src) Folder: 
 
 Admin File – Sets the configuration for shares. 
 Data file – Class used to store all the user data and share information. All 
information the system had is referenced and updated here. 
 DTOSecret File – DTO of the results from SSSS. 
 DTOSmsResult File – Saves information on all results from the SMS 
Client (Gate way: SMS Text Marketer); i.e., fail, texts left, text used, etc. 
 GetUserDetails File – Used class in ajax call to regulate the user edit 
details form. 
 OnetimePassCode File – Displays the secret key for the user only once. 
 Reset File – Resets all system variables. 
 ViewData File – Carries out all the checks before the Authorised User (s) 
can view the data. 
 
8.2 Database Folder: 
 
 DB_SecureShare File – Main DB Class. 
 MYSQLDB File – DB Connection class. 
 UserDao File – interface for user details DB access. 
 
8.3 Authentication Folder: 
 
 Authentication File – Checks to ensure that login details are correct. 
 AuthenticationRegister File – Creates/Registers new users. 
 Register File – Displays Registration Form. 
 
8.4 SecureShare Folder: 
 
 SendSMS File – Class used to send SMS to user. 
 SetKeyForm File – Handles all the user input for share. 
 UnlockDataRegister – Checks Authorised User details before showing 
the secret data (final checks). 
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8.5 Utility Folder: 
 
 Utils File – Various utilities’ help functions. 
 GPSTest File – Tests limitation of GPS distance. 
 TestSMS File – Tests the XML; the SMS that Client sends back. 
 
9. Functions Client Side Processing Functions 
 
9.1 Javascript Folder: 
 
 JQuery File – a library.  
 Utils File - . Implementation of Client side functionalities, which include- 
sending keypad values to the text box; getting GPS coordinates and 
placing them in appropriate fields; etc. 
 
10. Java Server Pages (JSP) 
 
This is a technology that helps software developers to create dynamically 
generated web pages based on HTML and XML or other document types. 
Released by Sun Microsystems in 1999,28 JSP is similar to PHP, but it uses 
the Java programming language. The functions of the various files are as 
highlighted herein. 
 
10.1 JSP Folder: 
 
 Admin File – Sets the login for share. 
 ChosenUser File – Page where the Authorised User sees the unlocked 
secret data. 
 Don’tShowData File – Page that displays error message for Authorised 
User; e.g., unsuccessful keys, GPS, etc. 
 DataAccepted File – Page that shows when an unauthorised user enters 
his keys and other input data correctly. 
 DataShare File – Page where keys and other data are entered; unlocks 
edit details; sends Authentication Code SMS; sends one-time key; 
countdown timer. 
 Header File – Displays title and time at the top of page. 
 MasterShareData File – Admin page (Page 2) results (master). 
 Register File – Form to register new users. 
 Registered File –Confirmation that a user has been registered. 
 Reset.jsp File – Resets all the data. 
 ResetUser File – Page that displays after the secret data has been 
unlocked; it resets the data. 
 ShowData File – Show the Secret Data (Page that contains the View 
Data button). 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
28
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JavaServer_Pages 
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11. JUnit Tests 
 
These are tests carried out to find out if the various Java Units (smallest code 
elements) actually perform their functions according to the design 
specifications. 
 
12. Database  
 
The database contains a table which is created to handle user information; such 
as ID number, Username, Password, GPS Lon, GPS Lat and Phone number. 
Of these, only the password is encrypted. These data could be edited in three 
possible ways: From the Admin page, all the data can be edited, except the ID; 
From the database, all the data can be edited except the ID and password; 
From the Client side, all the data can be edited by a user after due 
authentication, except the ID and Phone number. Without regard to personal ID, 
a user could just input these data directly from the Client side via the 
registration process. However, if the position of the ID is to be pre-determined, 
then, the Admin must assist the user by entering his phone number in the 
database to enable him edit the rest of the user data for the particular ID 
location from the Client side.  
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Appendix 7 
 
Cloud Data Repository Secure Access Service Prototype: 
Results for the JUnit Tests 
 
Tests Conducted on: 24 May 2015 
 
 
Figure 7-1. Result: JUnit.Test_GPSTests.java_PT 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-2. Result: JUnit.Test_ShamirTestUtils.java_PT 
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Figure 7-3. Result: JUnit.Test_ShamirPHPTest.java_PT 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-4. Result: JUnit.Test_ShamirTestFile.java_PT 
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Figure 7-5. Result: JUnit.Test_ShamirTestFile.java_PT 
 
 
 
Figure 7-6. Result: JUnit.Test_TestSMS.java_PT 
 
 
Figure 7-7. Result: JUnit.Test_test.docx_PT 
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Appendix 8 
 
CDRSAS-DT: Projected Characteristics, Functions and 
Capabilities 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Cloud Data Repository Secure Access Scheme (CDRSAS) – 
Deployment Type (DT) will be a global web-based secure data 
communication service. Its ubiquity is limited only by Internet connectivity; 
wherever there is Internet access, the CDRSAS will be there. It is 
essentially a Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme, with additional inherent 
capabilities for secure data transmissions and cloud data repository. This 
brief account seeks to highlight the projected characteristics, functions and 
capabilities of the CDRSAS-DT, when implemented by upgrading the CDRSAS-
PT in future. The projected features which are not currently available in the 
Proto-type (PT) are asterisked (*) herein. The CDRSAS-DT will operate very 
similar to the CDRSAS-PT, except that, the former will have more enhanced 
security features with provisions for multiple simultaneous operations, while the 
later provides for only single operations in most cases. In addition, the 
Deployment Type will be adapted to handle a large volume of customers from a 
hosted website, although it could function from a computer-based server; the 
prototype is the exact opposite of this design. The highlights will cover the 
programming languages/software components to be used in building the 
system, its capabilities, security features and the basics of its operations from 
login to logout.  
 
 
2. Programmimg Languages and Software Components 
 
The CDRSAS-DT will be built using the following software components and 
programming languages, similar to the CDRSAS-PT: 
 
a. PHP (PHP originally stood for ‘Personal Home Page’; it now stands 
for Hypertext Pre-processor - a recursive backronym). It is used mainly for 
the Server side. 
 
b. Javascript/JQuery {‘JQuery’ stands for Java Query (Library)}; used 
mainly for the Client side. 
 
c. MySQL database {‘My’ Structured Query Language; a Relational 
Database Management System (RDBMS} and Apache.  
 
d. HTML (HyperText Markup Language) - this is used as the backbone 
or structural framework for the programme. 
 
e. CSS (Cascading Style Sheets – a new feature being added to HTML) 
– used for styling to give the website a better outlook. 
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f. XAMPP Server (for a computer-based server), using Apache web 
server application; this runs together with MySQL database. 
 
g. Eclipse IDE (for a computer-based server) – it is an Integrated 
programme Development Environment. 
 
h. Random Integer Generator (In-built in PHP – used in place of 
Shamir’s shared secret keys in the CDRSAS-PT system to improve 
security). 
 
 
1. Projected Capabilities 
 
The projected capabilities of the CDRSAS-DT could be summarised as follows 
– it will: 
 
a. Register an *29Organisation, a *Sharer (Sender, Transmitter or 
Administrator) or a User (Sharee, Recipient or Participant) at any time; 
with requisite corporate/personal information. The projected organogram 
of the hierarchical family tree for the projected CDRSAS-DT is in Figure 8-
1, attached herein. 
 
b. Create a *group of Sharers (the CDRSAS-PT has only one Sharer, 
who also doubles as the Admin). 
 
c. *Send a confirmation email to a designated email address for the 
Registrar (e.g., hamummadu2k7@yahoo.com) and the registered, on 
registration. 
 
d. Create Shares within a time window; with start time and end time. 
 
e. Transact in a session which is valid only within a time window; i.e., 
while registration could take place any time, the 
sharing/distribution/transmission, storing and unlocking of the 
shared/distributed/transmitted or stored secret item (text or document file) 
could only be accomplished within the time window (between the start time 
and end time; the limits of the time window is as configured by the Admin 
– it can be modified, as long as the window exists). 
 
f. Display the received or unlocked message for view by the authorised 
User (s) only; this is to be viewed or downloaded once only. 
 
g. Make Shares (message transmission sessions) to all or selected 
Users (collective or discriminatory sharing/communication). 
 
h. Authorise all or selected Users only to view the sent/shared or stored 
message. 
 
i.  Start operation only after the Quorum has been configured; with one 
or more number of Users specified {Figure ‘1’ is the default number of 
User (s) for the Quorum}. Depending on the configuration, the CDRSAS 
could serve as follow: 
                                                     
29
*Capabilities which are not available in the Prototype (CDRSAS-PT); available only in the projected Deployment 
Type (CDRSAS-DT). 
273 
 
 
(1)  If the total number of User (s) is set to ‘1’, it facilitates the use 
of the CDRSAS-DT as a web-based storage facility (i.e., a secure 
cloud data repository) or a point-to-point (one-to-one) secure data 
transmission system, depending on the duration of the time window; 
 
(2)  If the total number of Users is anything from 5 and above, and 
the Quorum is set to some reasonable number of Users (e.g., 5 
Users), with only one or a few (e.g., 2 or 3) Users designated as 
‘Authorised Users’, it facilitates the use of the CDRSAS-DT as a 
Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme or a discriminatory data 
broadcaster; 
 
(3)  If the total number of Users in a session is any size but the 
number of Authorised Users is equal to the total number of Users, 
and the Quorum being set to any reasonable number, this facilitates 
the use of the CDRSAS-DT as a data broadcaster; and  
 
(4)  In all the configurations, depending on the time window, the 
CDRSAS-DT would serve as a web-based storage facility (i.e., a 
secure cloud data repository) and secure data transmitter. 
 
j. Choose both secret texts and *files or *either of the two to send, 
share or store (in a cloud data repository); either on a wired/wireless 
network or website. 
 
k. Select an appropriate security classification; including ULTRA 
SECRET. 
 
l. *Assign a Share name; a name given to each transaction session in 
order to be able to distinguish one Share session from another. 
 
m. *Configure a post-share options; either delete or save. 
 
n. *Display the list of available pending Shares, if any. 
 
o. *Display the list of Shares; with notifications as to whether there are 
Shares to be unlocked (for that day/date) or not. 
 
p. *Go back to a Share that has been completed but waiting to be 
unlocked, within its time window, and edit its settings. 
 
q. Allow a User to edit his personal data; *subject to confirmation by the 
Admin (Administrator). 
 
 
2. Security Features 
 
The security features of the CDRSAS-DT will include the following: 
 
a. Use of Password that is encrypted with SHA-1 encryption (MD5 for 
the CDRSAS-PT). 
 
b. GPS coordinates; the system employs the browser to acquire its geo-
location tag, which is delivered to the User to be used for authentication. 
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c. SMS Authentication Code; using HTTP protocol – possible only when 
the Server is connected to the Internet. 
 
d. Randomly generated key (using a random key generator); it is a one-
time key which is destroyed after usage. The CDRSAS-PT originally used 
the Shamir’s key that is derived from the encrypted output of the original 
message itself; this could be of security concern when homomorphic 
encryption becomes a reality. 
 
e. Use of Username. 
 
f. The FTP access to the Server (Website) is disabled; via Server 
configuration. 
 
g. The secret text is encrypted (SHA-1). 
 
 
 
5. Operations from Login to Logout 
 
The operations that may take place within the system from Login to Logout 
could be summarised as follow: 
 
a. On login, the system calls the database to check if the login details 
are correct. 
 
b. If all the login details are correct, a User Profile is created and added 
to the session. This will display the correct web page with three options; 
namely, a web page for an *Organisation, a *Sharer and User. 
 
c. Logging in as an Organisation – If one logs in as an Organisation, 
one can create Sharers.  
 
d. Logging in as a Sharer – If one logs in as a Sharer, one can create 
Users and set up Shares among them (the Users). When a Share is made, 
it is set up in the database; this creates a randomly generated one-time 
authentication key and a one-time mobile SMS verification code. These 
are stored in the session. 
 
e. Logging in as a User – If one logs in as a User, one would see the 
following: 
 
(1) One’s pending Shares, if any; if it is within the time window.  
 
(2) Unlock Share instructions, if one has any pending Share (s); 
provided it is within the time window. 
 
(3) One would not see anything, if one had no pending Share (s), 
or if the time window had expired. 
 
f. Creating or Setting Up a Share Session -  For a User to be able to 
participate in a Share or Transmission/Communication session, after the 
Admin has configured the system and declared the Share session open, it 
would require the following: 
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(1) The randomly generated one-time authentication key sent to 
the User (s) from the Admin (Server); either via the CDRSAS system 
or any other means of communication – e.g., email (for now, it is 
designed to be sent through the system); 
 
(2)  The randomly generated one-time mobile SMS verification 
code sent to the User (s) via HTTP POST Request; 
 
(3) The GPS coordinates; popped up by the browser of the User (s) 
from its geo-location tag; and 
 
(4) All of the data enumerated above must be entered by the User 
(s) within the time window and checked, for accuracy, by the system, 
in addition to other login details like the username and password. If 
all the details are correct, then, a successful Share is created, with a 
successful message displayed (Share Status: Successful). This flags 
the Share to be unlocked. 
 
(5) The unlocking of the Share must be accomplished within the 
time window; if the time window expires, it will not be possible to 
unlock the Share. If any of the above data is incorrect, or it is not 
entered before the time window expires, an unsuccessful Share will 
result, with an error message displayed. 
 
g. Unlocking Shares (Receiving Transmitted Messages) – In order 
for one to be able to unlock a Share, one must not only be a registered 
User in the system, but must have also taken part in creating or setting up 
the particular Share session. The process of unlocking a Share requires 
the following: 
 
(1) The User enters own GPS coordinates, one-time key and SMS 
authentication code. The system checks to see if all other Users 
have completed their shares, and also entered their unlocking 
details. When all the data entries (i.e., password, username, key, 
GPS and SMS code) are correct and the Quorum is satisfied within 
the time window, the Share can then be unlocked;  
 
(2) Only the Authorised User (s) can unlock the secret data or 
transmitted message/document file. 
 
(3) When unlocked, the received data/file can be 
viewed/downloaded (either see an on-screen message or a link to 
download an attachment) by the Authorised User (s) only once. 
 
(4) Thereafter, the post-Share option configuration (action; either to 
delete or save the Share session) is automatically activated. 
 
(5) If any of the details is incorrect, or the Quorum is not met within 
the time window, the Share cannot be unlocked; an on-screen failure 
message will be displayed instead. 
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6.   Conclusion 
 
As briefly illustrated above, the CDRSAS-DT will be a secure web-based 
service, to be designed with the security industry in focus. It will be designed to 
handle secret data communications in large organisational or industrial settings 
with a global reach. However, it will be so versatile that it could also handle 
normal routine correspondences, and even serve as a secure cloud data 
repository, both for individual users and organisations. All these will be in 
addition to its unique function as a secure Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme. 
Although some level of computer literacy will be required of users, a basic 
introductory training would suffice to enable effective handling of the system by 
most users. When implemented, the system will be tested for sustainable high-
volume traffic operations before presentation to the public. Public presentation 
is expected to create room for the accommodation of further modifications in its 
features. 
 
 
Bradford, UK       MIU ADEKA  
July 2015       Doctoral Research Student 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-1. A Projected Organogram for the Cloud Data Repository Secure 
Access Scheme – Deployment Type (CDRSAS-DT) 
  
1 ≤  n  ≤ ∞ 
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Abstract. This paper reviews the context of technology in the overall network security 
system. This is done with a view to finding out its singular effectiveness in cyber 
defence. Security solutions have a technological component but security is 
fundamentally a people problem. This is because a security system is only as strong as 
its weakest link, while the weakest link of any security system is the human 
infrastructure. In this regard, the significance of social engineering as a tool for cyber 
defence has been underplayed, compared to technological tools like cryptography.  
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Abstract 
 
A realisation of the relationships among the security terms threat, vulnerability and risk, 
led to a perception of inconsistency about the security assessment procedure in the 
defence and public security industry in Nigeria. This is a practice whereby threat 
analysis is usually over-emphasised to the detriment of vulnerability and risk analyses. 
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An original misconception surrounding the term analysis, as employed in the 
Intelligence Cycle, and its opposite counterpart, synthesis, was suspect. This paper was 
designed to sort out the technical relationship between analysis and synthesis, with a 
view to exploiting the implications optimally.  
 It was revealed that the two terms are opposite in meaning but need to be 
intricately inter-woven in their employment as evaluation techniques. Unfortunately, 
most intelligence and security “analysts” embark on analysis with little or no idea about 
synthesis, thus muddling up the two concepts to the advantage of analysis. This original 
misconception led to a culture of non-systematism and haphazardness in the intelligence 
assessment procedure. This culture was transmitted, in situ, from intelligence ‘analysis’ 
to security ‘analysis.’ Thus, the terms vulnerability and risk in security assessment 
suffer an almost identical fate with synthesis. It is the same reason that is most probably 
responsible for the divergence in the security assessment procedure between the public 
and private segments of the security industry. 
The implications of this anomaly include the virtual disappearance of synthesist in 
the global professional vocabulary of intelligence and security organisations, except for 
India; with resultant inconsistencies in the definition of intelligence analysis, and a 
culture of lack of systematism and accountability in the security assessment procedure. 
It is proposed that the phrase intelligence analysis, as employed in intelligence 
processing, should be replaced with intelligence synthesis. Intelligence  
products should be made amenable to re-evaluation and accountability. In military and 
security operations, the object of security assessment should be risk analysis, as opposed 
to threat analysis. Newly suggested terminologies are analosynthesis, synthonalysis and 
equisynalysis. Similarly, thesis, as a synonym of dissertation, should be replaced with 
synthesis. 
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Abstract - Passwords are the most popular and constitute the first line of defence in 
computer-based security systems; despite the existence of more attack-resistant 
authentication schemes. In order to enhance password security, it is imperative to strike 
a balance between having enough rules to maintain good security and not having too 
many rules that would compel users to take evasive actions which would, in turn, 
compromise security. It is noted that the human factor is the most critical element in the 
security system for at least three possible reasons; it is the weakest link, the only factor 
that exercises initiatives, as well as the factor that transcends all the other elements of 
the entire system. This illustrates the significance of social engineering in security 
designs, and the fact that security is indeed a function of both technology and human 
factors; bearing in mind the fact that there can be no technical hacking in vacuum. This 
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paper examines the current divergence among security engineers as regards the rules 
governing best practices in the use of passwords: should they be written down or 
memorised; changed frequently or remain permanent? It also attempts to elucidate the 
facts surrounding some of the myths associated with computer security. This paper 
posits that destitution of requisite balance between the factors of technology and factors 
of humanity is responsible for the purgatory posture of password security related 
problems. It is thus recommended that, in the handling of password security issues, 
human factors should be given priority over technological factors. The paper proposes 
the use of the (k, n)-Threshold Scheme, such as the Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme, to 
enhance the security of the password repository. This presupposes an inclination 
towards writing down the password: after all, Diamond, Platinum, Gold and Silver are 
not memorised; they are stored. 
 
Keywords – technology; cryptography; computer security; social engineering; 
human hacking; socio-cryptanalysis; password;  password repository; purgatory 
 
 
4. Password Security Awareness in African Countries within the Context of 
Password Security Purgatory {published by Dline Journals: Journal of Information 
Security Research - Journal cover attached on Page 278 
(http://www.dline.info/index.php/about-us; www.iccat2013.org)}. 
 
Authors 
 
Muhammad Adeka, Simon Shepherd, Raed Abd-Alhameed 
School of Engineering, Design and Technology, University of Bradford, Bradford, 
West Yorkshire, BD7 1DP, United Kingdom 
{M.I.Adeka@student.,S.J.Shepherd@,R.A.A.Abd@}Bradford.ac.uk 
 
Abstract – In spite of the existence of more attack-resistant authentication schemes, 
passwords are the most popular means of access control. They also constitute the first 
line of defence in cyber-based security systems. Unfortunately, the twin problem of 
multiplicity of passwords combined with destructive human factors has resulted in 
numerous rules which have made password management cumbersome. The resultant 
evasive tendency on the part of users has created a divergence among security experts. 
Using a survey, this paper examines the level of password security awareness in Africa, 
vis a vis the current divergence among security engineers as regards the rules governing 
best practices in the use of passwords: should they be written down or memorised; 
changed frequently or remain permanent? It also proposes a possible way out in respect 
of the password security purgatory phenomenon. It is posited that, in order to enhance 
password security, there should be a delicate balance between having enough rules to 
maintain good security and not having too many rules that would compel users to take 
evasive actions; i.e., human factors should be given priority over technological factors. 
The password security survey further confirmed the fear that most Internet users are 
inclined to choosing passwords that are both meaningful and easily remember-able. 
Similarly, in Africa, and probably most developing countries, senior executives are less 
security conscious compared to their subordinates, as regards password related matters. 
The paper proposes the use of the (k, n)-Threshold Scheme, such as the Shamir’s secret-
sharing scheme, to enhance the security of the password repository. This presupposes an 
inclination towards writing down the password: they could be stored securely, along 
with other valuables, even where other modern technological facilities are not available. 
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Abstracts 
Security is a function of the trust that is associated with the active variables in a system. 
Thus, the human factor being the most critical element in security systems, the security 
perimeter could be defined in relation to the human trust level.  Trust level could be 
measured via positive identification of the person/device on the other side of the 
interaction medium, using various authentication schemes; location-based being one of 
the latest. As for the location-based services, the identity of a customer remains hazy as 
long as his location is unknown; he virtually remains a ghost in the air, with 
implications on trust.  This paper reviews the various location-based authentication 
techniques with a focus on the role that GPS could play in optimising this authentication 
approach. It advocates the urgent need to make all transmission devices GPS-compliant 
as a way forward, despite the privacy issues that might arise. 
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Abstract. The degree of insecurity occasioned by fraudulent practices in Nigeria 
has been of great concern economically, especially as it relates to overseas 
transactions. This paper was designed to mitigate this problem for Nigeria and 
countries with similar dispositions. Based on a survey involving field trip to 
Nigeria, the paper examines the general security situation in Nigeria and its 
mutual impacts with computerisation, miniaturisation and Location-Based 
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Authentication (LBA). It was discovered that both computerisation and 
miniaturisation had some negative effects on cyber-security, as these were being 
exploited by fraudsters, especially using ‘advance fee fraud;’ popularly called 
419. As a countermeasure, the research examined the possibility of using LBA 
and further digitisation of the GSM Mobile country codes down to City/Area 
codes along with GSM Mobile/Global Positioning System (GPS) 
authentications. Where necessary, these could be combined with the use of a 
web-based Secret Sharing Scheme for services with very high security demands. 
The anticipated challenges were also examined and considered to be of 
negligible impacts; especially roaming. 
 
Keywords: Cyberspace, Computerisation, Miniaturisation, Authentication, 
Advance Fee Fraud (419), Digitisation and Tele-density. 
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Abstract 
The state of insecurity occasioned by fraudulent practices in Africa has been of 
concern economically, both at home and abroad. This paper was designed to 
mitigate this problem, using Nigeria as a case study. Based on a survey in West 
Africa, the paper examines the security situation in the continent and its mutual 
impacts with computerisation, miniaturisation and Location-Based Authentication 
(LBA). It was discovered that computerisation and miniaturisation had negative 
effects on cyber-security, as these were being exploited by fraudsters, using 
advance fee fraud; called 419. As a countermeasure, the research examined the 
possibility of using LBA and digitisation of the GSM Mobile country codes down 
to City/Area codes along with GSM/GPS authentications. These could also be 
combined with the use of a web-based Secret Sharing Scheme for services with 
very high security demands. The anticipated challenges were also examined and 
considered to be of negligible impacts; e.g., roaming. 
Keywords: cyberspace, computerisation, miniaturisation, authentication, advance 
fee fraud (419), digitisation and tele-density. 
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Abstract - The Versatile and Ubiquitous Secret Sharing System, a cloud data 
repository secure access and a web based authentication scheme. It is designed to 
implement the sharing, distribution and reconstruction of sensitive secret data that 
could compromise the functioning of an organisation, if leaked to unauthorised 
persons. This is carried out in a secure web environment, globally. It is a threshold 
secret sharing scheme, designed to extend the human trust security perimeter. The 
system could be adapted to serve as a cloud data repository and secure data 
communication scheme. A secret sharing scheme is a method by which a dealer 
distributes shares of a secret data to trustees, such that only authorised subsets of 
the trustees can reconstruct the secret. This paper gives a brief summary of the 
layout and functions of a 15-page secure server-based website prototype; the main 
focus of a PhD research effort titled ‘Cryptography and Computer 
Communications Security: Extending the Human Security Perimeter through a 
Web of Trust’. The prototype, which has been successfully tested, has globalised 
the distribution and reconstruction processes. 
Keywords – authentication; secret sharing; cryptography; key management; 
interpolation; authorised user; human security perimeter; (k, n)-threshold; 
participants (trustees); dealer or distributor; combiner; cloud data repository 
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Chapter Summary 
(Chapter 1 – Telecommunication Network Security)  
 
Our global age is practically defined by the ubiquity of the Internet; the worldwide 
interconnection of cyber networks that facilitates accessibility to virtually all ICT and 
other elements of critical infrastructural facilities, with a click of a button. This is 
regardless of the user’s location and state of equilibrium; whether static or mobile. 
However, such interconnectivity is not without security consequences.  
A telecommunication system is indeed a communication system with the 
distinguishing key word, the Greek tele-, which means "at a distance," to imply that 
the source and sink of the system are at some distance apart. Its purpose is to 
transfer information from some source to a distant user; the key concepts being 
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information, transmission and distance.  These would require a means, each, to 
send, convey and receive the information with safety and some degree of 
fidelity that is  acceptable to both the source and the sink.  
Chapter K begins with an effort to conceptualise the telecommunication network 
security environment, using relevant ITU-T
31*
 recommendations and terminologies for 
secure telecommunications. 
The chapter is primarily concerned with the security aspect of computer-
mediated telecommunications. Telecommunications should not be seen as an isolated 
phenomenon; it is a critical resource for the functioning of cross-industrial businesses 
in connection with IT. Hence, just as information, data or a computer/local computer-
based network must have appropriate level of security, so also a telecommunication 
network must have equivalent security measures; these may often be the same as or 
similar to those for other ICT resources, e.g., password management. 
In view of the forgoing, the chapter provides a brief coverage of the subject matter 
by first assessing the context of security and the threat landscape. This is followed by an 
assessment of telecommunication network security requirements; identification of 
threats to the systems, the conceivable counter or mitigating measures and their 
implementation techniques. These bring into focus various cryptographic/crypt 
analytical concepts, vis a vis social engineering/socio-crypt analytical techniques and 
password management.  
The chapter noted that the human factor is the most critical factor in the security 
system for at least three possible reasons; it is the weakest link, the only factor that 
exercises initiatives, as well as the factor that transcends all the other elements of the 
entire system. This underscores the significance of social engineering in every facet of 
security arrangement.  It is also noted that password security could be enhanced, if a 
balance is struck between having enough rules to maintain good security and not having 
too many rules that would compel users to take evasive actions which would, in turn, 
compromise security. The chapter is of the view that network security is inversely 
proportional to its complexity. In addition to the traditional authentication techniques, 
the chapter gives a reasonable attention to location-based authentication. The chapter 
concludes that security solutions have a technological component, but security is 
fundamentally a people problem. This is because a security system is only as strong as 
its weakest link, while the weakest link of any security system is the human 
infrastructure. 
A projection for the future of telecommunication network security postulates that, 
network security would continue to get worse unless there is a change in the prevailing 
practice of externality or vicarious liability in the computer/security industry; where 
consumers of security products, as opposed to producers, bear the cost of security 
ineffectiveness. It is suggested that all transmission devices be made GPS-compliant, 
with inherent capabilities for location-based mutual authentication. This could enhance 
the future of telecommunication security.  
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